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ABSTRACT
Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy and the Politics of U.S. International Investment
Agreements

By

Jesse Liss

Advisor: Dr. Paul Attewell
Previous sociological studies on U.S. trade policy institutions concluded that “free trade”
political actors had durable power to determine U.S. trade policy. This conclusion was proven
wrong when the Trump administration promised “a new direction” and to implement an
“America First” trade policy. My dissertation serves to explain the U.S.’ political transition away
from “free trade” and towards “nationalist” trade policy. I do this by examining the politics of
U.S. international investment agreements, which are central to U.S. trade policy. As case studies,
I use the investment agreements from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which are the first and most recent U.S. free trade
agreements with developing countries, although the U.S. is no longer a member of the TPP. I use
a qualitative method called “process tracing” to document their negotiations, in which competing
actors became either policy-makers or policy-takers. I show how and why “free trade” political
actors successfully negotiated and implemented the NAFTA, and how and why “free traders”
unsuccessfully implemented the TPP in the U.S. I conclude that U.S. trade and investment
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agreements had polarizing effects in the U.S., which empowered “nationalists” and social
movements to force major revisions to U.S. trade policy.
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I. Introduction
In a 2011 Senate Hearing just before the U.S. hosted the annual heads of state
meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, ranking Senators and business
leaders commiserated over declining U.S. market shares in the Asia-Pacific due to the
lack of free trade agreements (FTAs) with the region in relation to U.S. competitors.
Official Peter Scher represented the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the
government agency that coordinates trade policy. Scher responded that domestic political
conflicts constrained the USTR’s ability to make trade deals. Scher was opining the fact
that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a FTA the USTR was negotiating with countries
in the Asia-Pacific, was so unpopular in Congress that the Obama administration lacked
Congressional mandate to negotiate the TPP, which was the first time in over thirty years
that a Presidential administration negotiated a FTA without Congress’ authority. Scher
revealed that domestic politics are “very relevant” to the USTR and the business
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community, who are highly cognizant about popular concerns that “globalization [helps] some,
but not the masses” (cited in Senate 2011).
Five years later, reality television star Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential election
by promising to empower the white working class in swing states. Trump’s trade promises
became a symbol for his nationalism. At Trump’s 2016 campaign rally in Ohio, while wearing a
red hat with his campaign slogan “Make America Great Again,” he declared, “The Trans-Pacific
Partnership is another disaster done and pushed by special interests who want to rape our
country, just a continuing rape of our country. That’s what it is, too. It’s a harsh word: It’s a rape
of our country.” Trump’s “nationalist” trade promises were a stark contrast to the “free trade”
policy norms in Washington.
Since at least 1986, when the U.S. began to negotiate the establishment of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), U.S. trade policy reflected “free trade” doctrine. “Free trade”
policies refer to a set of institutions and legal norms that seek to establish a market-based
governance of the global economy. Since the WTO came into force in 1995 and up until the
Trump administration took office in 2016, “free trade” political actors had the institutional power
to determine U.S. trade policy (Chorev 2007; Dreiling & Darves 2016). During this time,
competing political actors, including “nationalists” and social movements, were marginalized
from U.S. trade institutions and they had only trivial victories over the “free traders.” In that
context, “free trade” proponents championed the TTP as the largest comprehensive FTA in
history. However, in 2017, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the deal. He promised to
implement an “America First” trade policy, guided by “nationalism” first and “free trade”
second. If the “free traders” had such strong institutional control over U.S. trade policy, how did
they lose the TPP? Why did the “nationalists” gain the political power to write U.S. trade policy?
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II.A. A sociological perspective
Studies on economic globalization are done by economists or political scientists and
sociologists, and each have different methodologies and make distinct contributions to the field.
Broadly, economists offer “structuralist” approaches, in which economic globalization is
determined by technological change and market conditions. Political scientists and sociologists
prefer “institutionalist” approaches, which focus on the political actors and institutions that
condition processes of economic globalization.
“Structuralist” approaches to economic globalization are done by trade economists who
measure and model international trade and finance. However, the legal content of trade policy,
trade agreements, and trade institutions relate to issues of governance of the global economy, and
governance is not just about economics but also politics. Economic and “structuralist” research
lacks political analysis of the role of trade policy and trade institutions in international
governance. For this reason, economists tend to conflate “nationalist” trade orientations and
social movements with trade “protectionism,” which is an irrational departure from the universal
benefits of “free trade.” According to the Trump administration, “nationalist” trade policy is
actually about prioritizing national sovereignty over multilateral trade institutions, which is not a
traditional topic in economics (USTR 2017: 1-3). As President Trump’s appointee for USTR,
Robert Lighthizer, explained to Congress, “The definition of protectionism is shifting.”
Conversely, social movements that seek to alter globalization argue that trade policy should be
revised to prioritize workers, consumers, and the environment over corporate profits. Since
“structuralist” research does not focused on the politics of the governance of trade, “structuralist”
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research on trade policy must be complemented by “institutionalist” analyses of trade
institutions.
Political scientists and sociologists provide “institutionalist” approaches to economic
globalization, which investigate the actors and institutions that shape globalization, its scope, and
its pace. My study is an “institutionalist” analysis of the shift from past U.S. “free trade” policies
to Trump’s “America First” trade policy. Contrary to “structuralist” assumptions that Trump’s
“nationalism” is trade protectionism, I argue that people who voted for Trump based on his
campaign promises on trade policy had rational concerns about trade. Actors and institutions
from across the political spectrum argued that past “free trade” policies had prioritized the
interests of multinational corporations (MNCs) over national interests. In the 2016 Presidential
elections, Trump harnessed these sentiments for his political advantage. Therefore, an
“institutionalist” analysis is necessary to understand the political transition from a “free trade” to
a “nationalist” trade policy, and its consequences.

II.B. Existing “institutionalist” approaches to U.S. trade Policy
In The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal Was Done (2000), political scientists Maxwell
Cameron and Brian Tomlin detailed the NAFTA negotiations to explain the outcome of the final
agreement. Cameron and Tomlin provided not only a historical account of the negotiations, but
they reflected on negotiating strategies and processes, and the role of institutions in shaping
bargaining outcomes. They conclude that negotiations were shaped by power asymmetries
between the three countries, the structure of domestic political institutions, and differences in the
non-agreement alternatives. Similarly, in Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political
Analysis (1998), political scientist Frederick Mayer presented a U.S.-centric analysis of the
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NAFTA negotiations and ratification. Mayer’s focus was the politics of support and opposition
for the NAFTA and he offered a political analysis of the relative success and failure of
negotiating strategies in particular contexts.
Both analyses offer insights into the NAFTA negotiating dynamics that produced wins
and losses for different actors. However, neither account explains the origins and motivations the
legal content of the NAFTA and the original authors of those policies. In broad terms, this gap in
the literature was filled by sociologist Nitsan Chorev in her book Remaking U.S. Trade Policy:
From Protectionism to Globalization (2007). Chorev focused on the domestic institutional
arrangements that affected the U.S.’ scope and pace of integration with the global economy,
which is particularly relevant because the U.S. has been a global trade policymaker. She argued
that trade protectionists controlled U.S. trade policy for a century and a half, so throughout the
twentieth century “free traders” had to overcome formidable political resistance from
protectionists. She demonstrated that, “…the more consequential political struggles focused not
on substantive policies but rather on [‘free traders’] changing the institutional arrangements in
place, that is, the rules and procedures that govern how future policies would be formulated and
implemented” (2007: 7). In so doing, the “free traders” successfully installed institutional
arrangements that contained the political influence of “protectionists,” thereby providing “free
traders” with the structural political power to implement trade policy. In political economist Jane
Kelsey’s book, Serving Whose Interests?: The Political Economy of Trade in Services
Agreements (2008), she documented that in order for U.S. MNCs to intellectually justify their
trade policy proposals in key areas, they had to change the public and pedagogical discourse on
trade.
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Building on Chorev and Kelsey’s findings, in the book Agents of Neoliberal
Globalization: Corporate Networks, State Structures, and Trade Policy (2016), sociologists
Michael C. Dreiling and Derek Darves theoretically and empirically demonstrate the regulatory
capture of U.S. trade policy by U.S. MNCs. They focused on the institutional alliances between
MNCs and national and international trade agencies, which enabled MNCs to shape international
markets using trade policy. In parallel, political scientists Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin combined
a “structuralist” and “institutionalist” perspective in their book, The Making of Global
Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire (2012). They argued that the post-war
internationalization of U.S. MNCs meant that they became increasingly dependent upon crossborder inputs and outputs. Gindin and Panitch argue, “This increased pressures on states to
support the ‘constitutionalization’ of free trade and capital movements through both bilateral and
multilateral agreements that effectively protected the assets and profits of MNCs around the
world” (2012: 10). Since MNCs are the main importer and exporter of capital, U.S. MNCs
became the “key vehicle” for the diffusion of U.S. policy abroad as well as a key source of
domestic economic growth. Therefore, MNCs had the structural power to justify their dominant
role in U.S. trade policymaking.

III. Research Questions
The purpose of past investigations into the NAFTA negotiations were to not only to
provide historical documentation of the negotiations, but to explain the outcomes in terms of
power relations (Mayer 1998; Cameron & Tomlin 2000). However, these studies exclusively
focused on the negotiations and not the legal content of the agreements. In my study, I identify
the origins of the legal content of the NAFTA and TPP investment agreements, and then I detail
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their negotiations. My focuses are the political actors in the negotiations and their interactions
with trade institutions and political processes. I have two main research questions, how and why
did “free trade” actors defeat “nationalists” and social movements in negotiating and
implementing the NAFTA? And, how and why did “nationalists” and social movements defeat
“free trade” actors in implementing the TPP in the U.S.?

IV. The Politics of U.S. International Investment Agreements
There is no consensus among social scientists about the political logic that
motivates U.S. trade policy. There are two competing characterizations of U.S. trade
policy, the first is the theory of comparative advantage, and the second theory purports
that U.S. trade policy is a political project to consolidate class power, called
“neoliberalism.” However, both of these social science theories are focused on the U.S.’
“free trade” initiatives. Neither of the two theories explain the Trump administration’s
“nationalist” revisions to U.S. trade policy. In this section, I outline both existing
theories. Then I rely on Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” theory to reconcile the two
theories with the Trump administration’s “America First” trade policy. Using Polanyi’s
“double movement” theory, I construct three ideal types of U.S. trade policy orientations
- “free trade,” “socialist,” and “nationalist.” Throughout my project I will use these ideal
types of trade policy positions to analyze the political motivations of trade policy actors
in the NAFTA and TPP negotiations.

IV.A. “U.S. FTAs as comparative advantage”
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The WTO claims the theory of comparative advantage as “the single most powerful
insight into economics” (WTO 2016). Former USTR Carla Hills, who negotiated the WTO,
asserted, “[comparative advantage] has successfully guided our bipartisan trade policy for more
than six decades” (2008). Comparative advantage is credited to the early political economist
David Ricardo in his forceful argument against British agricultural protectionism in the early
1800s (Ricardo 1821). Ricardo aimed to prove that free trade was beneficial for all trading
partners. He reasoned that comparative costs determine the gains from trade. When nations trade
the goods that they produce most efficiently then they produce greater world output, even when
one nation has an absolute advantage in producing all tradeable goods. The market ensures that
exports exchange for an equivalent amount of imports, balancing trade. Contemporary trade
theories combine the theory of comparative advantage with economies of scale to model patterns
of trade and investment (Krugman 1979; Baumol & Gomory 2001).
Economists argue that FTAs function to remove barriers to trade such that countries
realize gains from trade and economies of scale (Krugman et. al. 2012: 5). In addition, FTAs
establish international governance institutions, such as the WTO, that facilitate trade. Sociologist
Min Zhou found that the institutions that FTAs create serve to promote trade flows (Zhou 2015).
By removing barriers to trade and creating institutions that facilitate trade, FTAs are a rational
means of raising national incomes. In early-mid 2015, Congress was engaged in a heated debate
concerning “trade promotion authority” which would allow an “up or down” vote for the
implementation of the TPP. The White House published a report on the benefits of FTAs and
claimed that “…the main impact of [TPP] will be to reduce foreign barriers to U.S. exports,
rather than further opening U.S. markets to imports” (White House 2015, emphasis added).
Following this logic, distinguished economist Gregory Mankiw published an op-ed on the vote
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and asserted, “If Congress were to take an exam in Economics 101, would it pass? We
are about to find out” (2015). If an FTA facilitates trade according to comparative
advantages then that trade policy is “rational” because it produces mutual gains, even if
they are very small, and opposition to the FTA is “irrational.”
Economists and political scientists have advanced several explanations of
“irrational” opposition to FTAs. One is the role of money in politics, Congress can be
“bought” for trade policy votes (Grossman & Helpman 1994). Another is a problem of
“collective action.” Trade produces “winners” and “losers,” the “winners” are the public
who experience small gains via reduced consumer prices. The “losers” are importsensitive industries. Since the “losses” are concentrated in import-sensitive industries,
those constituencies become politically organized, but since gains from trade spread out
among the public, then the public is less politically invested in FTAs (Krugman et. al.
2012: 250). Yet another reason are the “mistaken” beliefs of voters who understand that
FTAs bring undesirable foreign competition that increases inequality and destroys jobs
(Caplan 2011; Mankiw 2015).
The theory of comparative advantage explains the universal benefits of free trade
so it is a framework to evaluate trade actions as rational or irrational. However, the
concept of economic rationality has a limited application to twenty-first century trade
issues and their political motivations. The theory of comparative advantage does not
apply to trade policy in two respects, (1) it does not address politically constructed
comparative advantages, and (2) it does not account for the role of trade institutions as
international governance institutions that have authority over public issues that go well
beyond trade.
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The theory of comparative advantage does not offer any assessment of the economic
rationality of comparative advantages that have political determinations rather than market
determinations. For example, currency manipulation creates national comparative advantages
because it reduces the prices of national goods in international markets, thereby promoting
national exports. Candidate Trump promised to label China a currency manipulator, a position
that has bipartisan support in Congress. Currency manipulation falls outside the scope of
comparative advantage because the value of a national currency is the result of political decisions
and not the free market. Yet currency devaluations create comparative advantages. The theory of
comparative advantage offers no insights into to whether trade with a currency manipulator is
economically rational. For that matter, the theory of comparative advantage is silent on the
rationality of trade between nations that have grossly different labor and environmental practices,
which condition their comparative costs. In this context, the theory of comparative advantage can
only offer a limited assessment of the political motivations of trade policy.
Similarly, U.S. trade policy and trade institutions reorganize national authority around
international markets and property claims. In so doing, nations relinquish state sovereignty to
multilateral trade institutions. Multilateral trade institutions gain authority to regulate public
issues that go well beyond trade and the theory of comparative advantage. Ranking Congressman
Sander Levin explained in a House debate over the TPP in 2015,
“What do David Ricardo and Adam Smith have to say about the inclusion
of investor-state dispute settlement in our trade agreements? Nothing, to my
knowledge. What do they have to say about providing a twelve-year monopoly
for the sale of biologic medicines? About the need to ensure that our trading
partners meet basic labor and environmental standards? How about the issue of
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currency manipulation? What does the theory of comparative advantage
have to say about those issues? Absolutely nothing – and yet those are the
issues at the crux of the TPP negotiations today” (Levin 2015).
In short, the theory of comparative advantage focuses narrowly on the concept of
economic rationality, which does not account for much of the political and legal content
of U.S. trade policy. For this reason, the theory of comparative advantage does not
explain the political motivations of the Trump administration’s most pressing trade
priorities - national sovereignty and confronting trading partners that use “unfair” trade
practices (USTR 2017: 1-3).

IV.B. “U.S. FTAs as neoliberalism”
There is a wealth of social sciences literature characterizing FTAs as “neoliberal”
political projects to construct a global economy according to “free market” principles.
Celebrated anthropologist David Harvey defined “neoliberalism,”
“…a theory of political economic practices that proposes that
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free
trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional
framework appropriate to such practices” (2005: 2).
While most studies accept that the U.S. was the principle driving force behind the
construction of “neoliberal” globalization, “neoliberalism” had to emerge in other
countries for a “neoliberal” trading order to institutionalize. Scholars disagree on the
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motivations of neoliberalism in developed and developing countries, or they emphasize different
actors and processes, but there is consensus that U.S. FTAs embody “neoliberal” governance
(Gowan 1999; Sklair 2002; Dumenil & Levy 2004; Harvey 2005; Chorev 2007; Prashad 2013;
Dreiling & Darves 2016).
Sociologist Nitsan Chorev concluded that U.S. FTAs do not simply remove the state from
the market according to free market principles. Rather, U.S. FTAs are political projects that
replace old protectionist institutions with new “neoliberal” institutions (2005; 2007; 2010).
Chorev identified that the main objective of “neoliberal globalism” is to “make national
economic activities competitive in [the] global market…by subjecting domestic constituencies to
market-based rather than state-managed growth strategies” (2005: 320). U.S. FTAs, including
the WTO, are global governance institutions because they establish new forms of authority that
are independent of nation-states yet are binding upon nation-states, including dispute settlement
procedures (Chorev 2005). For sociologist Saskia Sassen, these new forms of authority
established by FTAs reshaped the relationship between the public and private domain such that
public interest regulatory norms became the maximization of market efficiency (2008: 186).
Social scientists arrived at the conclusion that FTAs are neoliberal governance by
studying the political actors in trade policy and the processes and conflicts between them. In the
U.S., FTAs were in the interests of exporters and MNCs and contrary to the interests of labor
unions and import-sensitive industries (Chorev 2010). In the making of U.S. trade policy and
U.S. FTAs, MNCs had to “defeat” working-class interests and protectionist political actors, in so
doing, U.S. FTAs reflect the interests of MNCs (Panitch & Giddin 2012). MNCs from across
economic sectors organized policy organizations and networks, often with members in and out of
trade policymaking positions, so as to design and implement U.S. FTAs (Chorev 2007; Kelsey
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2008; Dreiling & Darves 2011; 2016). In turn, U.S. FTAs inspired new forms of
transnational resistance to them, from labor unions, environmental organizations, and
consumer advocacy groups (Kay 2005; Evans & Kay 2008; Gallagher 2014).
Existing “institutionalist” studies share the conclusion that U.S. MNCs are the
dominant political actor in determining U.S. trade policy, in turn, U.S. MNCs use trade
policy to condition international market outcomes. Sociologist Nitsan Chorev concluded,
“As a result, today’s protectionist sentiments pose little threat to the durability of
economic globalization.” (2007: 11). Prior to the Trump administration, institutional
analyses of U.S. trade policy had concluded that the champions of “free trade” had
successfully captured the most significant trade policy-making institutions. However,
President Trump announced that U.S. trade policy would no longer be determined by
“special interests” but it would be guided by an “America First” nationalism. President
Trump’s withdrawal of the U.S. from the TTP in January, 2017 marked a new direction
in trade policy. The U.S.’ TPP reversal was a decisive defeat of U.S. MNCs and other
“free trade” advocates and it was a victory for “nationalists” and social movements.
Therefore, “free trade” political actors and institutions are not as durable as previous
“institutionalist” studies had concluded. For this, “neoliberalism” can no longer fully
account for the motivations and content of U.S. trade policy and agreements.

V. Karl Polanyi’s “Double Movement” and U.S. Trade Policy Actor
The social sciences literature that have assigned a political logic to U.S. trade
policy are inconsistent with Trump’s “America First” trade policy. I propose that Karl
Polanyi’s “double movement” theory can be used a framework to bridge this gap. Among
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the most cited theoretical investigations into the relationship between states and markets is Karl
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (1944).
Polanyi deconstructed classical liberal economics and its modern incarnations, which rely on
conceptual models of capitalist markets as self-regulating by the “natural” forces of supply and
demand. Polanyi argued, “No market economy separated from the political sphere is possible;
yet it was such a construction which underlay classical economics since David Ricardo and apart
from which its concepts and assumptions were incomprehensible” (2001: 205). Contrary to the
assumptions of free market economics, Polanyi demonstrated that “the economy” is actually a
social and political entity. In Polanyi’s terms, the “free market” is not possible because in every
day practice, capitalist states create, determine, condition, support, and protect markets.
For Polanyi, the implementation of so-called “free market” policies inspired diverse
resistance from political actors seeking protections from market failures and abuses, a conflict he
described as a “double movement.” Polanyi explained, “For a century the dynamics of modern
society was governed by a double movement: the market expanded continuously but this
movement was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions” (2001:
136). Polanyi observed that domestic and international “free market” policies received generous
support from the banking and trading classes, while the working and landed classes sought social
protections and market interventions, including, industry standards, financial regulations, and
labor and environmental protections (2001: 138-9). Polanyi mulled that this contradiction
produced “deep seated institutional strain” within states as conflicting social groups vied for
political power (2001: 140).
Polanyi’s purpose was to demonstrate that the implementation of “free market” policies
led to economic and political crises in 1930s Europe. Polanyi argued that many European nations
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responded to capital flight, rising unemployment, and social and racial tensions by
electing socialist and fascist leaders who promised social protections from unfettered
markets. For Polanyi, socialism was governance guided by subordinating markets to
democratic control, but this threatened private property rights (2001: 242). Conversely,
fascism involved implementing social protections from markets at the expense of the
“extirpation” of democratic institutions (2001: 242). The fascist tradeoff of greater social
protections for less freedom and democracy was justified by nationalism, “The nascent
fascist movement put itself almost everywhere into the service of the national issue; it
could hardly have survived without this ‘pickup’ job” (Polanyi 2001: 249). Therefore,
Polanyi had assigned a logic to fascist governance – nationalist social protections from
market failures in exchange for losses of freedom and democracy. Polanyi concluded that
there may be times and places in which socialists and fascists have similar economic
policies, however, each have opposite principles of freedom and democracy (2001: 267).

V.A. Polanyi’s “Double Movement” as Ideal Types of U.S. Trade Policy Positions
While today’s world is entirely different from Polanyi’s, his “double movement” framework is
still useful. To apply Polanyi’s “double movement” to U.S. trade debates, I constructed ideal
types of U.S. trade policy positions. Ideal types are pure theoretical categories, although they are
rarely empirically observable because in “real life” there are grey areas and overlaps (Weber
1944). Based on Polanyi’s “double movement,” I present three ideal types of U.S. trade policy
orientations - “free trade,” “socialism,” and “nationalism.” All three are different forms of
government control of the economy, albeit with starkly different policy directions. U.S. trade
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policymakers and actors rarely fit an ideal type perfectly due to conflicting political interests and
tradeoffs.

Figure One: Polanyi’s “Double Movement” as Ideal Types of U.S. Trade Policy Positions

V.B. “Free trade” policies
Some sections of U.S. trade deals are concerned with trade in goods and services. There
are strong arguments that the legal content of these sections are organized by the theory of
comparative advantage and other standard free trade principles. However, the majority of the
legal content of U.S. trade deals are regulatory. That is, the legal content relates to issues of
governance. In U.S. FTAs, states succeed sovereignty to international governance institutions,
including, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. In turn, international economic governance
institutions are organized around “free market” principles, in which the regulatory norm is
market efficiency (Sassen 2008). International economic governance institutions embody
market-based governance (Chorev 2007; Sassen 2008). Therefore, the objective of “free trade”
politics are to use FTAs and trade institutions to impose market-based governance, particularly
on developing countries with histories of socialist and nationalist policies.
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V.C. Social Protections
In contrast to “free trade” policies, social protections do not refer to trade
protectionism, which are tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. In Polanyi’s terms, social
protections are ad hoc policies that are intended to protect workers, the environment,
productive industry, and financial stability. In this case, some social protection policies
support free trade while others support trade protectionism. I identify two ideal types of
socially protective trade policy, “socialism” and “nationalism.”

“Socialist” trade policies
Thea Lee, Policy Director of U.S. labor union AFL-CIO, pleaded during a House
hearing on U.S. trade and investment policy in 2009, “…it is important that we clarify
that the interests of the U.S. are not entirely synonymous with the interests of U.S.
MNCs” (cited in House 2009). Since the U.S. began to negotiate the WTO, U.S. MNCs
have been the most significant actor in U.S. trade policy formation while competing
stakeholders have been marginalized, including, labor unions, environmental
organizations, and consumer advocacy groups (Dreiling & Darves 2016). In Thea Lee’s
testimony, she was imploring that trade policy include public interests and not only
private interests. Sociologist Fred Block updated Polanyi’s definition of “socialism” as
“the project of deepening democracy and subjecting the market to democratic control”
(2015: 62). To that end, “socialist” trade policies are formed in democratic processes,
specifically, public trade policy-making institutions that include the input from all
stakeholders and not just U.S. MNCs.
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“Nationalist” trade policies
Soon after taking office, the Trump administration released its rhetorical vision of an
“America First Foreign Policy” (White House 2017). The document accused that past U.S. trade
deals were negotiated in the exclusive interests of the “Washington establishment,” and that
President Trump will implement trade policies to “put America first” (2017). “Nationalist” trade
policies prioritize national interests over multinational interests and national sovereignty over
multilateral governance. The Trump administration’s top two trade policy priorities are, “(1)
defend U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) strictly enforce U.S. trade laws” (USTR
2017: 2). Each represents significant policy breaks from past practice. On the regulatory side, the
USTR’s report asserted that, “…the Trump Administration will aggressively defend American
sovereignty over matters of trade policy” (USTR 2017: 3). The Trump administration’s “2017
Trade Policy Agenda” put considerable emphasis on stressing U.S. sovereignty in relation to the
WTO’s dispute settlement system, setting precedent for the U.S. to ignore WTO rulings that the
Trump administration would consider violations of U.S. sovereignty. On the income side, the
priority to “strictly enforce U.S. trade laws” is setting precedent to use trade remedy laws to
restrict imports from non-market economies that use “unfair trade practices” (read: China).
Protectionist restrictions on China’s imports would be a nationalistic break from past U.S. trade
practice.

VI. Data and Method
Method: process tracing
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To compare these ideal types of trade policy positions to actual trade events, I do a
process tracing of trade negotiations. Process tracing is a qualitative method often used in
political science and international relations, defined by political scientist David Collier as “the
systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research
questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (2011: 823). The method focuses on the
unfolding of events over time by utilizing “diagnostic evidence” at particular moments in time to
explain the outcome of a dependent variable. That is, the causation(s) of a dependent variable are
determined by observing “snapshots” of its development over time. According to Collier, process
tracing is a distinctive methodology in three ways: causal-process observations in which causal
evidence is qualitative, careful description to capture trajectories of change and causation, and
close attention to the sequencing of independent, dependent, and intervening variables.
In my project, the dependent variables are the final texts of the NAFTA and the TPP
investment and financial services chapters. The independent variables are the different political
actors shaping the drafts and negotiating process, such as, negotiating teams and their competing
proposals for the same provisions. I will observe the processes and conflicts between the
different political actors that produced the final agreements. This will provide an understanding
of the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters that goes beyond a face-value
legal analysis and situates the agreements in a comparative, historical, and sociological context.

Data:
Data sources include primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include: draft texts
and competing proposals; press releases; government officials’ letters, reports, documents,
statements; news articles; Congressional testimonies; Congressional research documents;
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stakeholder letters, publications, press releases, and presentations; leaked information from
negotiations, including negotiating documents, notes, and emails. Secondary sources include:
publications on negotiations from third party commentators and analysts.

VI. Outline of the Manuscript
My study builds on existing “institutionalist” studies on U.S. trade policy by offering an
explanation of the transitions of political power in U.S. trade policy, specifically, the switch from
“free trade” policies to “nationalist” trade policies under the Trump administration. I use the
negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP investment
agreements as case studies. The investment agreements of an FTA are the investment chapter
and the financial services chapter. These two chapters facilitate capital flows between the
countries in the FTA, therefore, U.S. investment agreements are core components of U.S. trade
policy and U.S. FTAs.
I will use the investment agreements of the NAFTA and the TPP as case studies to
examine why a U.S. international investment agreement is made or unmade. My focus is how the
politics of support and opposition to these agreements interacted with trade institutions and
political processes. Within these processes and conflicts, competing political actors became
either policy-makers or policy-takers. I will show how and why “free trade” political actors
successfully negotiated and implemented the NAFTA, and how and why “free trade” political
actors unsuccessfully implemented the TPP due to overwhelming political opposition from
“nationalist” and “socialist” actors.
I organize the reminder of the manuscript as follows, in chapter two I present an account
of the historical origins of U.S. international investment policy, its role in trade policy, and the
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stakes of investment negotiations. In chapter three, I present a process tracing of the negotiations
of the investment agreements of the NAFTA, and I offer an analysis of the outcomes in terms of
Polanyi’s “double movement,” in which “free trade” actors triumphed over the “nationalist” and
“socialist” actors in all three countries. In chapter four, I synthesize the economic and regulatory
effects of the NAFTA investment agreements. I will use this information to clarify trade policy
positions and to measure trade rhetoric against trade policy, including Trump’s “America First”
trade policy. In chapter five, I present a process tracing of the negotiations of the investment
agreements of the TPP, and I offer an analysis of the outcomes in terms of Polanyi’s “double
movement,” in which “nationalist” and “socialist” actors defeated the “free trade” actors in the
U.S. In chapter six, I compare the NAFTA and TPP investment agreements to determine the
direction of U.S. investment policy, which offers further clarifications about the stakes of trade
policy debates.
In chapter seven, I conclude using my analysis of the NAFTA and TPP to explain the
political motivations of the Trump administration’s “America First” trade policy. I argue that
after more than twenty years of U.S. FTAs and the WTO, and the collapse of international
markets in 2008 and its long-term effects, voters were seeking social protections from unfettered
“free markets.” In comparison to the “nationalist” actors in the NAFTA negotiations in the early
1990s, I argue that Trump’s “nationalist” trade promises had far more currency with voters in
2016 due to the polarizing effects of U.S. trade and investment agreements. Specifically, as
employment shares shifted from manufacturing to services, the white working class in rust
belt/swing states had the most to lose. By 2016, Trump was the first Republican nominee in over
thirty years to run on a “nationalist” trade policy platform, thereby distinguishing himself from
the “free trade” agenda of the “Washington establishment.” Trump won the vote of the rust belt
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white working class by pledging to empower them with an “America First” foreign policy and
putative immigration and criminal justice polices. Trump’s anti-TPP position had widespread
appeal because of the activism of broad-based coalitions of labor, environmental, and consumer
advocacy groups calling for fundamental reforms to trade policy. In so doing, “nationalist”
political currents and social movements had forced major revisions to U.S. trade policy.
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Chapter Two: Historical Origins of U.S. International Investment Agreements
I.
II.

Introduction
The emergence of the U.S. trade deficit

III.

The making of U.S. trade policy

IV.

Investment policy in U.S. trade policy

V.
VI.

U.S. investment policy and global competitors
Conclusion: the stakes of international investment negotiations

“…no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without
provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefor.”
-U.S. Secretary of State Hull, August, 1938, responding to Mexico’s nationalization of the oil
industry without compensation to U.S. oil companies (emphasis added)

“No Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly
through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (expropriation), except…on
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation”
-TPP Investment Chapter, Article 9.8: Expropriation and Compensation, 2016 (emphasis added)

I. Introduction
In the twenty-first century, in a world of unprecedented global production sharing and
financial integration, how much sovereignty should a state have to design and implement market
regulations? According to Oxford dictionary, sovereignty is “the authority of a state to govern
itself or another state.” A country’s international investment policy addresses the relationship
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between sovereignty and foreign direct investment. The U.S. government’s official position is
codified in the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program, which originated to
replace gunboat diplomacy with developing countries during the Cold War. The USTR, State
Department, and the Treasury integrated the U.S. Model BIT into larger trade policy as a means
of promoting the global market shares of U.S. MNCs and domestic jobs at home. In this chapter,
I provide an account of the origins of the legal content of U.S. international investment
agreements. First, I trace the political origins of the U.S. trade deficit, and then I consider how
U.S. trade policymakers developed trade policy as a response to the growing trade deficit, among
other secondary political considerations. I detail the historical origins of the U.S. Model BIT
program and its integration into U.S. trade policy. Lastly, I provide an overview of the
differences between U.S. international investment policy and those of global competitors, which
explains the stakes of diplomatic conflicts over the legal content of international investment
agreements.

II. The emergence of the U.S. trade deficit
The United State Trade Representative (USTR) is the government agency that
coordinates U.S. trade policy and conducts trade and investment negotiations. Between 1986 and
1994, when the USTR negotiated the World Trade Organization (WTO), a central negotiating
objective mandated to the USTR by Congress was to establish trade and investment rules that
would reduce the U.S. trade deficit.1 By that time, the U.S. had large and growing trade deficits
with East Asia and to a lesser extent Western Europe. Since then, the U.S. trade deficit has
multiplied and it has been a source of much political anxiety and conflict, as politicians and

1

The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1001.
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commentators link chronic trade deficits to loss of jobs, income, industrial competitiveness,
currency wars, and global savings and investment imbalances. As such, U.S. trade policy must
be understood within the context of rising global trade imbalances, which is a multilateral
problem whose causes and effects are fiercely debated among policymakers and analysts.
Karl Polanyi famously articulated that markets are not the “natural” evolution of
capitalists’ animal spirits or an “invisible hand,” but rather markets are products of states and
commercial and political actors (1944). States assume the core responsibilities of constructing,
managing, and protecting capitalist markets, and in so doing they condition distribution. Political
scientists Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin argued, “The role of states in maintaining property rights,
overseeing contracts, stabilizing currencies, reproducing class relations, and containing crises has
always been central to the operation of capitalism” (2012: 1). States, particularly the U.S., were
central to the making of global capitalism. Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, explained, “I take it almost as an article of faith (a faith that in this case can be backed
by facts) that the United States, as the dominant power after World War II and for decades
afterwards, was the driving force toward a liberal trading order and the freedom of international
investment” (Volcker and Gyohten 1992: 288). The diverse and complex motivations of the U.S.
government’s pursuit of a “liberal” world order are beyond the scope of this paper (see Panitch &
Gindin 2012 for a detailed account). The origins of the U.S. trade deficit are policy decisions by
U.S. government officials in the 1970s to secure access to the necessary financing of the trade
deficit. U.S. policymakers formulated trade and investment policy in the context of the growing
U.S. trade deficit.

The Bretton Woods system produced tiny trade imbalances
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Emerging from WWII, there was widespread belief that “free market” policies were
central to both world wars (Silver 2004: 151). Lead by the U.S., the world leaders of the Atlantic
powers met at Bretton Woods to construct multilateral organizations to address international
political economy as a root cause of war (Silver 2004: 151). The principle multilateral
institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) were empowered to coordinate
an international monetary and financial system, finance reconstruction and development, and
promote trade (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 10). The Bretton Woods Accord established an
international monetary system that placed the U.S. dollar at the center of a fixed exchange rate
system, in which all major countries pegged their currencies to the dollar and the dollar was
convertible to gold at $35 an ounce. In essence, the dollar became the ultimate means of payment
as it became the quoted denomination for all major commodities and international debts.
Therefore, the dollar became the global reserve currency as central banks had to hold dollar
reserves for possible intervention in foreign exchange markets to maintain the value of their
currencies (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 118). The dollar’s peg to gold theoretically imposed a
restraint on inflation as the gold standard would act as a check on the dollar supply and the U.S.’
balance of payments (a country’s balance of payments is the sum of its current account and
capital account, which according to standard free trade theory, should eventually sum to zero).
A prerequisite to the dollar standard was the depth, liquidity, expansion, and openness of
U.S. financial markets, such that dollar denominated financial assets provided the necessary
investor confidence to support to the dollar standard. To that end, U.S. government debt (U.S.
Treasury securities) became the most “quality” debt in international money markets and the U.S.
Treasury bill became the foundation for all calculations of value in the global economy (Gindin
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& Panitch 2012: 10). In so doing, the U.S. government institutionalized itself as the world’s
money manager, charged with maintaining universal confidence in the dollar. Until the 1960s,
the dollar standard and the Bretton Woods institutions facilitated strong economic growth in the
U.S. and the development of U.S. financial markets, the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, and
increasing financial integration between the global north and the global south. The U.S.’ political
and military expenditures in the Marshall Plan and Korean War laid the basis for development in
Europe and Japan, and by the 1960s they would emerge as manufacturing competitors in world
markets, which is the reason many commentators conclude that U.S. foreign policy took
precedence over domestic economic development in the post-war period (Gindin & Panitch
2012). Trade imbalances were minuscule compared to more contemporary global imbalances. To
be sure, world trade flows were tiny compared to the twenty-first century, however, the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates imposed a far more stringent balance of payments
constraints on the U.S. and the rest of the world, which led to economic and political constraints
on trade imbalances.

Crisis of Bretton Woods
The shift from an asset-money (gold) to a debt-money (U.S. government bonds)
international monetary system in the first years of the 1970s provided the foundation for the U.S.
to finance its chronic trade and budget deficits that have been multiplying since the 1980s.
Contrary to many academic accounts, the reinvention of the international monetary system was
not was a deliberate plan of U.S. imperialist ambitions. Rather, it was the result of the
unsustainability of Bretton Woods and the culmination of various policy decisions made at the
international level. These events serendipitously permitted U.S. policymakers to adopt a policy
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of “benign neglect” towards the growing budget deficit while securing necessary capital inflows
to cover the growing trade deficit (Hudson 2003). Economist Robert Triffin first formalized the
structural instability of the Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1959. Triffin
testified to Congress that the growth of world trade and capital were outstripping the growth of
the world’s gold supply, which would inevitably lead to a crisis of confidence in the dollar and in
turn the Bretton Woods monetary system (Triffin 1978). Throughout the 1950s, the U.S. was
running relatively small balance of payments deficits, meaning more capital was leaving the U.S.
than entering. Triffin cogently argued that this condition was unsustainable for the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates,
“…if the U.S. corrected its persistent balance of payments deficits, the
growth of world reserves could not be fed adequately by gold production at $35
an ounce, but that if the U.S. continued to run deficits, its foreign liabilities would
inevitably come to exceed by far its ability to convert dollars into gold upon
demand and would bring about a ‘gold and dollar crisis’” (Triffin 1978: 3).
The persistent U.S. balance of payments deficits resulted in the buildup of dollar reserves
in the central banks of Europe and Japan, which were gradually redeeming the dollar reserves for
U.S. gold (IMF 2016). The Kennedy administration made the initial attempts to offset capital
outflows with a mix of policies, including, increasing the U.S. trade surplus, capital controls, and
import taxes (Hudson 2003: 30). However, none of the efforts addressed the underlying
dynamics driving the U.S. balance of payments deficits and by the mid-1960s Triffin’s prophesy
was materializing. The IMF reported, “In 1966, foreign central banks and governments held over
14 billion U.S. dollars. The United States had $13.2 billion in gold reserves, but only $3.2 billion
of that was available to cover foreign dollar holdings. The rest was needed to cover domestic
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holdings” (2016). World leaders and the international financial community feared that the U.S.
would either devalue the dollar, which would cause worldwide deflation and potential social and
political instability, or, stop redeeming gold for dollars, which would permit inflationary
pressures to undermine confidence in the dollar and lead to social and political instability.
Paul Volcker, Undersecretary of the Treasury, led a research and policy group at the
Treasury on the international monetary system and its crisis. On June 23, 1969, the Volcker
Groups issued a confidential memo to President Nixon mulling three alternatives to Bretton
Woods:
“…(a) a series of multilateral negotiations pointing toward a fundamental,
but ‘evolutionary’ change in the existing system; (b) suspension of the present
United States policy of providing for the conversion of dollars held by foreign
monetary authorities at their discretion; and (c) a change, large or small, in the
official price of gold” (Volcker Group 1969: 22).
The Volcker Group established that the U.S. budget deficits paid for the U.S.’ Cold War
military and political expenses overseas as well as domestic economic policy (1969: 7). This
U.S. budget deficit provided the rest of the world with dollars to sustain an international
payments system and a multilateral trading order. In so doing, the U.S. was able to base its
economic leadership on the international role of the dollar, however, this came at the cost of
substantial borrowing from surplus countries in the form of short-term dollar liabilities (Volcker
Group 1969: 7). Simultaneous to the growing U.S. budget deficits, the U.S. was moving from a
trade surplus to a trade deficit state. The Volcker Group identified two fundamental causes of
this trade shift – domestic inflation and growing industrial competition from abroad (1969: 18).
Therefore, with a growing trade deficit, for the U.S. to achieve an equal balance of payments, it
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would need to attract capital inflows. The memo argued that without an equal balance of
payments, the U.S. would have faced severe consequences in its ability to borrow in the future
and it would have undermined the U.S.’ economic leadership and negotiating strength. Above
all, the Volcker Group stipulated, “For both the period immediately ahead and the medium-term
future, the dominant factor affecting the evolution of the international monetary system (and our
success in guiding that evolution) will be our ability to contain domestic inflationary forces”
(1969: 19).
An internal memo among the Nixon administration’s high-level staff revealed that their
objective was to “reassert [U.S.] leadership of international economic and trade policy”
(McCracken 1971:7). The memo outlined that “great market strength” for the dollar and globally
competitive industries were “indispensable” conditions for international political leadership
(McCracken 1971:7). To achieve both of these objectives the Nixon administration first
negotiated the international financing of both the U.S. budget deficit, and then negotiated a
revaluation of the currencies of surplus countries.

Financing the growing budget deficit
As explained by economist Michael Hudson, to finance the growing budget deficit the
Nixon administration had “to induce the central banks and treasuries of foreign countries to
refrain from cashing in any more dollars for gold, but to accumulate dollar assets in growing
amounts, whatever their fears regarding the stability of the dollar” (2003: 263). To that end, the
Nixon administration adopted a number of policy positions: to reach political agreements with
surplus countries such that they would not buy U.S. gold; to end dollar-gold convertibility; to
demonetize gold. The Treasury had made various political agreements with surplus countries
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such that they would invest in illiquid (non-marketable) U.S. government debt (U.S. Treasury
bills) instead of using their surplus to buy U.S. gold reserves (Hudson 2003: 264-5). Beginning
in the early 1960s, the Treasury made such agreements with Canada, Western European
countries, and Japan. For example, according to the president of Germany’s central bank, in
1971, the U.S. Treasury “implicitly” threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from West Germany [in
1968] if the German central bank did not renounce its rights to convert surplus dollars into
American gold (cited in Hudson 2003: 288). However, by the late 1960s, Europe and Japan had
little choice but to hold U.S. Treasury bills because the size of their U.S. Treasury bill holdings
exceeded the total U.S. gold holdings (Hudson 203: 264).
The June, 1969 memo from the Volcker Group to President Nixon proposed suspending
the Bretton Woods dollar-gold convertibility. The memo detailed that the main objective was to
strengthen the U.S.’ negotiating position because it would present surplus countries with
“essentially unpalatable alternatives” as they would have to either “passively hold dollars or
permit a gradual appreciation of their currencies” (1969: 38). That is, if the U.S. closed the gold
window and Europe, Japan, and other surplus countries chose not to hold and accumulate dollar
assets thereafter, then they would devalue the dollar. This would provide U.S. exporters with a
competitive devaluation while reducing the value of surplus countries’ dollar assets. Therefore,
the Volcker Group endorsed suspending dollar-gold convertibility. They surmised, “If
successfully carried off, the United States would retrieve for itself a very substantial degree of
flexibility in financing future balance of payments deficits and would remain in an extremely
strong position for guiding future changes in the international monetary system” (1969: 38).
Nixon eventually did close the gold window on August 15, 1971 (discussed below).
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In so doing, the Nixon administration effectively told the rest of the world that the U.S.
balance of payments deficit and the dollar was their own problem, and European leaders termed
the Nixon administration’s approach to the U.S. balance of payments deficit as one of “benign
neglect” (cited in Hudson 2003: 284). Central banks around the world were able to hold U.S.
government debt as reserves because they were supported by the depth and breadth of U.S.
capital markets. The Volcker Group explained in their 1969 memo, “Foreign official short- and
medium-term dollar holdings ($16.1 billion) and foreign private dollar holdings ($23.4 billion at
the end of 1968) are serviced by a complex and highly developed set of banking, investment, and
trading facilities both in the U.S. and Europe” (1969: 5). Throughout the 1960s and 70s, dollarbased capital markets in Europe expanded and evolved and international dollar markets were by
far the deepest financial markets in the world, which provided the foundation for investor
confidence in U.S. government debt. In fact, by the end of the 1970s, European outward FDI to
the U.S. accounted for half of total global FDI flows (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 148).
For this reason, the Volcker Group prioritized controlling the domestic inflationary
pressures on the dollar in the 1960s and 70s. The memo explained,
“…the fact that the United States may be less harmfully affected than
other countries by the additional strain on international monetary cooperation
does not, in itself, make this a happy prospect. These risks could be minimized
only if the United States were successful in its anti-inflationary efforts at home
and in improving the structure of its balance of payments” (1969: 33).
The inflationary domestic conditions of the 1960s and 70s undermined investor
confidence in the dollar, which in turn threatened the U.S. government’s credibility vis-à-vis
surplus countries holding dollar assets, which would eventually undermine the U.S.’ ability to
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finance its budget deficit. Therefore, the Volcker Group concluded that suspending the dollargold convertibility would only be sustainable if the U.S. could contain inflation to strengthen its
balance of payments and industrial and financial competitiveness (1969: 31).

Currency wars and the beginning of floating exchange rates
On August 15, 1971, after a wave of unprecedented speculative dumping of the U.S.
dollar, European central banks stopped accepting dollars for their own currencies, and the U.S.
gold supply reached a critically low level, the Nixon administration decided to cancel the dollar’s
convertibility to gold (Silber 2012: 79-85). The Nixon administration’s aim in their unilateral
decision to suspend the gold window was to force an upward revaluation of Europe and Japan’s
currencies to reverse the declining U.S. trade surplus (Silber 2012: 80; Stein 2010: 40). Some
commentators refer to these acts as “currency wars” because countries were implementing
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies by competitively manipulating their exchange rates to promote
national exports at the expense of competing countries (Rickards 2012).
President Nixon’s key economic advisors, led by the Treasury Secretary John Connally,
argued that the cause of the shrinking trade surplus was an overvalued dollar. Connally wanted to
pressure Europe and Japan to devalue against the dollar (Stein 2010: 37). The Nixon
administration justified their position because of the U.S.’ overseas military expenditures were in
the “common interests” of Europe and Japan (Stein 2010: 41). After meeting with finance
ministers from West Europe, Canada, and Japan, Treasury Secretary Connally “said blandly for
the television cameras as he left the afternoon meeting…‘We had a problem and we are sharing
it with the world just like we shared our prosperity…That’s what friends are for’” (cited in
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Hudson 2003: 290). Connally was demanding exchange rate adjustments from the rest of the
world that would return the U.S. to full employment (cited in Hudson 2003: 290).
At that meeting, the Atlantic powers renegotiated fixed exchange rates against gold,
however, in a world of increasingly mobile capital, those fixed exchange rates were politically
impossible to maintain and they abandoned fixed exchange rates in 1973. The multilateral
abandonment of fixed exchange rates cemented the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency
and the ability of the U.S. to rely on the rest of the world to finance its budget and trade deficits.
Countries with trade surpluses could not use their dollars to purchase gold but only U.S.
Treasury securities. Ironically, the Nixon administration initially intended to suspend dollar-gold
convertibility to shift the U.S. trade balance back into surplus. However, it had the long-term
effect of permitting the endless expansion of the U.S. trade deficit as foreign governments
recycled their trade surpluses into U.S. government debt. However, domestic social and political
conflicts throughout the 1970s produced inflation that undermined investor confidence in the
dollar (Stein 2010). This threatened the U.S. ability to cover its balance of payments and provide
economic and political leadership, not to mention the negotiating strength of the U.S.

Stabilizing the dollar to finance the trade deficit
The rampant “stagflation” (a combination of high unemployment and high inflation) of
the 1970s had multiple determinations, and it resulted in a crisis of profitability for U.S.
industries and a loss of confidence in the dollar as the world reserve currency (Gindin & Panitch
2012: 137; Krippner 2011: 16). Domestically, the high inflation of the 1970s had devastating
effects, including by making investment and production inefficient, eroding returns on financial
assets, and reducing capital investment (Bluestone & Bennett 1982). At the international level,
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inflation undermined the dollar as world reserve currency and the creditability of the U.S.
government. Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve between 1970-8, identified public
sector labor unions and welfare programs (which he viewed as a subsidy to striking workers) in
the 1960s and 70s as driving a wage-price inflationary spiral (cited in Gindin & Panitch 2012:
141). Paul Volcker succeeded Burns as Chairman of the Federal Reserve and had a similar
diagnosis, sociologist Michael McCarthy observed,
“Above all else, the members of the FOMC and Volcker himself operated
with a cost-push theory of inflation that specifically pointed to labor power as the
driver. Despite their public comments to contrary, privately they understood that
inflation was more about the balance of class forces than the amount of money in
the economy. And this reflected in the monetary policies they pursued”
(McCarthy 2016).
Paul Volcker announced The Federal Reserve’s new “monetarist” policy to break
inflation in October, 1979 (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 168). Consequently, at the end of Carter’s
presidency the federal funds rate was at 19.1% and they remained at that level six months into
the Reagan presidency, a period some commentators refer to as “the Volcker shock” (Gindin &
Panitch 2012: 168). The Volcker shock thrusted the U.S. into the deepest economic downturn
since the Great Depression, consequently, inflation was finally broken when unemployment rose
from its 1979 level of 6% to reach above 10% in the fall of 1982 (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 168).
It was at this point that Volcker announced the end of monetarist restraint and shifted to
monetary easing. Economic growth finally resumed in 1983, and inflation came down to just
over 3% and it remained at about that level for the rest of the century (Gindin & Panitch 2012:
168).
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Domestically, “the Volcker shock” secured broad and lasting anti-inflationary conditions
by facilitating a shift in the balance of class forces. According to Steven Hayward, biographer of
President Reagan, Paul Volcker praised Reagan’s firing of 12,000 public sector union strikers in
the airline industry as “the single most important anti-inflationary step that Reagan took”
because it influenced other labor negotiations (2010: 173). In 1979, as U.S. automaker Chrysler
faced bankruptcy, the United Auto Workers made wage concessions and allowed for the
outsourcing of production to non-union plants (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 171). These concessions
became “the template” for the spread of similar concessions throughout US industry, including
“airlines, meatpacking, agricultural implements, trucking, grocery, rubber, among smaller steel
firms, and in public employment” (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 171-2). This was met with the
Reagan administration’s cutbacks to welfare, food stamps, Medicare, public pensions, and
unemployment insurance (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 171-2). Therefore, there were two main
determinants to the shift of class power that broke inflation: (1) the Volcker shock advanced the
U.S. as a “post-industrial” economy, in which employment transitioned from manufacturing to
services; and (2) the anti-unionism and cutbacks to the social wage during the Reagan
administration.
At the international level, “the Volcker shock” effectively restored confidence in the
dollar and saved it as the world’s reserve currency, thereby attracting capital back into U.S.
Treasury bills to cover the budget deficit. The breaking of inflation restored confidence in the
dollar, which was necessary to secure investor confidence in U.S. capital markets and thereby
strengthen the U.S. balance of payments. Surplus countries continue to finance the U.S. trade
deficit by recycling their surpluses back into U.S. financial assets, particularly U.S. Treasury
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bills. In turn, the U.S. trade deficit allows the U.S. to import cheaper goods, particularly
consumer goods, which further holds down inflation.

III. The making of U.S. trade policy
While the international monetary system was primarily a conflict among the Atlantic
powers, world trade and trade policy was further complicated by challenges to the Atlantic
powers from the global south. On November 16, 1975, the heads of state of the U.S., Canada,
Japan, and Western Europe converged in Rambouillet, France to discuss world monetary and
trade affairs. Despite the currency conflicts, stagflation in the major economies, and growing
trade and payments imbalances, each of the world leaders vowed to resist domestic calls for
import restrictions and protectionism. German Chancellor Schmidt reasoned, “The countries in
this room should act together not just because of a deep-rooted liberalism but because the market
system benefits us” (Memorandum of Conversation 1975: 407). However, British Prime Minister
Wilson responded that protectionism cannot be ruled out as a response to “…lethal attacks by
other countries directed at destroying two or three sectors of our economy. These are not lame
duck industries” (1975: 407). Chancellor Schmidt’s response is worth quoting at length,
“Harold, you talked of viable industries, and indicated that this excluded
lame ducks. You referred to textiles as an example. I am a close friend of the
chairman of the textile workers union in Germany. It is a union of a shrinking
industry. I would hope that this would not be repeated outside of this room. Given
the high level of wages in Europe, I cannot help but believe that in the long run
textile industries here will have to vanish. We cannot ward off cheaper
competition from outside…wages in East Asia are very low compared with
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ours…The German textile industry is viable, but will vanish in ten or twelve
years” (1975: 407).
All of the Atlantic powers collectively mulled a new geography of production, in which
industrial competition was not only amongst developed countries, but also from emerging lowwage and labor-intensive manufacturing in East Asia and Eastern Europe. Domestically,
beginning in the early 1960s, policymakers were keenly aware that the U.S. was transitioning
from an export-oriented to an import-oriented economy, and the Kennedy administration
identified a fundamental solution as promoting the export competitiveness of U.S. firms and
reducing barriers to trade abroad (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 125). The 1962 Trade Act expanded
the trade negotiating powers of the Executive branch and established the government agency that
would become the USTR in preparation for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Kennedy Round of negotiations (1963-7) (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 125).
By the early 1970s, U.S. MNCs began lobbying Congress and the President for
fundamental reforms to GATT. The GATT’s mandate was to be a negotiating forum for only
trade in goods. U.S. MNCs sought to include trade in services, investment, and intellectual
property issues in the GATT’s framework (Kelsey 2008; Feketekuty 1988: 300). In the 1974
Trade Act, for the first time Congress had instructed the President to include services, investment
and intellectual property as “fundamental negotiating objectives.”2 In the GATT Tokyo Round
(1973-9), the USTR’s efforts in bringing the “new issues” into the GATT were rebuked by a
large coalition of developing countries, however, it had set a precedent for future negotiations
(Feketekuty 1988). Following the Tokyo Round, the U.S. corporate lobbies would
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institutionalize, multiply, build strategic alliances, and become advisors to trade policymakers to
ensure that the new issues would be pursued in future negotiations (Kelsey 2008: 78).
As new technologies revolutionized the cross-border movement of information, data, and
capital, the corporate services lobbies sought to secure deregulations of any new markets based
on information technology, particularly within developing countries (Feketekuty 1988; Kelsey
2008: 13). A range of sectoral corporate lobbies sought to secure a multilateral agreement on
investment for the purposes of protecting foreign investments and securing foreign market
access, especially in developing countries (Vandevelde 1988). Securing a multilateral agreement
on intellectual property was vital to the U.S.’ highly capitalized and knowledge intensive
industries in both manufacturing and services. U.S. multinational firms required strong
intellectual property rights to secure profits as labor-intensive manufacturing shifted to the global
south (Prashad 2013). This convergence of corporate interests motivated U.S. trade policy in the
GATT Tokyo Round and into the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-94).
In 1975, political scientist Robert Gilpin identified the structural reasons that U.S.
policymakers enthusiastically promoted the interests of U.S. MNCs in trade and investment
policy. By the 1970s, U.S. MNCs were already the main importers and exporters of capital, on
the dollar standard. As U.S. MNCs expanded, the dollar zone expanded, and U.S. financial
markets expanded. In turn, U.S. policymakers depended upon deepening dollar markets and
dollar-denominated financial markets to finance overseas political and military expenditures
(Gilpin 1975: 161). Gilpin cited Henry Fowler, Treasury Secretary in the mid-1960s, to illustrate
the point,
“[MNCs] have not only a commercial importance – but a highly
significant role in the U.S. foreign policy that has met with general approval by
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the Atlantic countries…[in order to finance its military position overseas] the U.S.
government has consistently sought, and will continue to seek, to expand and
extend the role of the [MNC] as an essential instrument of strong and healthy
economic progress through the Free World” (cited in Gilpin 1975: 161).
By the mid-1980s, there had been an unprecedented expansion of the U.S. trade deficit,
notably with East Asia and to a lesser extent Europe. As the USTR prepared for the GATT
Uruguay Round, which produced the WTO, Congress fully embraced the U.S. corporate agenda
in services, investment, and intellectual property rights as a means of reducing the U.S. trade
deficit. These objectives were codified in The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
in which Congress mandated specific negotiating objectives for the USTR in the GATT Uruguay
Round. In outlining the premise of the 1988 Omnibus Act, Congress found that, “The United
States is confronted with a fundamental disequilibrium in its trade and current account balances
and a rapid increase in its net external debt.”3 Therefore, Congress mandated a principle
negotiating objective to address “persistent” trade imbalances and countries with structural trade
surpluses “by imposing greater responsibility on such countries to undertake policy
changes…including expedited implementation of trade agreements where feasible and
appropriate.”4 In so doing, rather than restricting imports, Congress and the President sought to
reduce the trade deficit via exports. Specifically, policymakers directed trade policy at
establishing new multilateral trade agreements in services, investment, and intellectual property
to create opportunities for U.S. exporters and enhancing global market shares for U.S. MNCs.
The trade strategy of reducing chronic trade deficits with aggressive export programs was
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adopted on a bipartisan basis from the Kennedy administration through the Obama
administration.

IV. Investment Policy in U.S. Trade Policy
U.S. investment policy had multiple determinations. At the turn of the twentieth century,
the U.S. sought to institutionalize international investment law to protect FDI in developing
countries. By the 1970s, the interests of U.S. MNCs and U.S. geopolitical considerations
converged to make services, investment, and intellectual property indispensable pillars of U.S.
trade policy, and Congress mandated the USTR to expand agreements on those issues around the
world. As the U.S. had fully integrated investment policy into trade policy, the USTR had
expanded the scope investment law for the purposes of market access and deregulations in
developing countries.

The Calvo Doctrine vs. the Hull Doctrine
In 1938, the governments of the U.S. and Mexico were entangled in a conflict over the
relationship between international investment law and state sovereignty. The focal point was the
location of the rights of foreign investors, were they located in domestic or international law? In
that year, Mexico nationalized the entire oil industry, which had been dominated by U.S. and
British oil companies (Thomas & Gimblett 2011: 664). During Mexico’s 1917 revolution,
Mexico adopted a new Constitution and it outlined “strategic areas” of economic activity “in an
exclusive manner” to the Mexican State, especially the oil and energy sector.5 Concurrent to the
oil expropriations, the Mexican and U.S. governments were negotiating a settlement from
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Mexico’s land takings of U.S. nationals during Mexico’s sweeping land redistribution policy as a
result of Mexico’s 1917 revolution (See Jayne 2000).
The 1917 Mexican Constitution adopted the Calvo doctrine, which stipulates that
foreigners must bring property disputes to domestic courts without recourse to their home
governments. In other words, in investment and capital disputes with foreign nationals, the Calvo
doctrine emphasized state sovereignty and rejected international law. Carlos Calvo (1824-1906)
was an Argentine diplomat who wrote a treatise on international law in the context of European
military interventions in Latin America, particularly France’s intervention in Argentina and
Uruguay from 1838 through 1850 (Del Luca 2003: 20). The Calvo Doctrine was widely adopted
in Latin America and it provided that diplomatic protections and interventions by foreign
governments on behalf of foreign investors was a violation of state sovereignty (Del Luca 2003:
20).
After Mexico nationalized the oil industry in 1938, the U.S. government pursued a “good
neighbor” policy and decided against military intervention in Mexico. The U.S. and British oil
companies brought their claims to Mexican Federal Courts. The contentious cases were highly
politicized as the Mexican and U.S. governments were sharply divided over two issues - the
standard of compensation and that foreign nationals are entitled to a “minimum standard of
treatment.” In the correspondence between the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs and U.S.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the Mexicans denied that there was any consensus on
international law that would oblige compensation for expropriation (Thomas & Gimblett 2011:
664). Mexico acknowledged that compensation was necessary under Mexican Constitutional law,
however, they asserted that “…the doctrine which [Mexico] maintains of the subject…is that the
time and manner of such payment must be determined by [Mexico’s] own laws” (Thomas &
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Gimblett 2011: 664). A few weeks later, on August 22, 1938, U.S. Secretary of State Hull
responded in what has since become known as the Hull Doctrine. He maintained “a self-evident
fact” that not only does international law exist but that “…the applicable precedents and
recognized authorities on international law” support the U.S. position (Thomas & Gimblett 2011:
664). Indeed, there had been a range of international arbitral decisions in the 19th and early 20th
century establishing such obligations as a rule of international law (Borchard 1940).
In the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs note to Secretary Hull on September 2, 1938,
the Mexican government contended that the Calvo Doctrine and Mexico’s rejection of
international investment law was established to defend “weak states against the unjustified
pretension of foreigners who, alleging supposed international laws, demanded a privileged
position” (Borchard 1940: 450). After provocative political exchanges and threats from U.S.
Congress, the cases were eventually settled as Mexico agreed to one lump sum payment in
compensation for the land and oil expropriations. However, the underlying cause of the
investment dispute – a fundamental opposition between claims to sovereignty and claims to
international law - was certainly not new and it was far from resolved.

From gunboat diplomacy to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
U.S. investment policy and law, even in its most elementary forms in the 19th and 20th
century, emerged from conflicts with developing countries over state sovereignty. During the
interwar years, Mexico was joined by the Soviet Union and Romania in implementing farreaching nationalizations (Thomas & Gimblett 2011). In the League of Nations in 1930, the U.S.
attempted to codify international investment law to protect against expropriations and denials of
justice to foreign nationals. The representative from China responded with essentially a version
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of the Calvo Doctrine in arguing that a foreigner must be prepared for “all local conditions,
political and physical, as he is the weather” (Borchard 1940: 451). The conference fell apart as
the seventeen “weaker” nations located the rights of foreign investors in domestic law while the
twenty-one “great powers” opposed that position as contrary to international law (Borchard
1940: 451).
Following WWII, as countries in the global south gained their independence from
colonial rule, the rate of expropriations increased markedly while developing countries continued
to reject international investment law. From 1960-9 there were 136 expropriations in developing
countries, but from 1970-9 there were 423 and during 1980-92 there were 16 (Minor 1994).
Since the 19th century, the U.S., British, and other European powers tended to respond to
expropriations with “gunboat diplomacy,” or military intervention in a foreign country to protect
commercial interests in that country. The U.S. has a long history of gunboat diplomacy in Latin
America and the Caribbean and Asia, as early as 1833 the U.S. had deployed military forces to
Argentina to protect private commercial interests during a local insurrection (Collier 1993). At
the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. had a particularly active military intervention policy on
behalf of on U.S. private commercial interests in Latin America and the Caribbean, mostly
motivated by capital and investment disputes (Langley 2001). In 1937, a State Department
official commented,
“It was in large part the influence of pressure groups bent upon selfish
gain and immediate material profit that led more than once to our interference in
the internal affairs of our Central and South American sister republics, finally
resulting in armed intervention and the sowing of fears and deep-seated
resentment” (cited in Lowenthal 1978).
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Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. continued military and covert operations in the
developing world in response to nationalizations and other commercial conflicts. Among the
most famous instances in Latin America were the U.S. military ouster of President Jacobo
Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 at the behest of United Fruit Company (Schlesinger et. al. 2005),
and the CIA and International Telephone and Telegraph’s successful efforts to overthrow the
democratically-elected Salvador Allende government in Chile in the early 1970s (Qureshi 2009).
As the Cold War pressed on, the U.S. was increasing commercial ties and exporting capital to the
developing world (Vandevelde 1988: 208). Simultaneously, investment and capital disputes in
the global south became increasingly complicated. In addition to expropriations, developing
countries imposed “performance requirements” on multinational corporations (MNCs) to ensure
that foreign investors acted in accordance with the national policy objectives of the host state.
The U.S. Commerce Department defined performance requirements6 as “any requirement placed
upon a foreign controlled enterprise by a host nation” (Cited in Coughlin 1982: 129).
By 1965, in response to the increasing amount of capital and investment disputes in
developing countries, the U.S. and Europe established an investment dispute settlement court at
the World Bank.7 The purpose was to enforce international investment law and “depoliticize”
private investment disputes in the developing world by shifting the conflicts to third party
arbitrators at the World Bank. The U.S. and European countries developed respective bilateral
investment treaties for contract with developing countries that obliged that investment and
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Performance requirements include commitments to: regional development, training local
workers, research and development, technology transfers, mandatory exports quantities, and
mandatory local content inputs in which a certain percentage of the value of the final output is
sourced locally.
7
In 1965, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or the Centre)
at the World Bank was established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention or the Convention).
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capital disputes be arbitrated at the World Bank and not in the host country’s domestic courts.
The provisions are called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In 2015, The United States
Trade Representative (USTR), the government agency that coordinates U.S. trade policy and
negotiations, explained the origins of ISDS:
“Military interventions in the early years of U.S. history – gunboat
diplomacy – were often in defense of private American commercial interests. As
recently as 1974, a United Nations report found that in the previous decade and a
half there had been 875 takings of the private property of foreigners by
governments in 62 countries for which there was no international legal remedy.
Though diplomatic solutions were possible, they were often ineffective and
political in character, rather than judicial. ISDS represented a better way” (USTR
2015).
However, until the mid-1980s, the U.S. and Europe were largely unsuccessful in getting
significant groups of developing countries to agree to ISDS because most of the global south
continued to reject international investment law. The hundreds of expropriations of foreign
property and investments by developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s reflected the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1974. Article Two proclaimed that every state has “full permanent sovereignty…over all its
wealth, natural resources and economic activities” (UN Documents 1974). To that end, Article
Two addressed foreign investment and capital and provided that each state has the right to
regulate, supervise, and expropriate foreign investment and MNCs within national jurisdiction
(UN Documents 1974). The Mexican delegation to the UN had played a leading role in drafting

46

the 1974 UN Charter and ensuring that the Calvo Doctrine was codified in the document8
(Shihata 1986: 4).
It was not until after the “third world debt crisis” in the early 1980s that developing
countries began to accept international investment law as part of broader social and economic
reforms to attract multinational capital (Prashad 2007). In 1982, Panama became the first Latin
American country to do so by signing a bilateral investment treaty with the U.S. and thereby
ratifying ISDS procedures. In 1991, Mexico finally broke from the Calvo Doctrine and accepted
ISDS during the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the
U.S. and Canada. For both developed and developing countries, accepting or rejecting
international investment law has never been a question of free trade but one of politics. The
origins of U.S. investment policy and law was not free trade principles but conflicts with
developing countries, in which developing countries made claims to state sovereignty and
rejected international law. Similarly, in the twenty-first century, U.S. investment policy in U.S.
free trade agreements is not motivated by free trade principles but rather conflicts between state
sovereignty to implement market regulations and the rights of multinational investors.

The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program
The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) codifies the legal rights of multinational
investors and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) procedures. Kenneth J. Vandevelde was
one of the original drafters of the U.S. BIT in the Carter and Reagan administrations. Vandevelde
situated the purpose of the U.S. BIT program, “A state’s foreign investment policy generally is
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In addition, Articles Three and Five provided for the creation of raw material cartels; Article Six provided for the
creation of “multilateral commodity agreements”; Article Twenty-Eight provided for the creation of a system to
“promote just and equitable terms of trade.”
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an element of its larger economic policy, particularly its understanding of the proper role
between the state and economic activity” (2010). In other words, international investment law
regulates the boundaries between state and market, specifically, the relationship between
multinational investors and host states.
The U.S. BIT program came to fruition under the Reagan administration in the early
1980s. President Reagan explained the ‘fundamental premise’ of the first U.S. Model BIT,
“…foreign investment flows which respond to private market forces will lead to more efficient
international production and thereby benefit both home and host countries” (1983). To that end,
U.S. trade theorists assert that the U.S. BIT imposes a relationship between the state and market
according to three free market principles: (1) states must intervene to protect property rights and
contracts; (2) the market should allocate resources and the state should not “chose winners or
losers”; and, (3) the state may intervene to correct market failures such as supply public goods or
protect against anticompetitive behavior (i.e. monopoly) (Vandevelde 1988).
Table 1: Core Provisions of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
Investment
Broad definition, including: an enterprise, equity and debt securities,
Definition
loans, interest, real estate and property, profits and returns from
enterprise
National
Investments and investors of another Party must be treated “no less
Treatment
favorably” than nationals
Most-FavoredInvestments and investors of another Party must be treated “no less
Nation
favorably” than investments and investors of another Party or non-Party
Minimum
Investments and investors must be treated with “full protection and
Standard of
security” and “non-discriminatory treatment”
Treatment
Performance
No Party shall impose or enforce requirements upon an investment or
Requirements
investor of another Party, with an expansive list detailing prohibited
performance requirements
Transfers
Each Party permits all transfers relating to an investment of an investor
of another Party “to be made freely and without delay”
Expropriation
No Party may nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of
another Party, except for public purpose and on a non-discriminatory
basis, in which case compensation be “fair market value”
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Investor-State
Foreign investors may bring claims of violations of investor rights
Dispute Settlement against a host state to the World Bank, arbitrators can make monetary
(ISDS)
awards but not change laws in the state.
The core investor rights in the U.S. BIT have antecedents in international investment
agreements and laws from the late 19th and early 20th century. However, the U.S.’ objectives in
the BIT program were shaped by conflicts with developing countries during the Cold War, in
which developing countries were prone to expropriations, appropriations of intellectual property,
highly restrictive investment regimes, and imposed a range of costly regulations on U.S. MNCs.
As a response to such “Third World nationalism,” the global north codified Hull doctrine in the
OECD’s adoption in 1961of the binding Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements. U.S.
Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler addressed the International Chamber of Commerce in 1965.
Fowler shared that the experience of U.S. MNCs in Europe showed that “a vast area of potential
conflict” could be minimized provided that host states applied “equal treatment under the law for
foreign and domestic enterprises” and exorcised “the specter of state confiscation and state
operation of competitive units” (cited in Gindin & Panitch 2012: 116). As the U.S. had growing
commercial ties with developing countries, the original U.S. Model BIT (1982) sought to
reregulate developing countries to support the interests of U.S. multinational investors in the
developing world. Jose Alvarez, another former U.S. BIT negotiator, concurred that the objective
was to bind developing countries to investment law that would “resist the forces of change often
demanded by the political and economic life of host countries” (cited in 2009: 4).

V. U.S. investment policy and global competitors
Globalization and free trade agreements (FTAs)
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USTR Ambassador Michael Froman, who oversaw negotiations of the TPP and the U.S.EU FTA (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), addressed the think tank Cato
Institute in June 2016,
“But it’s important not to conflate trade agreements with globalization.
Globalization has impacted the workplace; trade agreements can be part of the
solution. Trade agreements allow us to shape globalization to our advantage. They
are the vehicle through which we help write the rules of the road for the global
trading system, and do so in a way that reflects our interests and our values”
(USTR 2016).
In the social sciences, globalization is a complex, interdisciplinary field concerned with
the exchange, transfer, and mix of people, places,9 and things. Trade and investment, global
production sharing, and financial integration, and other forms of economic globalization are
enabled by technological development and motivated by new supply and demand pulls.
However, economic globalization is also a function of international trade and investment law. As
stated by USTR Froman, FTAs shape economic globalization by establishing “the rules of the
road” for private enterprise in a global economy. Multilateral, regional, and bilateral FTAs
establish regulations and market access rules that condition patterns of global trade and
investment.
By the end of 2016, out the 423 regional FTAs that are in force worldwide, 19 are U.S.
FTAs. Not all FTAs are the same and the U.S.’ FTAs are unique. The difference between FTAs
is their regulatory reach. The WTO is the least intrusive into a country’s policy space, while

A “place” maybe “transferred” as MNCs invest and operate globally, such as the globalization
of McDonalds; “places” maybe “mixed” as MNCs adjust their business model to local markets,
such a McDonalds tailoring its menu to meet local tastes in a particular country.
9

50

U.S.-style FTAs are the most intrusive. In other words, U.S. FTAs contain the most demanding
regulatory commitments while the WTO provides countries with the most flexibility to regulate,
the FTAs of other countries fall somewhere in between. At issue is not necessary the quantity of
regulations contained in the FTA but its quality of regulations in trade-related and investmentrelated issues. It is necessary to distinguish between the content of different regional FTAs to
understand how each relates to processes of globalization.

FTAs and differential impact on state sovereignty
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the Bretton Woods institution
that governed the multilateral trade system in the post-war years and membership eventually
grew to include the vast majority of countries in the world. The GATT’s regulatory scope only
applied to tariffs on goods and commodities. However, by the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations
in the mid-1970s, the USTR was making strong pushes to include “new issues” of intellectual
property rights, investment, and services (i.e. “anything you can’t drop on your foot”). The
USTR’s effort was in large measure rebuked by developing countries but the Tokyo Round set
precedent for the eventual inclusion of the “new issues” into the GATT Uruguay Round (19861994). The highly contentious negotiations during the prolonged Uruguay Round successfully
incorporated intellectual property rights, investment, and services into the GATT’s regulatory
scope and the GATT became the WTO in 1995. However, the USTR’s proposals for deep
regulatory commitments on the “new issues” were successfully opposed by developing countries.
For this reason, the WTO is the trade agreement that has the least impact on state sovereignty to
implement market regulations.
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A central free trade principle in WTO agreements is “most favored nation,” which
stipulates that WTO members must extend the same preferential treatment towards one WTO
member as to all other WTO members. However, the WTO provides exceptions for bilateral and
regional FTAs.10 In so doing, FTAs are an exception to WTO commitments because FTAs create
preferential trading arrangements. For comparative purposes, the EU is not an FTA but rather a
political project to establish a common market with a common currency and harmonized fiscal,
monetary, migration, and social policies. From the perspective of the USTR, any FTAs that do
not go beyond WTO commitments on the intellectual property rights, investment, and services
are considered “low standard” deals; any agreement that goes beyond WTO commitments is
called “WTO-plus”; and any FTAs that approximate U.S.-style FTAs are “high standard” deals.
In broad historical terms, the USTR’s policy stance reflects U.S. commercial interests as
the global competitiveness of U.S. exporters and U.S. MNCs depends upon deep market access
and “high standards” in intellectual property rights, investment, and services. For this reason,
U.S. FTAs contain many WTO-plus issues. In the TPP, the USTR included regulations on stateowned enterprises, the digital economy, labor and environment, new intellectual property areas,
among others. The Obama administration frequently described the TPP as the U.S.’ “rules of the
global economy” in relation to those of China. The competitor to the TPP is the China-led
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP includes the ten11 countries
from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus six12 additional regional
countries. The ASEAN began as a geopolitical grouping in 1967 but they formalized an FTA in
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Paragraphs 4 to 10 of Article XXIV of GATT cover trade in goods; Article V of GATS covers
trade in services.
11
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam.
12
Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.
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1992 that mostly focused on tariff reductions to facilitate intra-regional trade and attract
investment. Since then, the ASEAN signed “low-standard” FTAs with other Asian countries,
including, China, India, Japan, and Korea.
The primary goal of the RCEP is to harmonize the various ASEAN agreements into a
single FTA (CIL 2011). Therefore, the RCEP assumes ASEAN centrality, which adopts a
flexible and sensitive approach to the differential interests of developing countries, whereas the
TPP does not (CIL 2011). To that end, the scope of the RCEP is mostly focused on tariff
reductions in goods, with some partial WTO-plus elements in services and investment (Xiao
2015: 36). For instance, in the RCEP there are only six non-tariff issues whereas the TPP has
twenty (Xiao 2015: 36). In sum, U.S. FTAs seek to “shape globalization” to “reflect U.S. values
and interests” by establishing trade and investment rules that go beyond WTO commitments and
have far-reaching regulatory implications, whereas China’s FTAs are more WTO-consistent
which preserves greater policy space to regulate the private forces of globalization.

Table 2: Differences Between International Trade Agreements
WTO
TPP
ASEAN
Membership
Vast majority of
Twelve Pacific Ten ASEAN
the world
Rim countries* countries**
Global benchmark
standards in
goods, services,
intellectual
property,
investment
Sectoral
All sectors:
liberalization**** positive list

“WTO-plus”
including range
of new
regulatory
areas

“WTOconsistent”

All sectors:
negative list

All sectors:
positive list

Liberalization
standards

All sectors:
high

Goods: high
Services: low

Regulatory scope

All sectors: low
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RCEP
ASEAN plus
six Asian
countries***
Partial “WTOplus”

Goods: blend
Services:
positive
Investment:
negative
Goods: high
Services: low

Intellectual
Property: low
Investment: low

Intellectual
Property: low
Investment:
medium
*TPP members include: U.S., Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru.
**ASEAN members include: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
***RCEP members include: The ten ASEAN countries “plus six,” including, Australia,
China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.
****Sectoral liberalization is negotiated on either a “positive list” or “negative list” basis.
The positive list approach entails countries choosing which of their economic sectors they
will negotiate liberalization; the negative list approach entails countries liberalizing all sectors
and then negotiating which sectors will not be liberalized.

VI. Conclusion: the stakes of international investment negotiations
The stakes of international investment agreements are their impacts on state sovereignty
to regulate foreign direct investment (FDI) and capital flows. There are two areas of debate in
negotiations, (1) industrial policy, and (2) the “public-private divide.” The regulation MNCs and
capital flows are fundamental to industrial policy in both the developed and developing world,
with acute consequences to social and economic development in developing countries. Second,
in international investment policy, policymakers must balance the private legal rights of “the
market” against the states’ policy space to regulate MNCs, known as the “public-private divide.”

Foreign direct investment and industrial policy
The U.S. BIT program also serves as the negotiating template for the investment chapter
in U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs), and in many respects, the investment chapter may be
considered the “heart” of U.S. FTAs. The investment chapter, in tandem with the financial
services chapter, functions to support, facilitate, and protect private flows of capital and
investment. Cross-border capital and investment flows play increasingly important roles in both
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developed and developing countries. From the perspective of multinational interests in developed
countries, “Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important vehicle to bring goods and
services to foreign markets.” (Sauvant 2009). Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN,
explained the perspective of multinational interests in developing countries,
“Increasingly, transnational corporations are engaging with developing
and transition economies through a broadening array of production and
investment models…[developing countries engage MNCs] to deepen their
integration into the rapidly evolving global economy, to strengthen the potential
of their home-grown productive capacity, and to improve their international
competitiveness” (cited in UNCTD 2011).
As FDI has assumed an integral part of the growth strategies in both the developed and
developing world, policymakers and trade negotiators have crafted investment agreements to
support and facilitate multinational investment interests. The U.S. and other developed countries
are capital-exporters and policy-makers of international investment law, whereas most
developing countries (China notwithstanding) are capital-importers and policy-takers (Alschner
& Skougarevskiy 2015). For this reason, the social sciences literature widely describes
contemporary FTAs as “transnational governance regimes,” because trade and investment
agreements export extensive market regulations from developed to developing countries. This
has differential impacts in developed and developing countries. For the U.S., the U.S. BIT
program reflects the interests of U.S. MNCs that use FDI to increase the scale of their operations
and thereby their global market shares. Conversely, developing countries have a wide range of
policies towards FDI from MNCs.
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The U.S. BIT provisions combine technical rules on market access and regulations. In so
doing, the U.S. BIT functions to enhance an investment-friendly climate in developing countries
by eliminating “barriers” and restrictions to investment, establishing transparent, common, and
predictable rules, and reducing political and social risks to investors (Menghetti 2011). In U.S.
FTAs, the investment chapter has complex and substantive interconnections with the other
chapters in the FTA. In the most recent U.S. FTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),13 the
investment chapter is a support to the other regulatory chapters, notably, intellectual property,
services, competition policy, labor and environmental commitments, tariffs, and rules of origin
(rules of origin establish product-specific requirements for regional content as inputs into a final
product) (Elms & Low 2013). In all comprehensive FTAs, particularly U.S. FTAs, this “tradeinvestment-intellectual property-services nexus” provides the legal underpinning of global
supply chains, global production sharing, trade in services, and international financial integration
(Elms & Low 2013). The investment protections and deregulations contained in the U.S. BIT
facilitate MNCs using FDI to achieve economies of scale. In so doing, the U.S. BIT program is a
component of U.S. industrial policy to strengthen the global market shares of U.S. MNCs, which
has a range of economic and political benefits to the U.S.
Economist Thomas Friedman refers to U.S. investment policies as a “golden
straightjacket” on developing countries because U.S. investment agreements enhance market
efficiency by constraining arbitrary government regulations (2000). However, many
policymakers and commentators in developing countries disagree with Friedman’s assessment.
For capital-importing developing countries, the ability to regulate FDI is central to development
policy. Developing countries that have the policy space to regulate FDI can do so to realize a
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Signed by the U.S. in 2016 but not ratified by Congress.
56

range of industrial development goals. Consider the investment policies of Mexico and
China, the two top U.S. trade partners that are developing countries, and their subsequent
divergent development paths. Mexico signed the NAFTA, which entailed granting the
broadest investor rights and ISDS to multinational capital, while China was only
constrained by the WTO’s investment agreement, which grants significant policy space
for regulating FDI and capital inflows. Mexico studiously followed the liberalization
principles espoused by the U.S. and the IMF and yet Mexico has been losing international
competitiveness since the early 2000s. Conversely, in the words of Enrique Dussel
Peters, director of The China-Mexico Studies Center, “China was the worst student and
got the best grade” (cited in Wang 2006). China rejected the investment liberalization
guidelines of the U.S. and IMF and China’s industries grew to be highly dynamic and
globally competitive.
Mexico dismantled its public sector, committed itself to the unrestrained free
movement of capital, and deregulated FDI. As U.S. companies invested in Mexico, most
Mexican companies were unsuccessful in integrating their operations with U.S. MNCs,
and when U.S. MNCs saw better conditions elsewhere the footloose companies simply
left Mexico for the Asia-Pacific, particularly in the information technology and textile
sectors (Gallagher & Zarsky 2007). On the other hand, China’s nationalistic investment
policymakers imposed a range of regulations on FDI and international capital flows while
China’s public sector dominated domestic markets. China did not permit the free
movement of capital and obliged MNCs to partner with China’s state-owned enterprises
and transfer their technology and intellectual property in exchange for access to China’s
rapidly growing domestic market (Roach 2014).
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In sum, as both Mexico and China imported capital and opened their markets to MNCs,
Mexico’s domestic industries waned in global markets while Chinese enterprises were able to
climb the value-added chain and eventually become globally competitive industries. The key
difference was that under the NAFTA, Mexico could not legally regulate investment and capital
inflows, while China had far more policy space to do so under WTO commitments and China’s
policymakers used it to the max. The relationships between state sovereignty and international
investment laws are central to development and development policy.

The “public-private divide”
Legal debates concerning international investment law focus on the balance between
investor rights and regulatory policy space. Legal scholars have a number of different
perspectives and interpretations to this dichotomy. For law professor Wenhua Shan, “the featured
debate of international investment law-making seems to have shifted from a ‘North-South
Divide’ to a ‘Private-Public Debate’” (Shan 2006). That is, throughout the Cold War, most
developing countries rejected international investment law, which was representative of the
larger conflicts between the global north and the global south. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s,
developing countries turned away from import-substitution industrialization and sought to attract
international capital. In so doing, developing countries signed investment agreements with
developed countries. For Shan, the content of the debate over international investment law
shifted “to be the conflict between the private interests of foreign investors and the public
interests of states, namely host states” (2006: 660).
However, while Shan recognized the public-private conflict he did not define it. Law
professor Barnali Choudhury framed the debate in terms of a “democracy deficit” (2008). For
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Choudhury, “democracy can be characterized both by principles of public participation
and accountability” (2008: 783). Choudhury argued that since ISDS arbitrators rule on
public interest regulations without input from the public, international investment law
contributes to a “democratic deficit.” Investment lawyer Suzanne Spears characterized
the dichotomy as “a balance between principles regarding the protection and promotion
of foreign investment on the one hand and principles regarding the protection of society
and the environment on the other” (2010).
Multinational corporations and investors have successfully used ISDS to
challenge public interest legislation around the world, motivating an existential debate
about ISDS. For example, the NAFTA ISDS cases overwhelming targeted environmental
regulations. Around the world, other ISDS cases have successfully challenged public
health, labor, financial, and a range of other public interest regulations. Strong investor
rights and the offensive use of ISDS have the effect of “locking-in” a government’s
regulatory environment. However, regulatory norms evolve. For example, the TPP
investment chapter contained a complete carve-out of tobacco companies from ISDS. The
regulatory norms on tobacco evolved from treating tobacco as a “safe” product to a
“dangerous” product, and states introduced public interest legislation accordingly. The
TPP’s tobacco carve-out confirms MNCs use ISDS as a deregulatory tool.
Tobacco is not the only commodity that is patently against the public interest and
in which regulatory norms have evolved. Nor is tobacco the only public issue that has
motivated public interest legislation that has been a target of ISDS claims. The U.S. fossil
fuel industry understands that they are contributing to global warming, which is against
the public interest as global warming causes an increasing frequency of natural disasters,
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among other public issues. Yet the oil and gas industry has won billions of dollars in successful
ISDS cases, thus weakening climate change and fossil fuel regulations in those countries. Two
NAFTA examples include a successful ISDS case against a ban on fracking in Canada, and the
pending $15 billion claim against the U.S. for the Obama administration’s denial of the Keystone
XL oil pipeline. In the lead up to the 2008 global financial crisis, the “toxic assets” that were
fraudulently sold to investors all over the world by U.S. multinational banks were malicious to
the public welfare as they destabilized the global financial system. Yet, the TPP extends the
“minimum standard of treatment” protection to the financial sector and one multinational bank
has already successfully used ISDS against emergency financial measures.14 Similarly, the
international regulatory norms on capital controls have been shifting and evolving for at least the
last hundred years (Abdelal 2009), yet the TPP cements a stringent and limiting approach to
capital controls that domestic lawmakers cannot change. Since at least the industrial revolution,
the relationship between capital and labor has been mediated by government and labor standards
have consistently changed, yet MNCs have used ISDS to challenge labor protections including a
minimum wage bill.15 Pharmaceutical MNCs have used ISDS to extend patent monopolies on
medicines even though many countries have laws recognizing that patent laws evolve over
time.16
In these examples, MNCs have used ISDS to lock-in a favorable regulatory climate,
thereby undermining a country’s sovereignty and democratic law-making processes. In other
words, international investment law categorically limits the parameters of acceptable national

14

Saluka Investments B.V. vs. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, Ad hoc-UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (2006).
15
Veolia Propreté v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/15)
16
Eli Lilly and Company v. Government of Canada.
60

policy. For these reasons, a number of countries have renounced any future trade and
investment agreement that includes ISDS, including, Germany, India, Brazil, and
Ecuador. However, there are thousands of investment agreements with ISDS in force
worldwide. States use international investment law to accommodate multinational
interests. The widespread international acceptance of ISDS reflects a broader
reorientation of national policy agendas towards the needs of MNCs and the demands of
global markets. Policymakers around the world support the position that ISDS is a
mechanism for resolving frictions in international affairs, and it is therefore a necessary
to the global economy.
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Chapter Three: Negotiating the NAFTA Investment and Financial Services Chapters
I.
II.

Introduction
U.S. trade policy in the NAFTA

III.

Negotiations of the investment and financial services chapters

IV.

The “double movement” and the NAFTA investment agreements

“In the post-Cold War world, our national security depends on our economic strength…We will
ask companies and workers to join in partnership with government to build competitive
industries.”
-USTR Michael Kantor, 1993, testifying to the Senate on U.S. trade policy and the NAFTA

“For the first time, different social groups have been brought into the negotiations over a trade
pact…Trade has become a public issue.”
-Rick Swarz, May, 1991, business lobbyist commenting on the unprecedented corporate
lobbying effort to win the necessary Congressional votes to extend fast-track to the NAFTA

I. Introduction
The NAFTA set many precedents in international trade law, especially the investment
and financial services chapters. However, the NAFTA also inspired an unprecedented broadbased resistance to international trade law. This chapter documents the origins, contexts, and
objectives of U.S. trade policy in the NAFTA investment and financial services chapters. In my
process tracing of the negotiations, my dependent variables are the NAFTA investment and
financial services chapters; the independent variables are the USTR, domestic political actors,
and other country negotiating teams. Using the “double movement” framework, I show that the
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USTR, representing the “free traders,” secured an unprecedented expansion of the rights of
multinational investors and corporations over the objections of the “nationalist” and “socialist”
domestic and international political actors.

II. U.S. Trade Policy in the NAFTA
II.A. Origins of the NAFTA as U.S. trade policy
Mexico’s restrictive trade and investment regime during the Cold War
In 1991, USTR Carla Hills explained to Congress the origins of the proposed FTA with
Mexico, “Consideration of the FTA initiative is possible because of a reorientation in Mexico
away from statist, interventionist policies toward a market-oriented system.”17 The “statist,
interventionist policies” that Hills referenced were parts of Mexico’s restrictive trade and
investment regime during the Cold War. These policies reflected the articles enumerated in the
1974 United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,18 which the Mexican
delegation played a lead role in drafting.19 In the 1974 UN Charter, developing countries argued
from the perspective of dependency theory that unfavorable terms of trade with developed
countries alongside unfavorable power relations with multinational corporations (MNCs) were
sources of their perpetuating poverty. The Charter implicitly confronted U.S. trade and
investment policies during the GATT Tokyo Round (1973-9) by asserting that international
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USTR Carla Hills testimony before U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 1990.
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commerce be organized around principles of sovereignty, equality, and social justice.20 Mexico
imposed high tariffs, far-reaching investment restrictions, and included the Calvo Doctrine in the
Mexican constitution. The Calvo Doctrine was widely incorporated in the constitutions of Latin
American countries and it prioritized national sovereignty over foreign investors, including
requiring foreign investors to settle dispute claims in domestic courts, which was a direct
opposition to U.S. investment policy towards developing countries.21 In tandem with highly
restrictive foreign investment policies, Mexico pursued import substitution industrialization
policies to encourage the growth and development of domestic industries. Therefore, USTR
Carla Hills testified to Congress that a “sea change” in Mexico’s domestic politics was the
prerequisite to the NAFTA,
“While Mexico is a key U.S. trading partner, for many years we had basic
disagreements over trade policy. We saw a Mexico whose policies were highly
interventionist, characterized by trade protection, a restrictive investment
environment, a large degree of state ownership and control of business, and an
overly regulated business climate.”22

20

Each State has the right: to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment and MNCs
within its national jurisdiction, including the right to nationalization and expropriation (Article
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Mexico’s sovereign debt crisis and gradual commitment to open commerce
Mexico’s sovereign debt crisis in 1982 triggered the “sea change” in Mexican domestic
politics, shifting from inward-looking to outward-looking economic policies (Cameron &
Tomlin 2000). Following a banking crisis and facing sovereign default in 1982, Mexico began to
gradually respond to low-growth and high-debt with unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral trade
and investment liberalizations, notably with Mexico’s accession to the GATT in 1986. Since the
Mexican economy was so dependent upon oil exports, Mexican President de la Madrid “had
made it clear” that low oil prices were the key factor in Mexico’s expanding foreign debt, which
increased ten-fold up to USD $200 billion between 1984 and 1988. 23 Therefore, de la Madrid
insisted that Mexico accede to the GATT to acquire new sources of foreign capital. In so doing,
de la Madrid began Mexico’s liberalization process by overriding domestic political pressure
against joining the GATT, perceived to largely reflect U.S. influences and interests. The Salinas
Administration took office in 1988 and pursued unprecedented unilateral liberalizations to make
Mexico one of the most open developing countries, often going beyond their formal GATT
obligations. Notably, the Salinas administration slashed tariffs, licensing restrictions, reduced the
role of government as an owner/operator of businesses,24 and implemented major unilateral
reforms in the “new issues” of investment and intellectual property, near and dear to the heart of
U.S. trade policy.25
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While Mexico’s domestic political reforms were the “impetus” for the NAFTA,
according to USTR Carla Hills, the U.S. “encouraged and supported Mexico in its process of
reform.”26 As Mexico was acceding to the GATT they concurrently established with the U.S. a
consultative mechanism to discuss trade issues and bilateral sectoral negotiations in agriculture,
investment, intellectual property, services, tariffs, and key industries including steel and
textiles.27 Most importantly, in 1989, Mexico became the first country to reach a new debt accord
under the Brady Plan, named after then U.S. Treasury Secretary Brady, designed to rearrange the
terms of debt service for developing countries. The debt agreement exchanged substantial debt
service relief for Mexico with greater assurance of future collectability and further marketoriented reforms. In the Uruguay Round (1986-94), USTR Carla Hills and her Mexican
counterpart Minister Jaime Serra became a dynamic lever in the conflicts at the bargaining table
between developed and developing countries.28 The emerging political partnership between the
U.S. and Mexico at the end of the Cold War became the origins of the NAFTA.

II.B. Context of the NAFTA as U.S. trade policy
II.B.1. Foreign policy context
Emerging “regionalism” in a world economy
Between Mexico’s formal request (1990) for an FTA with the U.S. and NAFTA’s
passage in the U.S. Congress (1993), Congress and the USTR repeatedly justified the agreement
as an exigent response to the emergence of regionalism and regional trading blocs as the Cold
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War closed. Congruent to the NAFTA talks, the EC had quickly moved on from the Cold War
and was pursuing political and economic integration that culminated with the founding of the
European Union in 1992. In 1993, USTR Michael Kantor argued that European integration
policies created new barriers to U.S. exports and investment.29 Simultaneously, Japan, then
second-largest economy in the world, was leading an inward-looking Asian integration on the
Pacific Rim. U.S. competitors were expanding their markets in Europe and Asia while barriers to
U.S. exports were becoming increasingly problematic. USTR Kantor warned, “…allowing other
nations to promote and protect their industries, building profits from secure home markets, while
targeting our open market, is a formula for competitive suicide.”30 The USTR and a chorus of
congressmen called for an American regionalism. An early NAFTA proponent, Rep. Bill
Richardson, pleaded to Congress, “If we are to avoid being ‘frozen out’ of the world market it is
imperative that we look to the future with the same [regional] strategy.”31
To that end, in 1990, President Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
which mounted the goal of a hemisphere-wide FTA from “Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego” called
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).32 The U.S.-Mexico FTA was to be the steppingstone to the FTAA, a plan that was subsequently adopted by Presidents Clinton and Bush II as
well. As Canada joined the FTA negotiations, the proposed NAFTA would create an integrated

USTR Michael Kantor testimony before U.S. Senate, “U.S. trade policy and NAFTA: hearing
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North American market larger than the EU which would boost the competiveness of the region.
In so doing, North American economic integration would increase the region’s influence –
individually and collectively – to keep markets open in other parts of the world, which became
particularly significant as conflicts escalated in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.33

U.S. trade strategy in the Uruguay Round
The NAFTA emerged on North America’s trade relations agenda during the GATT
Uruguay Round, which were the contentious and prolonged multilateral negotiations that
founded the WTO. Since the inception of the NAFTA, the overriding goal of both the U.S. and
Mexico’s trade strategy was to conclude the Uruguay Round.34 However, by 1991, the Uruguay
Round collapsed over seemingly irreconcilable differences between U.S. and EC in agricultural
disputes. As the Uruguay Round stalemate persisted, Washington turned its attention to the
NAFTA. In this context, the proposed NAFTA assumed new significance in U.S. trade policy
debates, aptly summarized in Sen. Clark Reynold’s address to Senate, “The breakdown in the
GATT Uruguay Round negotiations makes it all the more important to rely on regional
agreements as a ‘second best’ approach in the direction of ultimate global liberalization.”35
According to trade policy advisors Fred Bergsten and Jeffrey Schott, the NAFTA
“reminded” the EC “that the United States could pursue alternative trade strategies” (1997).
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Indeed, the EC released a study on potential effects of the NAFTA,36 and concluded that the
NAFTA is not a threat to the EC but that “an expanded NAFTA would not necessarily be in the
Community’s best interest.”37 Considering U.S.’ ambitions for hemispheric trade and investment
integration in the Americas, the EC report “strongly” urged the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round and suggested that free trade areas “can be useful building blocks of the world trade
regime.”38 Subsequently, the EC found a new resolve to conclude the faltering Uruguay Round
and in so doing the NAFTA is inseparable from the founding of the WTO.

II.B.2. Domestic political context
Renewing fast-track authority
As the Bush administration pursued the Mexico FTA which became the NAFTA, they
immediately had to address the domestic legislative process in Congress because it has the
authority to both implement a trade agreement and set the President’s negotiating objectives.
Beginning in the 1970s, Congress and the Executive branch agreed that in order to make
politically expedient deals with trading partners the Executive branch would need the power to
negotiate an agreement without interference from Congress. As a result, the 1974 Trade Act
established “fast-track negotiating authority” (simply “fast-track”) which obliged Congress to
“suspend its ordinary legislative procedures” and vote a trade agreement “up or down” with
limited debate and no amendments.39 In addition, fast-track legislation contained Congress’
negotiating objectives for the President, among other checks on the Executive including
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consultations with Congressional committees. In a 1990 Congressional testimony, USTR Carla
Hills explained the political importance of fast-track, “Although the Congress cannot preclude
negotiations as a legal matter, without the procedural advantages of fast-track authority, the
practical impediments to negotiating an agreement would be all but insurmountable.”40 Annex
One presents an explanation of the political procedures of fast-track and relevant processes in the
development of the Bush administration’s negotiating objectives in the NAFTA.
President Bush entered office with fast-track negotiating authority provided by the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which was designed for the Uruguay Round
but it legally applied to all trade and investment agreements under negotiation. However, when
the legislation was drafted, Congress was expecting the Uruguay Round to be completed by 1991
so Congress set fast-track to expire in June, 1991 with an automatic two-year extension that
could be vetoed by a simple majority vote in either the House or Senate. By early 1991 it was
evident the Uruguay Round would not be completed that year and the Bush administration would
need the two-year extension on fast-track, including for negotiating the NAFTA. On March 1,
1991, President Bush formally requested the two-year extension, and five days later, disapproval
resolutions (H.Res. 101, S.Res. 78) were introduced in both houses.

Congressional resistance to the Bush trade agenda
The March-May, 1991 political battle for the renewal of fast-track is well documented,41
however, at issue in this study is the extent to which the fast-track renewal process either
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contested or amended the Bush administration’s negotiating objectives in the NAFTA. The 1988
Omnibus Act enjoyed broad bipartisan support and it passed the Senate by 85 to 11 votes and the
House by 376 to 45 votes.42 However, the Bush administration’s plan to extend this fast-track
legislation to the Mexico FTA (NAFTA) inspired unprecedented domestic resistance to U.S.
trade policy. During the March to May debates in Congress over the renewal of fast-track, the
number of hearings on trade with Mexico exceeded those on the Uruguay Round by almost 10 to
1, even though the Uruguay Round was of far greater significance.43 A large minority of
Democrats were either opposed to the Mexico FTA for fear of loss of jobs or sought to shape its
content to reflect labor and environmental concerns. They were bolstered by an unprecedented
and increasingly organized alliance among the major labor unions, environmental groups, human
rights groups, and consumer advocacy groups, each with a unique set of concerns/demands that
were fundamentally opposed to the Bush trade agenda.
On May 1, the Bush administration responded with political concessions to Democrats
that included a trade-displaced worker adjustment program, future cooperation with Mexico on
health and safety issues, a joint border environmental plan, and appointment of environmental
experts to the USTR’s trade advisory committees.44 Simultaneously, the Bush administration
engaged in a major outreach effort to win Congress’ votes as Bush personally contacted “scores”
of lawmakers.45 On May 9, House Majority Leader Gephardt introduced H.Res. 146 to
implement the Bush administration’s new labor and environmental commitments even though
the commitments were legally non-binding. Major U.S. business groups organized a massive
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lobbying campaign to defeat the fast-track disapproval bills, “It’s a pan-business effort, I’ve
never seen a larger grouping from the private sector,” remarked a top lobbyist from the
Emergency Committee for American Trade.46 At the end of May, the House and Senate voted
down the fast-track disapproval resolutions (House: 192 to 231; Senate: 36 to 59) and fast-track
was renewed. In sum, the Bush administration was forced to make relatively small (non-binding)
concessions to environmental critics to win fast-track. The negotiating objectives from the 1988
Omnibus Act remain unchanged.

II.C.1. U.S. Objectives in the NAFTA
The official U.S. negotiating objectives in both the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA were
detailed by Congress in the 1988 Omnibus Act. The bill was designed to “enhance the
competitiveness of American industry,”47 signifying that for U.S. policymakers, international
trade and investment was an industrial strategy. However, the NAFTA also represented the Bush
administration’s trade strategy vis-à-vis the Uruguay Round and trade policy increasingly
reflected foreign policy and security goals. Therefore, the U.S. objectives in the NAFTA had
evolved as a carefully combination of industrial strategy, trade strategy, and foreign policy.
Table 3: Synthesis of U.S. objectives in the NAFTA
Industrial Strategy
Trade Strategy
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Foreign Policy

 Establish WTO-plus
standards in North
America
 Competitive
liberalization: leverage
negotiations in the
Uruguay Round;
encourage other
developing countries to
negotiate FTAs

 Reposition key U.S.
industries by shifting
production to Mexico
 NAFTA was the
cornerstone of the Free
Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA)
 “Asymmetrical trade
liberalization” to reduce
the trade deficit

 Support and
compliment bilateral
initiatives on border
safety and security
(narcotics trafficking,
undocumented migration,
environmental concerns)
 Support democracy in
Mexico and promote
reforms in Latin America
and the Caribbean

The NAFTA as U.S. industrial strategy
The 1988 Omnibus Act directed three overall negotiating objectives to the USTR, to
obtain: (1) open markets, (2) reductions to barriers to trade, and (3) a more effective system of
international trading disciplines and procedures.48 However, at the Uruguay Round the U.S.
faced fierce resistance from developing countries in negotiations over the USTR’s proposals in
the “new issues” of investment, services, and intellectual property.49 The purpose of the U.S.
proposals on “new issues” was to establish and protect U.S. comparative advantages in advanced
manufacturing, advanced services, and high intellectual property content commodities.50 By
extension, supporting U.S. industries (U.S. MNCs) would support U.S. exports and therefore
U.S. jobs. In fact, the USTR found that jobs supported by exports paid higher wages in both
manufacturing and services.51 However, due to geopolitical resistance at the Uruguay Round, the
USTR was unable to negotiate “high standard” agreements in investment, services, and
intellectual property (“high standard” trade agreements are referred to as “WTO-plus”). The
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NAFTA was an opportunity for the U.S. to reach a WTO-plus agreement with a geopolitically
important developing country, setting precedent for future trade agreements including the FTAA.
The NAFTA marked the beginning of the U.S. trade policy strategy of “competitive
liberalization,” which uses bilateral or regional FTAs with “ready and willing” countries to
overcome resistance to U.S. trade policy elsewhere. This trade strategy had its roots in the U.S.Canada FTA (1988). James Baker, then U.S. Treasury Secretary, described the geopolitical
significance of the FTA as “a lever to achieve more open trade.”52 He explained, “Other nations
are forced to recognize that the U.S. will devise ways to expand trade – with or without them. If
they chose not to open markets, they will not reap the benefits.”53 The NAFTA would develop
that strategy, President Clinton explained, “[bilateral and regional] agreements, once concluded,
can act as a magnet including other countries to drop barriers and to open their trading systems.
The [NAFTA] is a good example.”54 That is, the NAFTA would make Mexico and Canada a
“magnet” for international capital which would pressure other countries to negotiate with the
U.S. The competitive liberalization strategy is a part of U.S. industrial strategy inasmuch as it
encourages and facilitates the opening of new markets to U.S. exports and capital.

The NAFTA as U.S. trade strategy
The NAFTA was part of a U.S. trade strategy to generalize the maquiladora model in
Mexico which would facilitate the competitive restructuring of U.S. manufacturing industries to
better compete with East Asia, particularly in autos, electronics, and textiles (Peters 2009). The
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emergence of Asian manufacturing exporters in the 1970s eventually turned some U.S.
manufacturers into importers, including in shoes, luggage, toys, games, sporting goods, and
bicycles (Watkins 2013). However, other industries shifted assembly operations to Mexico to
preserve production in the U.S., notably autos, textiles, and electronics. U.S. imports from
Mexico contained much higher U.S. content than imports from Asia, therefore, by importing
from Mexico (rather than Asia) manufacturing plants would be maintained in the U.S. By the
time the NAFTA came into force cross-border production sharing, or supply chains, had already
emerged in autos, textiles, and electronics. The USTR’s main private sector advisory committee
explained, “With a NAFTA that allows companies to plan long term investments based on
economic efficiencies rather than government imposed barriers, costs can be reduced and
economies of scale achieved, allowing North American products to compete more effectively in
world markets.”55 Those industries, in addition to U.S. financial services and agricultural
exporters, were the main business lobbies promoting the NAFTA (Watkins 2013).
The Bush administration’s vision for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was
not simply about expanding U.S. market shares in Latin America and the Caribbean. Another
central motivation in the FTAA was to leverage European and Asian negotiators so as to “keep
their markets open” (Destler 2005). Joan Spero, an executive at American Express and a leading
corporate lobbyist, reasoned to Congress,
“U.S. exporters and investors must have access to rapidly growing and
increasingly sophisticated Asian markets in order to meet and beat our
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competitors. Our positive decision on the NAFTA will confirm to the world that
the U.S. is ready to lead and compete in a changing global economy.”56
The 1988 Omnibus Act was a response to the unprecedented yet structural expansion of
the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s with East Asia and to a lesser extent Europe. Moreover, U.S.
exporters were increasingly frustrated by Europe and Japan’s problematic, or “unfair,”
protectionism. USTR Michael Kantor summed up the dilemma, “We will not stand by and
pretend that other nations share our commitment to expanded trade and open markets if the real
world evidence suggests that they do not.”57 The NAFTA and the Bush administration’s plans
for the FTAA would leverage negotiations with Europe and East Asia. To that end, the 1988
Omnibus Act, Congress laid out specific negotiating objectives for developing countries58 and
for countries with persistent trade surpluses.59
Since the U.S. was the most open country to trade, negotiating partners had relatively
higher barriers to trade, especially developing countries. In the Uruguay Round, the USTR
sought to lower barriers to trade in areas where the U.S. already had low barriers, and
policymakers described this dilemma as achieving “reciprocity” in the exchange of trade
obligations. Therefore, in the 1988 Omnibus Act, the principal negotiating objectives of the U.S.
towards developing countries were two-fold, (1) to “ensure” that developing countries commit to
“reciprocal” trade obligations, and (2) to reduce the “nonreciprocal trade benefits” for the more
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advanced developing countries.60 In the Uruguay Round, solidarity among developing countries
prevented the USTR from realizing these objectives. However, in the NAFTA negotiations the
U.S. was able to practice its objectives of “asymmetrical trade liberalization” with an important
developing country (Bergsten & Schott 1997).
Achieving reciprocal market access was a means to the next negotiating objective,
“restoring current account equilibrium,”61 in other words, balancing total imports and exports. In
outlining the premise of the 1988 Omnibus Act, Congress found that, “The United States is
confronted with a fundamental disequilibrium in its trade and current account balances and a
rapid increase in its net external debt.”62 Therefore, Congress mandated a principle negotiating
objective to address “persistent” trade imbalances and countries with structural trade surpluses
“by imposing greater responsibility on such countries to undertake policy changes…including
expedited implementation of trade agreements where feasible and appropriate.”63 In so doing,
Congress sought to “restore” the trade deficit not with protectionism on imports but with an
aggressive trade policy on exports.

The NAFTA as U.S. foreign policy
As outlined by President Clinton in a foreign policy speech in 1993, “…it is time for us to
make trade a priority element of American security,” signifying that the Clinton administration
had developed a “comprehensive trade policy” that also reflected foreign policy objectives.64 The
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NAFTA reflected foreign policy goals in that it would support and compliment regional
partnership and cooperation, which was necessary to advance border security and support
democracy in Mexico and Latin America. In early congressional debates on U.S. trade policy in
the NAFTA, various congressmen promoted the agreement on foreign policy grounds in that it
would ameliorate social and political problems along the U.S.-Mexico border, which extends
more than 2000 miles over four states. In 1990, Congressman Bill Richardson of New Mexico
catalogued these border problems to Congress, “high unemployment, substandard living and
health conditions, drug trafficking, and a continued influx of illegal immigration.”65 Richardson
was joined by a coalition of Congressmen from border states in promoting the NAFTA because a
strong commercial relationship with Mexico would be the basis of a political partnership that
would be necessary to address common bilateral problems along the border. Even more
fundamentally, the NAFTA proponents in Congress repeatedly cited reports that the agreement
would bring prosperity to Mexico, which they argued, would reduce instances of undocumented
immigration and narcotics trafficking.
The emerging U.S.-Mexico political partnership became a symbol of the twenty-first
century as U.S. politicians elevated Mexico to a signpost for the rest of Latin America’s “fragile
democracies”66 seeking to prevent policy reversion to their nationalist and socialist policies of
the Cold War. The U.S.-Mexico partnership that was the foundation of the NAFTA quickly
became necessary to U.S. foreign policy to advance free trade and investment in Latin America
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and the Caribbean. Concurrent to the NAFTA, other regional trade agreements in Latin America
were emerging, notably the Southern Common Market, and President Bush had made a political
commitment to Chile for an FTA after completion of the NAFTA.67 In addition, many Latin
American countries began to undertake their own unilateral market-oriented economic and
political reforms, often as part of IMF structural adjustment programs. As Latin America began
to turn the page on its Cold War policies, U.S. policymakers recognized that the region needed
Mexico to be “an example of success with a market-oriented economy.”68 In 1993, President
Salinas met with leaders from twelve Latin American nations in Chile and described the regional
importance of the NAFTA,
“[NAFTA is] …a fundamental test of American relations not only with
Mexico but also throughout the hemisphere…When negotiations for the treaty
began, many people thought Mexico was turning its back on Latin America, and
events have shown the opposite to be true. For Latin America, the free trade
agreement has come to mean a different policy of the U.S. toward the region.”69

II.C.2. U.S. negotiating objectives in the NAFTA investment chapter (Chapter 11)
Even from before the Uruguay Round, the U.S. had a well-developed international
investment policy, which was eventually codified in the 1984 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT). In NAFTA negotiations, the Treasury imported the 1991 Model BIT to their
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negotiating position, which was a slightly revised version of the 1984 Model BIT. The U.S.’
objectives in the BIT program are summarized in Chapter One.

II.C.3. U.S. Negotiating Objectives in Financial Services (Chapter 14)
As in the beginning of the Uruguay Round, investment and financial services were
negotiated by the U.S. Treasury Department while most other working groups were negotiated
by the USTR. At the Uruguay Round, the Treasury proposed a separate financial services
agreement that would not be included in the GATS and it lobbied hard towards that end.70 The
Treasury argued that regulations on financial institutions were “substantially different from those
governing other services because, among other things, special controls were necessary to prevent
bank failures.”71 To that end, the U.S.-Canada FTA had a separate chapter for financial services
and the NAFTA would significantly build upon that foundation.
The NAFTA financial services chapter was the first financial services agreement to
merge free trade theory with banking law, in that it applied free trade principles to the agreement.
The Treasury specifically sought this approach for a number of reasons, including, to facilitate
the free movement of capital. International financial services provide critical infrastructure to
international commerce. Krista Schefer, international investment law expert, explained,
“Closely connected to movement in investment is trade in financial
services. The transfer of funds, necessary for setting up a business and engaging
in international transactions, as well as repatriation of profits or income across
national borders, requires the interaction of banks, non-bank financial institutions,
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insurance corporations, and security brokerages, on either side of the border, if
not around the world” (1999: 271).
Moreover, international financial institutions facilitate greater efficiency in multinational
commercial activities by minimizing transaction costs in making foreign direct investment. A
central purpose of the NAFTA financial services chapter was to lower the costs of doing
business between the “three amigos,” thereby facilitating and encouraging regional trade and
investment. Indeed, a main reason Canada joined the NAFTA was to prevent investment
diversion to the U.S. and Mexico.72 Similarly, several East Asian countries declared the NAFTA
as “sneaky protectionism” because by lowering intra-NAFTA transaction costs the agreement
would likely divert investment to North America.73
The application of free trade principles to financial services also reflected the aggressive
interests of U.S. financial institutions seeking both new markets and new profit from increased
trade flows. According to Wethington, the U.S. financial services negotiators entered
negotiations “having formulated certain core, substantive negotiating objectives” (1994: 11). The
right to pre-establishment74 and national treatment were essential and there would be no NAFTA
without these provisions in financial services. The right of establishment was to give U.S.
companies “unimpeded access” to the Mexican and Canadian markets. National treatment
guaranteed U.S. firms non-discriminatory treatment, and in drafting the agreement U.S.
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negotiators added the provision of “equal competitive opportunity.” The emphasis on “equal
competitive opportunity” was essential for situations in which law may read in neutral fashion
but in practice it leaves U.S. firms at competitive disadvantage.75 Provisions allowing for the
entry of new products and data processing would provide them with the free right to enterprise.
Indeed, since the 1970s, a fundamental objective of U.S. financial services industries was to
secure deregulations in developing countries on new financial products based on the use of
information technology (Feketekuty 1988). Moreover, since policymakers situated the NAFTA
in a context of a long-term pursuit of a hemispheric free trade agreement, the financial services
negotiators were “extremely cognizant of the precedential effect” of the agreement. 76
However, U.S. financial services negotiators placed little emphasis on regulation. Olin
Wethington, the principle U.S. negotiator in financial services, published their negotiating
objectives after the NAFTA was concluded (1994). None of Wethington’s objectives addressed
regulation except reference to specific exceptions to national treatment in accordance with
“internationally recognized [regulatory] principles” (1994: 18). In other words, the financial
services chapter would address regulation up to the standards of “internationally recognized”
regulations, which were codified by the IMF and followed “free market” orthodoxy.77 Krista
Schefer observed,
“As most of the negotiators came from a trade or free-market economic
background, the main Chapter 14 provisions demonstrate a firm commitment to
the principles of free trade (market access, non-discriminatory treatment,
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arbitration-based dispute settlement procedures) and a lesser consideration of the
interests of financial service regulators and practitioners” (1999: 120).
Table 4: Core Provisions of the NAFTA Financial Services Chapter
Scope and
Applies to financial institutions of another Party, investments and
Coverage
investors of another Party, cross-border trade in financial services, and it
incorporates the Transfers provision (1109) from the Investment Chapter
Establishment
An investor of another Party has the right to establish “in the juridical
form chosen by such investor”
Cross-border
No Party may adopt any measure restricting cross-border trade in
trade
financial services, including purchase of services in another Party
National
The same principle as the investment provision and it requires that Parties
Treatment
provide equal competitive opportunities rather than outcomes
Most-FavoredThe same principle as the investment provision, although emphasis is
Nation
placed on ensuring that prudential measures are non-discriminatory
New Financial
Parties shall permit a financial institution of another Party to provide “any
Services and Data new financial service” and shall permit the free transfer of data across
Processing
borders
“Balance of
Parties may violate obligations in the event of a balance of payments
Payments”
crisis, although under highly specific conditions
Exceptions
Dispute
Disputes are done on a state-to-state basis; the financial services chapter
Settlement
incorporated the “transfers” and “expropriation” provisions from the
investment chapter and subjected each to ISDS.

III. The NAFTA negotiations in investment (Chapter 11) and financial services (Chapter 14)
III.A. The NAFTA opening rounds (June to September, 1991)
As NAFTA negotiations began, trade ministers from the U.S., Mexico, and Canada
divided the negotiations into nineteen working groups within six broad areas: market access for
goods; services; investment; intellectual property; dispute settlement; and trade rules on
subsidies, dumping, and rules of origin.78 The USTR was Carla Hills and her office appointed
officials from the Treasury to head the investment and financial services working groups,
consistent with the negotiating format from the Uruguay Round.
Table 5: The NAFTA opening rounds (June to September, 1991)
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Negotiatin
g issues in
investment
and
financial
services
Investor
rights and
investorstate
dispute
settlement
(ISDS)
Market
access for
FDI
Investor
rights and
FDI in
financial
services

Domestic interactions with the USTR
Labor
Business
Congress and
unions,
lobbies,
government
NGOs, civil private sector
agencies
society
trade policy
organization
advisors
s
ddf
Labor and
Large minority
environmenta wary of
l concerns do offshoring and
not belong in Mexico as
the NAFTA
“pollution
haven”

N/A

Demands
high value
deal
The private
sector
“framed
parameters of
domestic
political
acceptability”

Apply free trade
principles to
financial
services/bankin
g law

Mexico

Canada

Rejects
expropriatio
n and ISDS

Unsuccessfull
y counters
U.S. Model
BIT with U.S.Canada FTA

N/A

Demands right
to screen FDI

No national
treatment,
cap on
foreign
market
share, long
transition
period

U.S. wants
branching,
Canada wants
changes to
U.S. banking
law

III.A.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
USTR tables the Model BIT
In the account of political scientists Maxwell Cameron and Brian Tomlin, at the
beginning of the investment negotiations the USTR tabled the U.S. Model BIT while Canada
proposed to use the U.S.-Canada FTA as the point of departure (2000: 100-101). The U.S. Model
BIT contained far more comprehensive and stronger investor rights than the FTA, and both the
U.S. and Canada attempted to persuade Mexico to join their side. There were two fundamental
differences between the U.S. BIT and the U.S.-Canada FTA, first, the U.S. Model BIT assumes a
“negative list” approach to sectoral liberalization while the U.S.-Canada FTA had a “positive
list” like the WTO. A “negative list” agreement assumes complete liberalization of all economic
84

sectors and with sectoral exceptions that are negotiated, whereas the “positive list” only
liberalizes certain negotiated sectors. The second difference between the U.S. BIT and the U.S.Canada FTA was the dispute settlement provisions, in which the U.S. Model BIT delineated a set
of procedures for investors to bring claims against states to the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Dispute at the World Bank, and arbitration panels can make legallybinding monetary awards. Conversely, the U.S.-Canada FTA directed disputes to a binational
committee or the GATT. However, concurrent to the NAFTA, Canada was negotiating a BIT
with Argentina79 that utilized the same dispute settlement procedures as the U.S. Model BIT, and
in the all of official draft texts of the Investment Chapter, Canada had never bracketed the
dispute settlement clauses. Therefore, since the beginning of (or early into) negotiations, Canada
was either in favor of (or not opposed to) the dispute settlement procedures tabled by the U.S.80
Despite Canada’s movement towards the U.S. on the negative list approach and dispute
settlement, there were fundamental differences between the two sides. Canada sought to narrow
the definition of investment in the U.S. BIT, thereby narrowing the scope of the entire chapter. In
addition, Canada insisted on maintaining the right to screen foreign investments which the U.S.Canada FTA had allowed, and the U.S. sought to eliminate this carve-out. The FTA permitted a
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indication that Canada was opposed to dispute settlement, although there is clear evidence
Canada insisted on a carve-out for their investment screening act. Therefore, it appears that only
Mexico was opposed to dispute settlement from the beginning of negotiations, contrary to
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Canadian law which sanctioned government review of direct acquisitions valued over Can$150
million, and Canada resisted the U.S. until the end of negotiations.
The U.S. BIT provisions posed two significant problems for Mexico, firstly, the U.S. BIT
expropriation clause provides that compensation must be “prompt, adequate, and effective.” This
language was unacceptable to Mexico as it was the language used by the U.S. when Mexico
expropriated U.S. oil companies in 1938.81 Secondly, Mexico did not accept the BIT dispute
settlement procedures, and Mexico took this position due to Calvo Clause in the Mexican
constitution, which was adopted from the Calvo Doctrine (discussed in Chapter One), and it
mandated that foreign investors can only seek disputes in local courts with no recourse to their
home state.

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
Labor union representatives testified to Congress that an FTA with Mexico would not
boost U.S. exports because Mexico lacked consumption power to buy U.S. goods, rather, the
NAFTA would worsen labor conditions in all countries. This argument had currency with a
growing number of House Democrats who were wary of offshoring to Mexico, some cited a
general lack of enforcement of labor and environmental standards in Mexico as an “unfair trade
subsidy”82 that would distort investment towards Mexico. They warned that offshoring to
Mexico would put downward pressure on wages, working conditions, and employment. In
addition, some argued that Mexico would become a “pollution haven” for dirty industry as plants
would relocate to Mexico in search of lower environmental standards/costs, causing
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environmental deterioration especially in the border region. During the early rounds of
negotiations, the coalition of labor, environmental, and other citizens groups protested their
exclusion from negotiations and began to “shadow the negotiators wherever they went” (Mayer
1998: 126). Environmental groups filed a law suit against the USTR on the grounds that the
NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay Round required environmental impact assessments. Former
U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker, advisor to the USTR, responded by asserting that the
NAFTA was not the “appropriate mechanism for labor and environment concerns.”83

III.A.2. Investor rights and FDI in financial services
Each country had a consultation process with representatives of financial services
subsectors. Olin Wethington reflected that the U.S. consultation process with the private sector
“…framed, early in the process, the parameters of domestic political acceptability and became a
two-way education process on specific issues, with both government and the private sector
learning and exploring the limits of negotiating feasibility” (1994: 21). To this end, from the
beginning of the negotiations there was a “high degree of convergence” on core principles
between the USTR and the private sector, particularly in establishment, national treatment, and
Mexico’s transition period.84 In negotiations, the majority of sticking points concerned how
much liberalization and how soon. Wethington reflected,
“Much of the NAFTA negotiations in the financial services sector
concerned the elements of the transition period - its length, the speed of the
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liberalization during the transition, the extent of market share for the U.S. and
Canadian firms…and certain special rules that would apply only to the transition
period” (1994: 55).
Negotiations were slow to begin as Mexico initially did not agree to negotiate financial
services on the grounds that they had just reprivatized their banks and they feared U.S.
competition. The U.S. responded that without a financial services agreement there would be no
NAFTA.85 Mexico conceded and then called for a permanent 5% cap on foreign ownership of
financial institutions and the Mexicans did not accept the core issue of national treatment, the
U.S. responded that is “not serious.”86 Both the U.S. and Mexico were “nowhere” near an
agreement.87 Both the U.S. and Canada wanted build on the FTA and establish the right to open
retail and commercial bank branches, but the U.S. claimed it was unable to permit branching due
to interstate banking laws and the Glass-Steagall Act, in turn Canada would not give anything on
the issue.

III.B. From fact-finding to drafting (October 1991 to January 1992)

Table 6: From fact-finding to drafting (October 1991 to January 1992)
Negotiating
Domestic interactions with the USTR
issues in
Labor unions,
Business
Congress
investment
Mexico
NGOs, civil
lobbies,
and
and financial
society
private sector government
services
organizations
trade policy
agencies
advisors
Investor
Successfully
Maintains that Offshoring
Concedes to
rights and
motivate
NAFTA is not concerns
U.S. BIT
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investor-state
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Market
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Investor
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FDI in
financial
services

USTR to
address
investmentrelated
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forum for
leads some
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tables
concerns; all
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BIT
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requirements
provisions
necessary
Mexico has
Treasury
Accepts
political
drafts
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III.B.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)

narrower
definition of
investment
Maintains
right to
screen FDI
Pushes for
repeal of
GlassSteagall

Investor rights
By the meetings of January 7-10, 1992, each side had “cut and pasted” its wish list onto a
draft text.88 Mexico continued to reject the U.S. BIT expropriation and dispute settlement
procedures through the initial January 16, 1992 draft.89 Mexico had not proposed an
expropriation text although it had agreed that the subject should be covered in “in a manner
consistent with its Constitution, which does not preclude fair market value.”90 The U.S. was
continuing to push for a broad definition of investment and “national treatment” over the
objections of Canada and Mexico.91 In 1989, during the GATT Uruguay Round, Mexico had
sided with India in support of performance requirements designed to support domestic industrial
development. In January, 1992, Mexico had proposed voluntary performance requirements in
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which “a company could voluntarily agree to meet a certain content requirement in exchange for
a subsidy payment.”92 The U.S. and Canada rejected this proposal for voluntary performance
requirements and investment incentives. As investment talks progressed, Mexico began to accept
the investor rights and ISDS enforcement that it originally rejected and Mexican negotiators
would come closer to the U.S. position in favor of strong investment disciplines because
Mexico’s objective was to attract U.S. capital (Cameron & Tomlin 2000: 100-101).

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
A GATT dispute panel ruled that a U.S. environmental law that protected wild dolphins
was in violation of GATT obligations because it prohibited imports of Mexican tuna. Public
Citizen spokeswoman Lori Wallach explained, “This case is the smoking gun, we have seen
GATT actually declaring that a U.S. environmental law must go” (cited in Mayer 1998: 128).
Sixty-three congressmen joined environmentalists in protesting the ruling with concerns of the
implications of the ruling for other U.S. environmental laws (Mayer 1998: 128). Congressmen
easily made connections to the NAFTA negotiations denouncing Mexico as a partner in
protecting the environment and advancing the “pollution haven” argument in which Mexico
would attract offshoring due to its lax environmental standards/enforcement. Mexican President
Salinas responded to the concerns of U.S. congress that Mexico would ignore the GATT ruling
and implement a new law to prevent the killing of dolphins (Mayer 1998: 128). U.S. negotiators
responded by inserting into the investment chapter draft, “Language on the environment may be
provided for this chapter and/or generically.”93
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III.B.2. Investor rights and FDI in financial services
In a January, 1992, the Mexican financial services negotiators prepared a document for
their counterparty negotiators in the U.S. Treasury. In the document, the Mexicans were in broad
agreement with U.S. liberalization objectives: “Behind the program for opening the domestic
financial system under NAFTA is the assumption that allowing foreign intermediaries to operate
in Mexico could contribute to economic efficiency and facilitate the globalization of the financial
sector.”94 However, the Mexican financial services negotiators retained the objective of
minimizing risks of instability that might result from “too sudden and too significant infusion of
foreign competition.”95 Therefore, by January, 1992, Mexico had agreed to the right of
establishment of foreign firms but was demanding a transition period until roughly 2010, with
permanent limitations on foreign ownership and foreign market share afterwards. Further,
Mexico was unwilling to accept the principle of “national treatment,” which the U.S. and Canada
outlined as an “essential condition” to the agreement.96
The U.S. negotiators responded that financial instability was not the core Mexican
motivation for insisting on permanent caps to foreign ownership and market share, but rather,
there were political motivations. U.S. negotiator Olin Wethington reflected, “The political
element stemmed from a strongly held view in certain Mexican political circles that the financial
system must be maintained under the control of Mexican nationals” (1994: 13). To that end,
Mexican negotiating documents characterized the Mexican banking and financial system
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generally as a “national asset” and “essential to the country’s economic security.”97 The Mexican
negotiating document asserted the necessity of permanent ceilings on foreign ownership of banks
- “…a ceiling is needed to assure adequate domestic control of the banking system so vital to the
national economy…”98 However, the U.S. rejected any permanent limitations on the principle of
national treatment.99
As negotiators prepared the first draft of the financial services agreement, they remained
“far apart” in seven areas: national treatment, coverage of agreement, administration of trade
laws and regulations, commercial presence, which services to include and exclude, transparency
of rules and regulations, and the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.100 In addition, the U.S.
was pressing for the agreement to cover financial services rather than financial firms, whereas
Mexico and Canada countered that the agreement should cover only firms subject to government
regulation. Mexico introduced a “sweeping proposal” that would ban financial service providers
from many programs that included government involvement, such as student loans, pension
funds, and export/import financing, and the U.S. rejected these exclusions. Canada insisted upon
the removal of Glass-Steagall restrictions on foreign banks and securities affiliates in U.S.
markets.101 Moreover, Canada sought to enlarge the ability of its securities firms to provide
cross-border securities services into the U.S. Towards Mexico, Canada was generally in line with
U.S. objectives but the Canadians did not make demands of Mexico as the U.S. did.
Simultaneously, in the “transfers” provision, the U.S. Treasury indicated that it would provide an
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emergency “safeguard” provision for balance of payment crises, although the language was not
yet drafted.102

III.C. “The Dallas Jamboree” and aftermath (February to April 1992)
Before the Dallas meeting there was a conclusion of the main draft text at the Uruguay
Round, although the U.S. and EU were still engaged in a standoff over agriculture. The
negotiations at Dallas assumed greater significance because concluding NAFTA would
demonstrate to the EU that the U.S. had an attractive non-agreement alternative to the Uruguay
Round. Presidents Bush and Salinas ratcheted up the pressure on their negotiators to complete
the NAFTA as soon as possible and the Dallas meeting was dubbed the “jamboree,” or large
gathering. In Dallas, all of the working groups met with chief negotiators for outstanding issues
to be decided at a higher political level.
Table 7: “The Dallas Jamboree” and aftermath (February to April 1992)
Negotiating
Domestic interactions with the USTR
issues in
Labor unions,
Business
Congress and
investment
Mexico
NGOs, civil
lobbies,
government
and financial
society
private sector
agencies
services
organizations trade policy
advisors
Investor
Leaked copy
NAFTA
NAFTA is
Expropriation
rights and
of negotiating should not
embraced as
language had
investortext confirms address labor alternative to to avoid Calvo
state dispute labor and
and
Uruguay
doctrine
settlement
environmental environment; Round;
(ISDS)
concerns
debate over
labor and
Market
N/A
environmental
access for
concerns
FDI
Investor
rights and
FDI in
102

N/A

Canada
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U.S.
investment
definition

U.S.
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Canada’s
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financial
services

treatment”
exception

services and
not just
firms;
pressures
Mex.

still pushes
for reforms
to GlassSteagall

III.C.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
Investor rights and ISDS
At Dallas, under pressure to conclude the NAFTA, Mexico finally conceded
“expropriation” and ISDS. In drafting the “expropriation” provision, negotiators had to figure out
how to word the obligation without violating the Mexican constitution, which permitted
expropriation on the grounds of national interest.103 An anonymous negotiator explained the
tradeoff, “We had to craft the expropriation language not using the words ‘prompt, adequate, and
effective.’ There are three paragraphs, and if you read them, you find that what they say is
exactly those three words, but in substitute language.”104 In market access talks, the U.S. had
conceded to Canada’s demand to maintain its foreign investment screen but the USTR sought to
reduce its scope.

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
A leaked copy of the draft text from the Dallas jamboree was published in March by the
Washington DC journal Inside U.S. Trade. It had confirmed all of the warnings of NAFTA
critics. The Sierra Club responded in a statement: “It’s pure and simple, the document does not
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pay attention to anything but expanding trade….The best you get is meaningless language or no
mention of the environment.”105

III.C.2. Investor rights and FDI in financial services
Similar to the investment negotiations, the Mexican financial services negotiating team
closely followed their directive to finish negotiations as soon as possible. At Dallas, the
Mexicans accepted the principle of national treatment in financial services.106 In addition, while
they maintained demands for a permanent cap on foreign market share, they abandoned their
fight for permanent caps on foreign ownership in banking. However, the Mexican negotiators
immediately repented this concession because they did so without any exchanges with the U.S.
or Canada, to the delight of those parties. As a result, U.S. negotiators became “hungry for
more.” An anonymous negotiator recalled, “They were giving things away; so I am going to
keep asking until they stop giving.”107 As the U.S. continued to push for the agreement to cover
financial services rather than financial firms, negotiators upped the ante, insisting that there
would be no NAFTA unless every financial intermediary who wanted access to the Mexican
market got it (Cameron and Tomlin 2000: 114).
Mexican financial markets had come to expect a NAFTA agreement, and the success of
NAFTA negotiations were already “factored into the market.”108 Therefore, any indication of
failure to reach an agreement would make Mexican markets highly volatile. The U.S. negotiating
strategy was to “keep demanding, and be patient.”109 The U.S. knew that Mexico was anxious for
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a deal as the country was in dire need of foreign capital. Therefore, U.S. negotiators were patient,
and when the Mexican markets became impatient, the U.S. would push Mexican negotiators for
concessions. The Mexican negotiators felt pressure from their superiors to conclude the
agreement as soon as possible and they would make tremendous concessions in a number of
working groups, especially investment and financial services.

III.D. Reaching an agreement (May to August 1992)
Table 8: Reaching an agreement (May to August 1992)
Negotiating
Domestic interactions with the USTR
issues in
Labor unions,
Business
Congress and
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Official study
rights and
argued that the over Canada
shows
investorNAFTA would and Mexico’s investment
state dispute increase
FDI screens
will be boon
settlement
offshoring and
to all
(ISDS)
decrease
NAFTA;
employment;
Market
Limit sectoral Congress
unsuccessfully exceptions to warns
access for
lobbied for
environmental
FDI
investment
labor and
concerns must
obligations
environmental
be addressed
provisions;
Investor
Financial
USTR and
presented
rights and
services
Treasury hold
studies
FDI in
lobby
meetings with
contesting
financial
threatens to
financial
official studies erode
services
services lobby
Congressional and must
support for
placate the
NAFTA
lobby’s
without
demands
Mexican
concessions

III.D.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
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Canada
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By the end of May, Mexico and Canada had conceded to all of the U.S. BIT provisions
and talks had progressed to negotiating which sectors would be exempt from the investment
chapter provisions. Mexico secured the most exceptions (89) although many were transitional
and to be phased out over time, followed by the U.S. (50) and Canada (48). Notably, all three
parties exempted government provided social services, telecommunications services, and
maritime and transportation sectors. Canada fought to protect their culture industries from
foreign investment while Mexico barred foreign investment in oil, gas, and petroleum. In
addition, Canada was persistent in maintaining investment screening of takeovers valued above
Can$150 million, and Mexico responded by also calling for an equivalent mechanism. The U.S.
rejected both, except for national security reasons, as in U.S. legislation. However, by August,
the U.S. conceded to both Canada and Mexico on permitting investment screening so as to
conclude the NAFTA, and the right to review investment acquisitions was carved out of the
dispute settlement coverage.110

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
The leaked draft text from the Dallas Jamboree was fuel to fire for opposition to the
NAFTA. A coalition of environmental groups, which included some fast track supporters,
presented the USTR with a list of demands. USTR Carla Hills “appeared uninterested” until a
number of Congressmen testified that the NAFTA would not make it past Congress unless
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environmental concerns were met.111 Hills responded in her testimony to Congress in September,
1992,
“Mexico will not become a pollution haven because it costs more for our
companies to move to Mexico than it does to comply with our U.S. environmental
standards. We did not negotiate this agreement to permit Mexico to enforce our
environmental laws or any of our other laws any more than we are going to
enforce theirs.”112
That is, the USTR concluded that the NAFTA would not turn Mexico into a “pollution
haven” because, “environmental compliance costs play a minimal role in relocation decisions
because they represent a small share of total costs for most industries.”113 The USTR even
claimed the contrary, the “NAFTA encourages environmentally sound investments” and “will
enhance environmental protection.”114 Therefore, to placate Congress, the USTR would “green
the text” including the investment chapter, but the environmental provisions were framed as
moral obligations and not legally enforceable provisions.
Similarly, the USTR concluded that neither Mexico’s low wages nor poor labor
conditions would attract U.S. FDI, because, “The total cost of production is what matters in
relocation decisions, not wages alone.”115 To the contrary, the USTR sold the investment
provisions to Congress as a “win-win” agreement for all parties, because, “U.S investments
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generate increased U.S. exports.”116 In August, 1992, the USTR press release on the investment
chapter explained that, “Integrated production in North America will make U.S. firms more
competitive against European and Japanese producers,” and the elimination of performance
requirements in Mexico “will increase the demand for inputs sourced from the United States.”117
Therefore, the USTR argued that the investment provisions will encourage job growth.
In May, 1992, at the request of the USTR, the U.S. International Trade Commission
surveyed and evaluated the various economic analyses of NAFTA. The subsequent report found
that:
“[T]here is a surprising degree of unanimity in the results regarding the
aggregate effects of NAFTA. All three countries are expected to gain from a
NAFTA. These independent studies found that NAFTA would increase U.S.
growth, jobs, and wages. They found that NAFTA would increase U.S. real GDP
by up to 0.5 percent per year once it is fully implemented. They projected
aggregate U.S. employment increases ranging from under 0.1 percent to 2.5
percent. The studies further project aggregate increases in U.S. real wages of
between 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent.”118
The President and the USTR announced these findings to Congress and the public. In so
doing, the USTR rejected the concerns of labor representatives in all three countries.
Simultaneously, the USTR’s negotiation of the investment chapter was strongly endorsed 119 by
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the Investment Policy Advisory Committee for Trade, the advisory committee that interfaces the
USTR with private sector perspectives.

III.D.2. Investor rights and FDI in financial services
In May, there was a deadlock in the financial services working group. At the Dallas
jamboree, Mexico had abandoned its fight for permanent caps on foreign ownership but insisted
on permanent caps on foreign market share in financial services and they refused to give more
market access. By May, Mexico had offered to “modify its demands” for a permanent cap on the
foreign market share in the financial sector.120 The U.S. negotiators consulted with financial
services corporate representatives and they were “furious.”121 The USTR and the Treasury then
got “hit with a lobbying barrage.”122 The U.S. financial services industry feared that such an
agreement would set “dangerous precedent” for future financial services negotiations with other
states. The major financial services lobbies wrote to USTR,
“The extent of liberalization in financial services will determine our ability
to support the final NAFTA agreement….Financial industry commitment to the
Mexican market will be undermined by any form of permanent cap even if used
for ‘safeguard purposes.’ These proposed restrictions are unacceptable in terms of
U.S. liberalization goals”123.
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The Treasury responded to Mexico that the U.S. financial services industry rejected the
Mexican proposal as “inadequate” and countered with a proposal that featured no permanent
caps within “some reasonable transition period”124. The standoff continued through June, as
Mexico was seeking tradeoff concessions with the U.S. and Canada. Mexico argued that the U.S.
cannot truly offer national treatment due to interstate banking laws and Glass Steagall and
Mexico joined Canada in demanding changes to Glass-Steagall. However, Mexico indicated that
it was willing to modify its demand of a permanent 12 percent cap on foreign share of the
financial services market for safe guards blocking further expansion.125
USTR Carla Hills and Treasury Secretary Nick Brady met with the financial services
lobby, where the lobby group demanded an improved deal or they would not offer financial
support to the pro-NAFTA lobby, which would make passing the NAFTA in the congress very
difficult.126 Hills and Brady returned to the Mexican negotiators with the ultimatum, and the
Mexicans understood that they could not get the NAFTA without the five largest banks in the
U.S. Mexico issued a new proposal with no permanent caps, but with a lengthy transition period
and for safeguards that would prevent rapid increases of foreign ownership. This new proposal
would be the basis of the final agreement and in July the U.S. and Mexico had reached a deal.
The USTR presented the agreement to the public and Congress as unprecedented support to U.S.
comparative advantages in financial services.127
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Canada still continued its demand for changes to U.S. interstate banking laws and GlassSteagall.128 The U.S. responded that repealing Glass-Steagall would require permission from the
Federal Reserve and it would not consider the demand, but foreign firms will be afforded same
rights as domestic firms. By the conclusion of negotiations the following issues between U.S.
and Canada remained unresolved: U.S. restrictions on interstate banking and Glass-Steagall
restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities firms.129 Those unresolved issues were
deferred for future negotiations, except for inclusion of hortatory language in the final
agreement.

Financial regulation and the “balance of payments” exception
The final agreement ventured into uncharted legal territory by seeking a tradeoff between
allowing for freer flows of capital and financial services while maintaining a “reasonable” level
of financial and monetary security. To this end, the liberalization of financial services could only
become viable by relying on exceptions to free trade principles (Schefer 1999: 402). The U.S.
Treasury inserted an emergency provision in the case of “balance of payments” crises in which
massive cross-border capital flows may destabilize a country’s financial system and/or exchange
rate (which was immediately put to the test during the 1995 Mexican Peso crisis, discussed in the
next chapter).130 The “balance of payments” exception can be broadly characterized as language
on capital controls, which allow exceptions to a country’s investment chapter obligations under
the “transfers” provision to allow for the absolute free movement of capital. However, the
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provisions of the “balance of payments” exception are highly conditional, in which they must:
only take specific forms under specific conditions; be implemented under the supervision of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF); be temporary; be non-discriminatory; and meet an
ambiguous standard “to not be more burdensome than necessary.”131 The USTR’s private sector
advisory committee strongly endorsed the provision,
“The provisions on transfers substantially meet the ACTPN's objective to
allow such transfers to be completely without restriction. The qualification
provided to address any possible balance of payments problem is reasonable, and
the conditions under which it may be invoked are clearly defined and limited.”132
That the balance of payments exception is ambiguous, vague, and highly conditional,
means that the NAFTA safeguards to financial stability are weak. Simultaneously, by applying
free trade principles to financial services, the agreement was intended to increase the mobility of
capital, which, according to free market principles, would increase economic growth.

IV. Polanyi’s “double movement” and NAFTA negotiations
In the NAFTA investment and financial services negotiations, U.S. political
actors represented all three of the ideal types of trade policy positions. U.S. MNCs, the
Bush and Clinton administrations, and bipartisan groups in Congress supported “free
trade” policies (market-based governance). Labor unions, environmental organizations,
consumer groups, and many Congressional Democrats supported “socialist” trade
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policies (subjecting markets to democratic control). Libertarian politicians and some labor unions
supported the “nationalist” trade policies (prioritizing national interests over multinational
interests). The Clinton administration’s embrace of the core text of the NAFTA and subsequent
implementation of the NAFTA was a big victory for the “free trade” actors over the “socialist”
and “nationalist” groups. The NAFTA had passed Congress because for at least three reasons,
the “free traders” had made a strong case for the necessity of the NAFTA in the context of
inevitable globalization, U.S. MNCs had made generous donations to the lawmakers for their
votes, and because the “socialist” and “nationalist” actors had less influence in Congress.

“Free trade” actors in NAFTA investment negotiations
The 1988 Omnibus Act mandated that the USTR negotiate trade and investment
agreements to “restore the trade balance” (reduce the trade deficit) with an aggressive export
strategy, which was a central purpose of the NAFTA. Since manufacturing imports from Mexico
contained greater U.S. content than similar imports from Asia, manufacturing industries were
competitively restructuring into Mexico as a low-wage export platform, notably, the auto,
textiles, and information technology industries. In addition, the NAFTA investment and services
chapters (including financial services) were designed to increase U.S. service exports in the
region and set a model for future agreements in other regions. According to the USTR’s private
sector advisors, the NAFTA investment chapter would encourage intra-regional investment in
manufacturing and services and in so doing facilitate firm-level economies of scale to “compete
more effectively in world markets.”133 The private sector argued to the Bush administration,
“The United States cannot afford to sit on the sidelines while our major trading partners, Europe
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and Japan, develop strategic alliances to enhance their own competitiveness.”134 The
Bush administration sold the private sector’s plan to the public as an engine of job growth
because more globally competitive industries implied more exports and jobs, “U.S
investments generate increased U.S. exports.”135 The Bush administration proudly
displayed the 1992 ITC report surveying all relevant and authoritative studies and
predicted that the NAFTA would increase GDP, employment, and wages in all three
countries.136
As U.S. financial services negotiators sought freedom of commerce for U.S.
financial institutions they simultaneously deregulated trade and investment in financial
services. This became evident in the conflict between Mexican regulators and U.S.
financial services firms, who eventually threatened to sink the NAFTA in Congress.
Mexico eventually conceded to accept ISDS because the USTR and the U.S. business
community insisted that ISDS was necessary for Mexico to attract U.S. capital, signifying
Mexico’s official break with the Calvo Doctrine. The USTR successfully reregulated
Mexico and Canada using the NAFTA investment and financial services chapters to
support the interests of U.S. MNCs in name of “market efficiency.”

“Socialist” actors in NAFTA investment negotiations
The USTR’s overall objective in the NAFTA investment and financial services
agreements was to support the efficiency, competitiveness, and market shares of U.S.
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industries and therefore U.S. jobs. This objective became codified as broad multinational
investor rights enforceable by ISDS. However, throughout negotiations, the core
proposals of the USTR and U.S. MNCs faced diverse social and political resistance. In
many instances, multinational investor rights and ISDS conflicted with a range of
regulatory areas, including, labor, environment, and financial regulation. Labor unions
warned that the lack of enforceable (investment-related) labor regulations in Mexico would
depress working conditions in the U.S. While the Bush administration opposed enforceable
investment-related environmental provisions because other countries should not have the right to
enforce U.S. environmental laws. In contrast, environmental organizations argued that investor
rights and ISDS gave multinational investors the right to undermine environmental laws, as
demonstrated by the GATT ruling that forbade the U.S.’ environmental ban on imports of
Mexican tuna.

“Nationalist” actors in NAFTA investment negotiations
Perhaps the most well-known “nationalist” politician was Ross Perot, who ran a
relatively successful third party campaign in the 1992 Presidential elections. During a debate,
Perot famously derided the NAFTA,
“We have got to stop sending jobs overseas. It’s pretty simple: If you're
paying $12, $13, $14 an hour for factory workers and you can move your factory
South of the border, pay a dollar an hour for labor,...have no health care – that’s
the most expensive single element in making a car - have no environmental
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controls, no pollution controls and no retirement, and you don’t care about
anything but making money, there will be a giant sucking sound going south.”137
Perot’s argument was that NAFTA would enable Mexico to “suck” manufacturing
investment away from the U.S., thereby putting downward pressure on employment and wages
in the U.S. Some U.S. labor unions shared Perot’s sentiments. They did not support the NAFTA
along nationalistic lines and advocated protectionist policies (Kay 2004). However, they only
influenced a small minority in Congress and President Bush alienated the “nationalists” during
the 1992 elections.
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Chapter Four: U.S. Effects of the NAFTA Investment Agreements
I.
II.

Introduction
Regulatory effects

III.

Income effects

IV.

Feedbacks between regulatory and income effects

V.

Clarifying U.S. trade policy positions

“…But as Steven P. Jobs of Apple spoke, President Obama interrupted with an inquiry of his
own: what would it take to make iPhones in the United States?...Mr. Jobs’s reply was
unambiguous. ‘Those jobs aren’t coming back,’ he said…”138

“If a single industrial sector might be called the cradle of international commercial arbitration, it
would be the energy business. Especially oil and gas.”139

I. Introduction
In this chapter I review the NAFTA investment and financial services chapters’ regulatory
effects and income effects. I divide the chapter into three parts. First, I examine the regulatory
effects of the NAFTA investment chapter by identifying trends in the investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) case law and jurisprudence. Second, I will synthesize studies about the
NAFTA investment chapter income effects of the agreement, including, industry, financial
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system, labor, and environmental effects. I will supplement these literature reviews with relevant
data. Third, I will review U.S. investment policy debates to see if there are feedbacks between
the regulatory and income effects.

II. Regulatory effects of the NAFTA investment chapter
As of January 1, 2016, the U.S. Department of State reports 49 concluded
NAFTA ISDS cases, 17 claims against the U.S., 18 claims against Canada, and 14 claims
against Mexico. Canada has paid $172.7 million in awards; Mexico has paid $204.2
million in awards; the U.S. has not lost a case. In this section, I identify two trends in the
NAFTA ISDS case law, (1) varying tribunal interpretations of the same provisions, and
(2) conflicts with public interest legislation. Next, I examine the regulatory effects of
these trends, which amount to an undermining of state sovereignty to regulate
multinational investors.

II.A. NAFTA investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) trends
II.A.1. Uneven implementation
While Canada and Mexico have nearly lost as many cases as won under the NAFTA
ISDS, the U.S. has not lost a single case (see Appendix Two). In fact, under every FTA and BIT
that the U.S. is party to, the U.S. has not lost one ISDS case. ISDS proponents hold this up as
evidence that ISDS merely functions to export U.S. legal standards while the claims of ISDS
opponents are unfounded; ISDS opponents warn that the U.S. does not have any ISDS
agreements with any of the large capital-exporting states so it has not faced many challenges and
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that trade politics condition tribunals’ decision making. As Rep. Doggett testified before the
Subcommittee on Trade,
“…the fact that the U.S. has yet to have a ruling against it, I think has to
be considered against the backdrop of the fact that the trade lawyers who are the
arbitrators in these panels are well aware of what the impact would be if the U.S.
did lose a major decision.”140
Tribunals have three members, one is appointed by the claimant, one is appointed by the
defendant, and the third is agreed upon by both parties; in general, most arbitrators have legal
background in relevant trade and investment law.141 The partiality of tribunals has been
frequently questioned.142 In one famous instance, Judge Abner Mikva, a former Congressman
and retired DC circuit court judge, was the U.S.-appointed arbitrator in Loewen v. United States
(2003) filed under NAFTA ISDS. After the U.S. appointed Judge Mikva, he recounted a meeting
with U.S. Department of Justice officials in a candid recording. The officials told him, “You
know, Judge, if we lose this case we could lose NAFTA.” Judge Mikva replied, “Well, if you
want to put pressure on me, then that does it.”143 In fact, Mikva revealed that he was the
dissenting opinion as the other two arbitrators were intent on finding against the U.S. The
Loewen case was later dismissed on a legal technicality.
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Certainly, one piece of anecdotal evidence hardly demonstrates that all ISDS tribunals are
politicized. However, two studies of international commercial arbitrations found that dissenting
opinions were almost invariably (in more than 95% of the cases) written by the arbitrator
nominated by the losing party, and these same results are replicated for ISDS cases (Redfern
2003; Romero 2005). In other words, in the vast majority of ISDS cases, arbitrators find in favor
of the party that appointed them. As explained by investment law expert Jan Paulsson, “The
problem is that the inevitability of such calculations proves that unilateral appointments are
inconsistent with the fundamental premise of arbitration: mutual confidence in arbitrators.”144 In
the context of the uneven implementation of the NAFTA ISDS, at stake is that the bias of the
arbitrators becomes colored by U.S. trade politics.
The original drafters of the U.S. Model BIT had never considered that the U.S. could be a
respondent to an ISDS case because the BIT program was designed for developing countries that
were not capital-exporters (Vandevelde 2009: 285). Years later, business lobbies and supportive
Congress members frequently justify ISDS by arguing that it functions to “raise legal
standards”145 in developing countries and ISDS is “…aimed mainly at prospective trading
partners.”146 In fact, the USTR explained that the original purpose of ISDS was to “de-politicize”
conflicts between U.S. firms and developing countries by shifting capital disputes to the
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jurisdiction of third-party arbitrators at the World Bank. However, the uneven implementation of
the NAFTA ISDS suggests that investment disputes are just as politicized as ever.

II.A.2. Varying tribunal interpretations of the same provisions
In the NAFTA ISDS case law, the two most cited provisions have been the ‘minimum
standard of treatment’ and ‘expropriation’ articles. These two articles have also been the most
controversial because they each contain vague language, which has led to varying interpretations
of the same provisions and uncertainty over future tribunals. The ‘minimum standard of
treatment’ provision is illustrative of the conflict.
The main provision of the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ article is ‘fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security’ of foreign investments. After the NAFTA came into
force, the article was immediately problematic as companies assumed liberal interpretations of
the provision ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and brought claims against all three governments.
This led the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to issue an Interpretative Note (2001) of the
provision, which tied the definition of “fair and equitable treatment” to “customary international
law.”147 Appendix Three provides an account of this decision. This revision scaled back the
strength of the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ article. However, the language remained
sufficiently vague such that it can be interpreted both broadly and narrowly. Investors have
claimed that ‘customary international law’ is an evolutionary concept that can change with legal
norms, while states have argued that ‘customary international law’ is limited to several specific
situations, notably, the denial of justice and due process.
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This conflict became illustrated in Glamis vs. The United States (2009),148 in
which Glamis Gold, a Canadian mining company, brought claims against the U.S. by
arguing that ‘fair and equitable treatment’ means that governments must maintain stable
and predictable regulatory environments to protect investors’ expectations. In other
words, once an investment contract is made with a government an investor has an
expectation of the regulatory environment for that investment, and governments breach
‘fair and equitable treatment’ when they make regulatory changes that later (negatively)
affect the investment. In defense, the State Department argued149 that a change in the law
does not violate ‘fair and equitable treatment’ because under the 2001 Interpretative Note
it is not a denial of justice for the law to change. Glamis contested that there are plenty of
NAFTA tribunal rulings demonstrating that the standard of ‘fair and equitable treatment’
can evolve and past tribunals have decided that the provision should assure a stable
regulatory environment, which means the government has a duty not to change the law.
The ‘minimum standard of treatment’ was cited in 29 of the 35 decided NAFTA
cases. In a number of these 29 cases, arbitral tribunals have applied an ‘evolutionary’
approach to ‘fair and equitable treatment’ that is based on the decisions of past tribunals,
as argued by Glamis. This demonstrates a fundamental ambiguity in the interpretations of
‘minimum standard of treatment.’ Beginning with the 2004 Model BIT, the U.S. also tied
the ‘expropriations’ article to ‘customary international law,’ and this has done little to
constrain tribunals from making broad interpretations of the ‘expropriations’ article.150
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II.A.3. Conflicts with public interest legislation
As MNCs increasingly utilized ISDS they have challenged a range of public
interest laws. In the NAFTA ISDS cases, environmental legislation is by far the most
targeted.151 These results are similar on a global scale, by 2012, out of the 450 total
worldwide ISDS cases, environmental policies had been most at risk of ISDS claims, especially
from the oil, gas, and mining sectors.152 In fact, in all ISDS cases, oil, gas and mining sectors
account for 25% of all claims.153 In 2014 alone, energy and mining companies brought half of
ISDS claims. A handful of NAFTA cases are illustrative. Among the most well-known is Lone
Pine Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada,154 in which the Canadian state of Quebec
instituted a moratorium on shale gas exploration and development, including fracking. Lone
Pine, a U.S. oil and gas firm, immediately brought an ISDS claim citing ‘minimum standard of
treatment’ and ‘expropriation’ charging that Canada ‘acted with no cognizable public purpose,’
and violated their ‘valuable right to mine for oil and gas under the St. Lawrence River.’ The
tribunal found in favor of Lone Pine and awarded the company $118.9 million USD. In a more
recent NAFTA case, after years of public opposition to TransCanada’s proposed Keystone XL
oil pipeline, which would funnel Canadian oil sands crude to the U.S. Gulf coast, President
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Obama determined that the pipeline was not in the national interest and denied its
construction. In June, 2016, TransCanada brought a NAFTA ISDS claim amounting to
$15 billion USD.155
States have won about half of all decided NAFTA cases, and the tribunals have dismissed
a number of claims targeting environmental legislation. Notably, in Methanex v. United
the tribunal dismissed Methanex’s claims against California in 2004 on jurisdictional grounds.
The tribunal ruled in favor of the U.S. that California’s public health ban on methanol was a
measure of general application and therefore been not related to the company Methanex. This
ruling affirmed that states do retain policy space for environmental laws. On the other hand,
outside of the NAFTA, by 2012 there were 274 decided ISDS cases and nearly 60% were
either settled or were decided in favor of the investor.157 In these cases MNCs have
challenged not only environmental measures but a range of other public interest laws,
including labor, public health, and financial regulations. Moreover, the rate of new ISDS
cases has been increasing dramatically - while fewer than 50 cases were filed in the first
three decades of the ISDS system, there were at least 50 cases each year from 2011-2015
(with 70 in 2015).
Public interest groups have argued that the effect of ISDS has been a ‘regulatory
chill’ on proposed legislation, in which governments modify, amend, or withdraw
legislation due to the threat of ISDS. In North America, in the mid-1990s, Canada sought
to introduce plain packaging regulations and U.S. tobacco multinational Phillip Morris
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along with Carla Hills, former USTR who negotiated the NAFTA, threatened Canada with an
ISDS challenge. Subsequently, Canada abandoned its plain packaging proposal and opted for a
larger size of the health warning label on packages.158 In sum, ISDS makes governments
accountable before investors and the case law demonstrates that ISDS produces fundamental
conflicts between private and public interests.

II.B. Regulatory effects of NAFTA ISDS
The NAFTA investor protections and ISDS can foreclose possibilities of governments
implementing new regulations even when regulatory norms evolve. In so doing, ISDS embodies
a trade-off between the rights of multinational investors and sovereignty to regulate them. For
example, the NAFTA ISDS directly and indirectly undermined state sovereignty with respect to
climate change regulations and emergency financial measures.

II.B.1. Direct undermining of state sovereignty: climate change regulations
In 1977, a senior scientist at U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobile concluded in a company report,
‘…the most likely manner in which mankind is influencing the global climate is through carbon
dioxide release from the burning of fossil fuels.’159 In 2015, investigative journalists found that
Exxon Mobile has decades of internal documents showing that its own scientists and executives
knew that burning fossil fuels contributes to global warming and that the executives suppressed
the findings.160 Publicly, Exxon Mobile denied global warming in their effort to fight off

158

See Sinclair, above n 19, at 37.
Neela Banerjee, Lisa Song and David Hasemyer, ‘Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil
Fuels' Role in Global Warming Decades Ago,’ Inside Climate News, 16 September 2015.
160
Ibid.
159

116

government regulations. Simultaneously, Exxon Mobile had used the NAFTA ISDS as a
deregulatory tool. In 2015, Exxon Mobile won $17.3 million USD from the government of
Canada against a ‘performance requirement’ that required Exxon Mobile to help finance
petroleum-focused research and development in Newfoundland and Labrador.161 This case
complemented other NAFTA ISDS cases in which U.S. oil company Lone Pine had successfully
won a case against a ban on fracking in Canada, and TransCanada’s $15 billion dollar
claim against the U.S. for the Obama administration’s denial of the Keystone XL
pipeline.
International consensus has been shifting to accept human-caused global warming
as a fact, and regulatory norms have also evolved to reflect this, which Exxon Mobile
well understood. Therefore, the fossil fuel industry’s explicit use of ISDS as a
deregulatory tool curtails state sovereignty to implement climate change regulations. In
other international investment agreements, the fossil fuel and mining industries are by far
the most active in bringing ISDS cases against governments, particularly developing
countries.

II.B.2. Indirect undermining of state sovereignty: emergency financial regulations
The NAFTA investment chapter’s ‘transfers’ article obliges the free movement of
capital. The only exception is the ‘balance of payments’ provision that allows states to
regulate the cross-border movement of capital during crises, which can only be
implemented under highly specific conditions (a policy mix known as ‘capital controls’).
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In both the 1995 Mexican Peso crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis, Mexican policymakers
did not attempt to implement the NAFTA balance of payments exception. However, since the
2008 global financial crisis, many developing countries in Latin America and Asia have
underscored capital controls as fundamental to development policy.162 In 2012, the IMF
announced a ‘new institutional view,’ which claims that the free movement of capital rests on
weak economic theory, and it has ‘heightened macroeconomic volatility and vulnerability to
crises.’163 The IMF’s new institutional stance calls for situational capital controls (i.e. capital
controls on a case-by-case basis).
The debates and merits of capital controls notwithstanding, both the U.S. and Mexican
policymakers’ commitment to the free movement of capital removed capital controls as a policy
option for confronting economic crises in the region. This steadfast commitment to the free
movement of capital is institutionalized in the NAFTA investment and financial services
chapters. As explained by the U.S. negotiators of those chapters, their purpose was to ‘lock-in’
Mexico’s commitment to the free movement of capital in case of future political shifts away
from free trade doctrine in Mexico.164 Therefore, the NAFTA’s stringent restrictions on capital
controls reflects pre-2008 regulatory norms as international policy consensus has shifted towards
supporting certain regulations on capital movements.
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There has only been one NAFTA ISDS case ruling on financial regulations,
Fireman’s Fund v. United Mexican States (2003).165 Following the 1995 Mexican Peso
crisis, the Mexican Central Bank had assisted Mexican financial institutions with Pesodenominated debt instruments but had denied the same treatment to the Fireman Fund, a
U.S. insurance company, which then claimed it to be a violation of the NAFTA’s
‘national treatment’ provision. In the tribunal’s ruling, the arbitrators had never
questioned the right of investors to challenge a government policy in response to
financial crisis. In fact, the tribunal ruled that ISDS arbitrators can determine the
‘reasonableness’ of emergency financial regulations. Moreover, the tribunal interpretation
stated that investors can challenge emergency financial regulations during crises as
expropriations. In 2006, under a European BIT, an ISDS tribunal awarded a foreign bank
$236 million because the government did not provide the foreign bank with the same
bail-out as national banks.166 In short, although Mexican policymakers do not support the
use of capital controls, the NAFTA provisions foreclose the possibility of their
implementation while ISDS leaves open the possibility for investors to challenge capital
controls and other emergency financial measures.

III. Income effects of NAFTA investment chapter
In this section I survey the first-order income effects of the NAFTA investment
chapter, and then introduce some second-order income effects. I mostly focus on the
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U.S.-Mexico investment relationship for two reasons, (1) considering the U.S.-Canada
relationship, it is impossible to separate the effect of the NAFTA investment chapter from
previous bilateral investment agreements, and (2) the U.S. BIT program was originally
designed for contract with developing countries, focusing on the U.S.-Mexico
relationship will highlight the effects of investment agreements between the U.S. and
developing countries.

III.A. Increased regional economies of scale
The immediate income effect of the NAFTA investment chapter was to facilitate
economies of scale for regional MNCs. In a meticulous survey of the assets and sales of Fortune
500 companies during the early 2000s, economists Alan Rugman and Chang Hoon Oh found that
most MNCs operate regionally rather than globally.167 That is, the vast majority of U.S.,
European, and Asian MNCs both produce and sell on a home region basis. Rugman and Hoon
Oh conclude that MNCs tend to dominate in their home region while marginally investing and
operating in other regions. For example, there are many European and Japanese MNCs investing
in North America, but the ‘home’ U.S. MNCs have most of the market share in North America,
and there are similar patterns in Europe and Asia.168 The NAFTA facilitated regional economies
of scale for U.S. MNCs while European and Asian MNCs contested the North American market.
Following the implementation of the NAFTA, U.S. FDI to Mexico has been concentrated in
manufacturing, followed by financial services and mining.
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Figure Two: U.S. FDI Stocks in Mexico by Sector
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IV.A.1. Regional economies of scale in manufacturing
U.S. trade policymakers negotiating the NAFTA investment chapter had two goals - to maintain
the global competitiveness of U.S. MNCs and to support jobs in the U.S. The USTR’s main
private sector advisory committee explained, ‘With a NAFTA that allows companies to plan long
term investments…costs can be reduced and economies of scale achieved, allowing North
American products to compete more effectively in world markets.’169 The U.S. sought to
integrate production with Mexico such that U.S. industries would better compete with East Asia,
particularly in autos, electronics, and textiles. The NAFTA investment chapter provided the legal
underpinning to this trade strategy as U.S. FDI entered Mexico. U.S. imports from Mexico
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contained much higher U.S. content than competing imports from East Asia, therefore, by
importing from Mexico (rather than East Asia) domestic manufacturing could be sustained. Prior
to the NAFTA, Mexican goods imports contained roughly 5 percent U.S. content, twenty years
later, one report estimated that figure climbed to 40 percent, demonstrating the success of the
NAFTA.170 Conversely, U.S. imports from China are estimated to have only 4 percent U.S.
content.171
The NAFTA investment chapter facilitated globally competitive regional value chains in
autos and transportation equipment, information technology, and textiles and apparel. These
value chains enabled the U.S. and Mexico to co-produce for export to the world. The NAFTA
trade strategy was relatively successful from the NAFTA entering into force in 1994 until 2001,
as North America’s annual shares of world merchandise exports outpaced those of East Asia
during that time. During that same period, all three NAFTA countries experienced growth in
GDP, employment, and productivity. However, after China joined the WTO in 2001,
competition from East Asia, led by China, either caused a disarticulation of North American
supply chains or undercut their competitiveness.172
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Figure Three: North America vs. East Asia, Shares of Total World Merchandise Exports
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Competition from China notwithstanding, vertically integrated production with
Mexico benefited U.S. firms. Economists Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski
analyzed confidential firm-level data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis on the
international activities of U.S. MNCs between the years 1990 and 2009. They found that
U.S. MNCs that have offshored to Mexico have become more globally competitive and
in turn they have increased their investment and employment in the U.S.173 Their findings
are consistent with other studies that observe that U.S. outward FDI has helped U.S. firms
to achieve globally competitive economies of scale and in turn expand domestic
operations and employment.174
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Information technology (IT) value chains
By 2011, the NAFTA had facilitated the emergence of the IT sector as a key source of
dynamism for North America, IT manufacturing accounted for 18% of trilateral trade in North
America ($179 billion) (Gallagher & Zarsky 2007; Rioux et. al. 2015). However, since the 1990s
the industry had undergone profound changes. In 2001, Mexico was the largest supplier of IT
goods to the U.S. and had 15.7% market share, yet by 2010 Mexico’s share of the U.S. market
shrank to 15%; in that same time period China increased its share of the U.S. IT import market
from 13.4% (2001) to 49.5% (2011).175
The central motivation of Mexico in the NAFTA was to attract manufacturing FDI and
Mexican policymakers identified information technology as a key sector for export to the U.S.
(Gallagher & Zarsky 2007). Following NAFTA, the plan was successful as a handful of the
“global flagships” of the IT industry quickly established manufacturing operations in
Guadalajara, Mexico, including Hewlett-Packard and IBM. Several of the large contracting
manufacturing firms followed the flagships to Guadalajara, and in turn, they contracted the
manufacturing of parts to suppliers throughout East Asia. In 2000-1, the bursting of technology
bubble produced a crisis of overcapacity in the IT industry just as China was joining the WTO.
Every multinational IT firm that relocated from Guadalajara headed for China. Analysts Kevin
Gallagher and Lyuba Zarsky observed, “With its large domestic market, low wages, and
significant IT manufacturing capacities (built up over 20 years by state-led development
policies), China became the production platform du jour” (2007: 8). Between 2000 and 2011,
Chinese exports of IT goods to NAFTA grew by 360 percent, reaching nearly $154 billion; in the
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same time period U.S. exports to NAFTA grew by 14 percent, Mexico’s grew by 59 percent, and
Canada’s decreased by 56 percent.176 Moreover, the U.S. market share of IT goods in Canada and
Mexico shrank while to China’s grew. These trends demonstrate that China’s vast gains in trade
in IT goods were at the expense of North America.
By the 1990s, China had emerged as the core of MNCs location strategy for two reasons China had a large and growing internal market and it was a low-cost export platform (Gallagher
& Zarsky 2007: 112). Global flagships of the IT industry, and their contracting manufacturers,
would base their supply chain in China for final assembly of finished goods and importing parts
and components to China from East Asia and to a lesser extent the U.S. and Europe. A famous
example is the production of iPhones in Foxconn assembly plants in China. The extent and
sophistication of China-East Asia supply chains were unparalleled in the world and became a key
source of growth and dynamism for the East Asian countries, particularly supply chains in
electrical machinery and semiconductor devices (Prema-chandra 2010: 15). However, not only
did Chinese IT manufacturing assume comparative advantage in the low-value added assembly
stages, but China has moved up the value chain at unprecedented speeds. Beginning in the 1980s,
China had begun to develop its IT sector with careful industrial policy. Chinese policymakers
implemented a strategy to develop its domestic firms while inviting the global flagship IT firms
to establish joint partnerships with Chinese firms. In exchange for market access, China required
the TNCs to transfer technology, establish R&D centers, source to local firms, and train Chinese
employees (Gallagher & Zarsky 2007: 112). In so doing, Chinese IT firms have assumed diverse
points of the value chain, laying the foundation for China’s rapid ascent to become the world’s
largest IT exporter by 2004. While the NAFTA investment chapter forbids requiring firms to
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establish joint ventures with technology transfers and R&D, the WTO permitted China the policy
space to do so and China used it to the max.

Textile and apparel value chains
The NAFTA rules of origin, investment chapter, and reduction of related tariffs led to the
development of a vertically integrated North American textile-apparel chain that flourished
briefly in the late 1990s, particularly in Mexico. Rules of origin oblige a certain amount of North
American content in the final good, thereby protecting against import competition. Mexico’s
textile and clothing chain is highly integrated with the U.S. for use of both inputs and export of
the finished goods. In fact, the sector uses a high number imported inputs from the U.S. and uses
the highest U.S. value added in its exports, far more than China and the rest of world.177
However, following 2000, China, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan substantially increased their
share of global production and trade while the U.S. experienced a steady decline in textile
production and trade.
The end of the Multifibre Arrangement in 2005 further led developing countries (largely
China) to increase their shares of global textile and apparel production, deteriorating the NAFTA
region’s textile and clothing value chain. Since 2005, in Mexico’s textile and clothing sector,
value added as a proportion of the total value of output has been lower than pre-NAFTA levels
and fell by more than a quarter from 2000 to 2010.178 Therefore, beginning in 2000 as North
America’s textile and clothing value chain faced increasing import competition from across the
Pacific, it disintegrated the NAFTA supply chain. From 1990 to 2000, Mexico’s textile and
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clothing exports to the U.S. grew by an average annual rate of 30.7 percent, from 2000 to 2010 it
contracted by 4.4 percent per year. In that same period, U.S. textile and clothing imports from
China grew from 12 percent of total textile and clothing imports to 42 percent (Peters &
Gallagher 2013b: 98). Simultaneously, textile and clothing manufacture as a share of U.S. GDP
and employment sharply contracted.

Automotive value chains
Prior to the NAFTA, the North American auto industry produced vehicles for their
respective domestic markets, due to transportation costs, tariffs, and regulatory constraints. The
NAFTA led to a highly complex and integrated automotive production supply chain.179 The
North American automotive chain that emerged was facilitated by the NAFTA auto rules of
origin, investment chapter, and tariff reductions, thereby protecting the sector from competition
from Asian and Chinese firms in both absolute and relative terms. Between 2000 and 2010,
Mexico’s auto sector has received over $10 billion in FDI as an export platform to the U.S. and
U.S. auto firms are by far Mexico’s largest producers and exporters, the “big three” (General
Motors, Chrysler and Ford) accounted more than 60 percent of exports prior to NAFTA and 52.4
percent in 2009.180 By 2011, Mexico had surpassed Canada and Japan as the leading supplier of
automotive goods to the U.S., accounting for 26 percent ($64.4 billion) of total U.S. motor
vehicle and auto parts imports. While the post-NAFTA restructuring of the auto industry
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produced a U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in automotive production, Mexico’s low-wage export
platform has allowed automakers to amortize the large fixed costs of capital-intensive production
facilities in the U.S., helping to sustain the entire North American industry.181 However, Chinese
automotive production has been growing at unprecedented clips, suggesting competition in the
near future.
While the North American automotive value chain has been a symbol of the success of
NAFTA as a competitive integration plan, Mexican producers have begun to significantly import
Chinese auto parts into their supply chain. In 2005, Chinese auto parts were 3.2 percent of
Mexico’s total imported auto parts, by 2009, that figure had climbed to nearly 10 percent.182 By
2010, China was the world’s top exporter of tires and tubes. Moreover, China has quickly risen
to be the largest automotive producer in the world. In the early 1990s, China accounted for less
than 1 percent of global automotive output, by 2009 China accounted for 23.5 percent of global
output becoming the world’s top producer.183 China has not yet begun to export cars on any
significant scale because China’s auto sector has been producing for China’s internal market.
However, as the pace of China’s domestic consumption slows, it is likely that China will seek to
increase automotive exports.

III.A.2. Regional economies of scale in financial services
In response to the Mexican Peso crisis in 1995, Mexican policymakers opened financial
services to foreign investment before the NAFTA liberalization schedule came into force. The
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IMF and the World Bank encouraged the private recapitalization of the Mexican banking
system by foreign banks because it would be foundational to a ‘sound and stable’
financial system.184 As a result, by 1997, Mexico raised the ceiling on foreign investment
from 30 to 49 percent and entirely repealed restrictions on foreign ownership of financial
institutions in 1999, fully opening Mexico to FDI in financial services. Mexico’s banking
system quickly became dominated by foreign banks. Between 1999 and 2002, foreign
bank market share jumped from 20 to 82 percent, mostly by cross-border mergers and
acquisitions from the U.S., Canada, and Spain.185
As Mexico’s banks became foreign owned they adopted foreign bank lending,
borrowing, and risk management practices. International banks have used
communications and information technology to create new financial markets and
introduce new financial products, notably, household and consumption loans and
financial market mediation.186 U.S. financial services FDI transplanted these same
banking practices into Mexico. Just as the widgets produced for export by Mexican
maquiladoras were ‘Made in Mexico,’ the household loans and derivatives that originated
from foreign banks in Mexico were ‘Made in the USA.’
The NAFTA investment and financial services chapter opened Mexico to foreign
banks which facilitated economies of scale in the regional financial services industry,
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contributing to the consolidation of the global banking industry (i.e. ‘too big to fail’).187 Foreign
bank operations and trading with developing countries have become key sources of bank
profitability. Appendix One provides an overview of U.S. bank operations in Mexico. According
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, in 1999, the U.S. exported to Mexico $19.514 billion in
financial services, which steadily expanded until a two year plateau in 2008 at over $60 billion,
then continued to climb to $87.774 billion by 2014. In 2014, Mexico accounted for nearly a
quarter of total U.S. financial services exports to Latin America. In 2007, U.S. financial services
affiliates in Mexico generated $6.989 billion in services supplied, and by 2014 that figure grew
to $11.985 billion. However, these figures are underestimates due to Mexico’s hub in the global
trillion dollar narcotics trade and the extensive money laundering activities of foreign banks in
Mexico on account of the drug cartels.188

III.A.3. Mining and fossil fuels
Mexico is one of the world’s leading producers of silver, copper, gold, and zinc. In terms
of mining investment attraction, Mexico ranks fourth in the world and first in Latin America.189
Mexico’s mining sector is largely dependent upon FDI and majority comes from Canadian firms
followed by U.S. investors.190 Scale dynamics in mining and fossil fuel extraction are
complicated by fluctuations in the prices of the commodities. However, mining is typically a first
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step in manufacturing value chains, and the Mexican market has enabled regional MNCs
and investors to achieve economies of scale.
During NAFTA negotiations, Mexico made its energy sector off limits to FDI and
so that the state-owned oil company could retain a monopoly and Mexico could use its
revenue to finance the budget. In response to a mix of political and economic conditions,
Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto opened the energy sector to private investment in
2014 to boost investment, exploration, and productivity in the sector. Although U.S. FDI
in Mexico’s fossil fuels is only beginning, U.S. oil and gas companies have been large
investors in Canada’s abundant oil and gas, facilitating regional economies of scale for
U.S. MNCs in fossil fuel extraction.
III.A.4. Regional economies of scale and increased productivity growth
There is a large and growing body of literature documenting that trade and
investment liberalization increases productivity growth. Economists Jan De Loecker and
Pinelopi Goldberg conducted a review of literature on this relationship and concluded,
‘…there is one robust finding that emerges from this literature: globalization improves
industry performance.’191 However, there no consensus on the causal relationship
between trade and productivity. A 2015 report by the White House pointed to several
different channels, notably, that trade and investment liberalization facilitates firm-level
economies of scale which then increases firm productivity growth.192 The White House
report then goes on to cite a number of studies in which ‘…the common mechanism is
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that exporting induces investments in technology.’193 For example, in the auto industry, Mexico’s
low-wage export platform has allowed U.S. automakers to amortize their investments in capitalintensive production facilities in the U.S., thereby sustaining the entire North American auto
industry.194 Similarly, the development of information technology has made service industries
more productive and allowed the increased offshoring of services.195 In so doing, U.S. outward
FDI in both manufacturing and services has increased productivity growth for U.S. firms in those
sectors. The NAFTA investment chapter directly and indirectly facilitated economies of scale,
which increased firm-level productivity growth and contributed to the dynamism of U.S. MNCs.

IV.B. Second-order income effects
The NAFTA investment chapter not only facilitated the global competitiveness of U.S.
MNCs but it had second-order income effects. They include: (1) intensified regional financial
instability, (2) heightened job polarization in the U.S. and Mexico, and (3) amplified regional
environmental damage. These income effects are relevant to regional economies of scale
inasmuch as they shift costs from the private sector to the public sector. Due to the scope of this
paper, I summarize them below.

IV.B.1. Intensified regional financial instability
The NAFTA investment chapter ‘transfers’ article obliges the absolute free movement of
capital. This provision, in tandem with other deregulatory provisions in the investment and
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financial services chapters, facilitated regional financial integration. However, these
deregulations have a costly trade-off with financial instability.196 Financial crises redistributed
income from the private to public sector by three channels: the direct social costs of bank bailouts from governments as multinational banks ‘socialized’ their losses; increased financial
instability leading to credit crunches followed by recessions which impose far greater societal
costs then the direct cost of bail-outs;197 the free movement of capital as the main channel
by which financial crises spread internationally.198 Each of these occurred in North
America during the 1995 Mexican Peso crisis and especially the 2008 global financial
crisis.199 While the NAFTA was certainly not the cause of these crises, the NAFTA
removed policy options for preventing and responding to them.200 This underscores how
financial integration has a costly trade-off with financial stability.

The NAFTA and the 1995 Mexican Peso Crisis
Immediately after the NAFTA came into force Mexico fell into a severe and
unprecedented balance of payments crisis leading Mexico to face a default on its sovereign debt.
The connection between the 1995 peso crisis to the NAFTA is subject to debate, however,
Mexican authorities attributed the causes of the currency crisis to unprecedented and rapid
(unilateral) liberalization of the Mexican financial sector. The U.S. and the IMF put together a
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“historic financial rescue package” of roughly $50 billion (Hufbauer & Schott 2005:10).
However, a condition of the bailout was that Mexico had to use $29 billion U.S. dollars to pay
the investors of exotic, peso-denominated Mexican government bonds (Felix 2001: 13). For the
purposes of context, the value of U.S.’ entire manufacturing FDI stock in Mexico was $10.58
billion in the same year as the U.S. and IMF bail-out. Michel Camdessus, the IMF’s Managing
Director, explained this peculiar loan condition in a candid television interview, “…the main
reason for attaching this condition to the bailout was to keep Mexico from imposing capital
controls to halt the flight to dollars” (cited in Felix 2001: 13). Camdessus explained that if
Mexico had implemented capital controls during its balance of payments crisis it would set
precedent for other developing countries to do so, which was counter the capital liberalization
goals of the IMF. Mexico’s decision not to implement capital controls in response to the 1995
Peso crisis had demonstrated its commitment to the NAFTA goals of financial integration.

The NAFTA and the 2008 global financial crisis
In Mexico, the 2007/8 solvency crisis of U.S. banks was magnified by the exposure of
Mexican corporations to foreign currency through complex derivatives instruments (Sidaoui et al
2010: 286). Mexican corporations had speculated on complex derivatives instruments in which
they were betting against a large and abrupt peso depreciation, which consequently brought a
high degree of risk to their balance sheets. In 2008, quick and voluminous capital flight from
Mexico triggered a dramatic Peso depreciation and corporations incurred significant losses
which had to be met with U.S. dollars (Sidaoui et al 2010: 286). Banco de Mexico observed that
corporate losses incurred by derivatives instruments caused “widespread disruption” in domestic
financial markets and destabilizing demand for dollars. In response Banco de Mexico had to rely
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on financing from (1) emergency “dollar swap lines” (bail-out loan) with the U.S. Central Bank
($30 billion USD), (2) an emergency IMF loan ($47 billion USD), and (3) drawing down
Mexico’s U.S. dollar reserves (over $90 billion USD). When these emergency measures are
summed ($167 billion USD), they amount to 18.66% of Mexico’s entire GDP in 2009 ($894.95
billion USD). In short, the risks posed by financial integration have been detrimental to financial
stability in Mexico which has imposed massive costs on Mexico and required emergency bailouts from the U.S. and IMF.

II.B. Effects on employment and jobs in the U.S.
Isolating the effects of trade and investment with Mexico on U.S. labor and jobs has been
at best an inexact science and at worst a politicized adventure in creative accounting. The effects
of trade with Mexico on the U.S. employment have been very small in relation to the larger
macro trends of the vast U.S. economy, nonetheless, any effects have assumed a symbolic
significance in trade policy debates as these topics are central to the justifications and
motivations of the proponents and opponents of U.S. trade policy. I present a literature review of
recent claims of the NAFTA proponents and opponents in Annex Four. Some of the evidence is
more plausible than others and this section is a critical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of recent literature.

Effects on employment
To my knowledge, all recent studies find that trade and investment with Mexico has
produced a net job loss in the U.S. Net job loss is the sum of jobs lost by import competition and
offshoring plus jobs gained by exports. A study produced by the Economic Policy Institute
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estimates that between 1994 and 2010 nearly 683,000 U.S. net jobs were lost due to US trade
deficits with Mexico (about 40,200 jobs per year) (Scott 2011). A contrasting study from the
Peterson Institute for International Economics reports that from 2009 to 2013, the U.S. net job
loss by trade with Mexico was roughly 15,000 annually (Hufbauer et. al. 2014). While NAFTA
opponents identify the trade deficit as the source of job loss, NAFTA proponents contest that
there has been no empirical correlation between unemployment and the trade balance (Hufbauer
et. al. 2014). However, contrary to the official unemployment rate, by different unemployment
metrics there is a correlation with the trade deficit. Contrasting the trade deficit with the male
labor force participation rate, both demonstrate clear secular declines (notwithstanding the
dramatic uptick in the trade deficit in 2008 as result of the collapse in spending during the global
financial crisis). Including females, the general labor force participation rate follows the same
secular decline but begins after 2000, and the ratio of full-time employed to working-age
population follows the same trend. Therefore, by different unemployment metrics there is a
correlation between the trade deficit and unemployment, but of course correlation is not
causation.
Economists Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski find that U.S. MNCs that have
offshored to Mexico have become more competitive globally and in turn they have increased
their investment and employment in the U.S. (2014). Moran and Oldenski analyzed confidential
firm-level data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis on the international activities of U.S.
MNCs between the years 1990 and 2009. Their findings are consistent with other studies that
observe that U.S. outward FDI has helped U.S. firms to achieve globally competitive economies
of scale and in turn expand domestic operations and employment. Moran and Oldenski conclude,
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“…any fall in U.S. employment by [U.S. MNCs] is not due to offshoring to Mexico, since this
offshoring exerts a net positive force on the domestic operations of U.S. firms” (2014: 41).
Contrary to these conclusions, it does not follow that a firm’s employment gains at the
micro-level produces job gains at the aggregate, macro-level. Moran and Oldenski (2014) do not
consider the likely macro outcome in which firm-level economies of scale produce greater
concentration in the industry leading to a fall in aggregate employment in the industry, as has
been the secular trend in manufacturing. A range of studies have found that during the NAFTA
time period U.S. MNCs have become more concentrated leading to industry consolidation
(Acemoglu & Hildebrand 2017; Autor et. al. 2017a; Autor et. al. 2017b). In the same time
period, manufacturing employment has suffered secular declines, in the information technology
sector alone from 2001 to 2015 employment halved and fell by over 1 million jobs. Therefore, it
is problematic to conclude that firm-level employment gains produce aggregate employment
gains in an industry or country, and to the contrary it may result in aggregate losses.201
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Figure Four: Total U.S. Manufacturing Employment by Sector
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Lastly, the data used in Moran and Oldenski’s study (2014) considers the years 1990 to
2009, a time horizon in which interest rates were secularly declining, firms were increasing their
leverage, and regional economic growth was led by the debt-fueled American consumer. Without
data from the post-2009 period, the study is omitting a time frame of debt deflation and
deleveraging in which firms may have been simultaneously offshoring and contracting domestic
operations, such as in the auto industry after receiving a bail-out in 2008. Therefore, it is
inconclusive that from 1990 to 2009 offshoring was the only variable associated with the
observed firm-level employment gains in domestic operations.

Effects on worker income
Despite the relatively small net job loss from trade with Mexico, NAFTA proponents
claim that for each job lost the U.S. economy makes efficiency gains by importing products more
cheaply, thereby lowering prices and giving firms and consumers greater purchasing power.
Hufbauer et. al. (2014) estimate that from 2009 to 2013, for each net job lost to Mexico the U.S.
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economy gained “several hundred thousand dollars” (2014: 13). However, NAFTA proponents
do not address the distribution of gains from trade, generally relegating the discussion to political
debates in Congress over displaced workers. Given the well-documented trends towards growing
income inequality, there is ambiguous evidence that gains from trade are enjoyed by all. A recent
study from Public Citizen (2014) finds that displaced workers experience downward social
mobility leading to increased income inequality, rarely addressed by NAFTA proponents.
Moreover, the income gains from cheaper Mexican imports do not equal the income loss of
downwardly mobile displaced workers, leaving them in worse condition (cited in Public Citizen
2014: 10).
A number of studies find that jobs gained by exports are typically higher-skilled and
better paying jobs than were displaced by trade, which is not generally addressed by NAFTA
opponents. The pattern that emerges is that trade and investment with Mexico has been
contributing to the well-established employment polarization trends in the U.S. (Kalleberg 2013).
Employment polarization is the relative contraction of middle-skill occupational shares of total
occupations. NAFTA proponents find that jobs gained by exports are higher-skilled and better
paid; NAFTA opponents observe that displaced workers gain new employment in lower-skilled
and lower income jobs. In fact, recent studies find that offshoring takes the shape of employment
polarization (Oldenski 2014; Vallizadeh 2015). Using the same firm-level BEA data from the
Moran and Oldenski (2014) study, Oldenski finds that offshoring takes the shape of job
polarization by expanding high-skill jobs and a contracting middle-skill jobs (2014). Offshoring
to Mexico has contributed to job polarization leading to increased income inequality as high-skill
U.S. workers benefit and displaced middle-skill workers experience job and/or income loss.
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Effects on labor unions and wages
The NAFTA investment chapter contained no language relating to labor standards, and
there is little to no evidence that the NAFTA has supported any enforcement of existing labor
standards, including child labor, not to mention an improvement in labor conditions as promised
by the labor side agreement. In fact, beginning with the NAFTA negotiations there is no
evidence that U.S. or Canadian officials approached Mexico about improving labor standards or
enforceability of existing standards (Luce & Turner 2012). Since then, the AFL-CIO reports that
despite some “modest” victories via the labor side agreement, the lack of an enforcement
mechanism of the labor side agreement has led countries to stop responding to violations and
complaints (2014). It is impossible to measure the extent to which the general lack of
enforcement of labor standards has attracted FDI to Mexico. However, there is diverse and
widespread evidence that the suppression of labor rights in Mexico has been key to supporting
Mexico’s low-wage exports in maquiladoras and mining (AFL-CIO 2014).
NAFTA opponents argue that the treaty has reduced U.S. wages and undermined labor
unions inasmuch as it enabled firms to threaten workers with offshoring during wage bargaining
sessions. A Cornell University study commissioned by the NAFTA Labor Commission found
that since NAFTA, as many as 62 percent of U.S. union drives faced employer threats to relocate
abroad, and the factory shut-down rate following successful union certifications tripled (cited in
“Public Citizen” 2014: 11). The report found that companies made explicit threats to relocate to
Mexico in more than 10 percent of the cases, and in other cases there were implicit threats, such
as “given NAFTA we may need to reconsider our options,” or handing out statistics to workers
on the wage differentials between U.S. and Mexican autoworkers (cited in Hufbauer et. al. 2014:
17).

140

However, many economists tend to dismiss qualitative evidence as “anecdotal,”
particularly NAFTA proponents (Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 17). Using aggregate industry-level data,
Autor et. al. (2013) found that import competition from China had a “modest negative effect” on
U.S. manufacturing wages but import competition from Mexico had no effect. However, there is
little consensus on the relative causes of wage stagnation – technological change, trade and
offshoring, declining productivity growth rates, and the myriad of factors causing deunionization. Since wage stagnation is such an empirically contentious topic, it is problematic to
try to isolate the effect of trade with Mexico on manufacturing wages from these other (potential)
causes, although there is zero evidence that it supports wage growth. Therefore, import
competition from Mexico either has either no effect or negative effects on wages.

Increased industry consolidation and automation
Considerations of the link between globalization and increased levels of automation are
largely absent in studies on the income effects of the NAFTA (and other agreements).
Proponents of U.S. trade policy argue that automation has had a much greater effect on job
polarization than globalization (Autor 2013), while opponents of U.S. trade policy tend to be
skeptical of this conclusion for a variety of reasons (Schmitt et. al. 2013). Similarly, President
Obama and USTR Froman repeatedly argued that automation has a far more significant effect on
total employment than offshoring and import competition. In so doing, they conceptually
separated offshoring and automation as mutually exclusive processes (for one example see The
White House 2014). However, there is growing evidence that globalization causes increased
automation.
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There is a large and growing body of literature documenting that trade and investment
liberalization increases productivity growth. A recent review of literature on this relationship by
De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) concluded, “…there is one robust finding that emerges from
this literature: globalization improves industry performance.” However, there no consensus on
the causes of how trade and investment enhances productivity. A report released by The White
House (2015) pointed to several different channels, notably, that trade and investment
liberalization facilitates firm-level economies of scale which then increases firm productivity
growth. The White House report then goes on to cite a number of studies in which “…the
common mechanism is that exporting induces investments in technology” (2015: 8). For
example, in the auto industry, Mexico’s low-wage export platform has allowed U.S. automakers
to amortize their investments in capital-intensive production facilities in the U.S., which
increases automation in the industry. Similarly, the development of information technology has
made service industries more productive and allowed the increased offshoring of services
(Jensen 2011). In so doing, offshoring and automation are complementary processes in both
manufacturing and services. Moreover, The White House report asserted that, “(1) trade
stimulates innovation directly, and (2) trade alters the incentives to innovate” (2015: 11). In
short, the NAFTA investment and financial services directly and indirectly facilitated economies
of scale and increased automation, and automation has also been demonstrated to be a cause of
growing income inequality (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014; Autor 2013).

II.C. Environmental Impact
The NAFTA investment chapter provides that no Party may lower environmental
standards to attract investment and that nothing in the agreement prevents a Party from
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implementing environmental legislation, although that language is unenforceable. This section
surveys literature that assessed outcomes of these provisions. Analyst Kevin P. Gallagher (2009)
found that contrary to the fears of environmentalists and public interest groups during
negotiations, “NAFTA did not result in Mexico becoming a ‘pollution haven’ for dirty U.S.
firms seeking weaker environmental regulations” (2009: 6). Similarly, analysts Elizabeth Cole
and Prescott Ensign concluded that U.S. manufacturing FDI into Mexico has generally been in
the lower polluting industries, and in certain cases U.S. FDI had brought cleaner technology to
Mexico (2005). Ironically, after NAFTA was enacted the amount of dirty industry decreased
more in Mexico than in the United States.
There is little evidence that Mexico became a “pollution haven” for FDI because lowwage manufacturing industries are typically less pollution-intensive than capital-intensive
manufacturing. Since NAFTA, capital-intensive and heavy polluting manufacturing industries
have actually decreased in Mexico, including cement, pulp and paper, and base metals
production.202 For these capital-intensive enterprises, the costs of environmental regulation are
relatively small in deciding production location as there are far larger costs for relocation.
Moreover, many capital-intensive and pollution-heavy industries must be physically close to
their markets, further dis-incentivizing plant relocation. Conversely, lower-polluting
manufacturing industries have low costs of environmental regulation which are also small
relative to the gains from low-wage labor.203
However, since NAFTA, environmental conditions have especially worsened in Mexico
and there is evidence of NAFTA-inspired environmental degradation in the U.S. and Canada
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(Gallagher 2009; Karpilow et. al. 2014). Although the majority of U.S. and Canadian FDI to
Mexico was not motivated by low environmental standards, there is evidence that many foreign
firms and domestic firms have not complied with Mexico’s low environmental standards in
addition to lax enforcement of these standards. In a World Bank survey of over 200 firms in
Mexico, foreign firms were no more likely than domestic firms to comply with Mexican
environmental law.204 Rather, Mexico’s poor environment record has been caused by the
Mexican government’s lack of commitment to environmental protection in the post-NAFTA
period (Schatan & Carillo 2006). Further, the NAFTA environmental side agreement does not
have a legally binding dispute mechanism and lacks the authority to confront these problems.
During NAFTA negotiations, as U.S. public interest groups, environmentalists, and some
members of Congress began to pressure Mexican officials on Mexico’s environmental record,
Mexico doubled spending on environmental protection and initiated an industrial environmental
inspection program. However, immediately after NAFTA took effect and the 1995 Mexican Peso
Crisis set in, the environmental budget was cut drastically. According to Mexican government
statistics, since 1994 real spending on environmental protection declined by roughly $200
million, or 45 percent, and coincidently the number of industrial environmental inspections had
also decreased by 45 percent over the same period.205 Since NAFTA was enacted, as
manufacturing and mining FDI have multiplied hazardous and toxic output, government real
spending on environmental enforcement and inspection have all declined (Schatan & Carillo
2006).
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According to Mexican government statistics, increased pollution costs 10 percent of
Mexican GDP to clean up which not only surpasses Mexican GDP growth but is not a
sustainable path to development (Gallagher 2009). Gallagher concludes, “Costly degradation is
occurring because the proper mechanisms were not put in place to help Mexico manage its
economic growth in an environmentally sustainable manner” (2004: 3). In sum, while the
NAFTA did not cause Mexico to become a “pollution haven,” the NAFTA lacks an enforcement
mechanism for environmental protection while supporting Mexico’s export-led growth model
that is by no means environmentally sustainable.

V. Feedbacks between the Income and Regulatory Effects of the NAFTA Investment Chapter
Figure Five illustrates the feedbacks between the income and regulatory effects of
the NAFTA investment chapter. The regulatory effects curtailed state sovereignty to
regulate regional MNCs, which established regulatory advantages for MNCS (providing
the legal underpinning to corporate trade and investment strategy; mitigating social and
political risks to FDI; institutionalizing market access and deregulations). In turn, the
NAFTA investor protections had two income effects – they facilitated economies of scale
for U.S. MNCs but also shifted costs from the private to public sectors.
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Figure Five: Feedbacks Between Regulatory and Income Effects of the NAFTA Investment
Agreements
Regulatory effects:
Strong investor protections
curtail sovereignty to regulate
U.S. MNCs
Feedback Two:

Feedback One:
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international investment
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Strong investor
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Income effects:

(1) economies of scale for U.S.
MNCs
(2) shift of costs from private to
public sectors

V.A. Feedback one: U.S. investor protections establish regulatory advantages for U.S. MNCs
V.A.1. Legal underpinning to corporate strategies
The NAFTA investment chapter, and its interactions with the other key chapters in the
NAFTA, provided the legal foundation to U.S. MNCs’ trade and investment strategy. The
NAFTA investment chapter has substantive interconnections with the other chapters in the
agreement, notably, intellectual property, services, and tariffs. The NAFTA’s strong intellectual
property rights chapter allowed U.S. MNCs to offshore production to Mexico while retaining the
most profitable inputs to the value chain, and it established long and strong patent monopolies,
both of which guaranteed market outcomes for U.S. MNCs. Simultaneously, the inclusion of
intellectual property in the definition of ‘investment’ provided U.S. MNCs with additional
protection of their regional market shares. The financial services and services chapters, which
incorporated key sections of the investment chapter, provided deregulations that reduced costs of
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cross-border transactions for regional firms, thereby bolstering regional economies of
scale. This ‘trade-investment-intellectual property-services nexus’ provides the legal
underpinning of international supply chains, trade in services, and financial integration.206
In turn, U.S. MNCs established regional economies of scale that would not only secure
their market position in North America but would make them globally competitive in
export markets around the world.

V.A.2. Mitigating political and social risks
The NAFTA investment chapter enhanced an investment-friendly climate in
Mexico by mitigating/eliminating regulations that were perceived to be ‘barriers’ or
restrictions to investment, establishing transparent and predictable rules, and reducing
political and social risks to multinational investors. The contentious history of investment
disputes, ranging from gunboat diplomacy to controversial ISDS cases, demonstrates that
MNCs investing in developing countries are exposed to a variety of social and political
risks. In U.S.-Mexico relations alone, beginning with the Mexican revolution in the early
twentieth century, there is a provocative history of Mexican authorities expropriating
U.S. investments in oil, agriculture, banking, and mining. Beyond expropriation, many
countries in the global south have histories of nationalist or socialist policies that have
negatively impacted the value of U.S. investments in those countries, such as requiring
MNCs to hire domestically, transfer technology, invest in research and development,
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among others. U.S. MNCs depend upon investment law to mitigate the social and political risks
of investing and operating in developing countries.

V.A.3. Institutionalizing market access and deregulations
Beginning with the NAFTA investment chapter, U.S. MNCs began to use investment law
for regulatory advantages in foreign markets, as opposed to using investor protections only to
mitigate risks. Regional MNCs explicitly used the NAFTA ISDS to strengthen their market
position and reduce costs. Several NAFTA ISDS cases demonstrate that as regulatory norms
evolve in a country, MNCs use ISDS as a political tool to lock-in a favorable regulatory
environment.
Governments around the world have increasingly linked the fossil fuel industry to global
warming and oil spills and regulatory norms have evolved to address these public issues. Yet the
oil and gas industry has won billions of dollars in successful ISDS cases, thus weakening climate
change and fossil fuel regulations in those countries, including the NAFTA cases cited above.
Pharmaceutical MNCs have used ISDS to extend patent monopolies on medicines even though
many countries have laws recognizing that patent laws evolve over time. In one NAFTA ISDS
case, U.S. pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly and Company initiated an ISDS suit after Canada
invalidated Eli Lilly’s monopoly patent rights for an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) drug.207 Tobacco has become a local public health issue all over the world as smoking
has increased cancer rates which has strained state budgets, motivating governments to regulate
tobacco companies, marketing, and products. In turn, tobacco companies have explicitly used
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ISDS as a deregulatory tool.208 Similarly, international regulatory norms on the free
movement of capital have been shifting and evolving for at least the last hundred years,
yet the NAFTA investment chapter cemented a stringent and limiting approach to capital
controls that domestic lawmakers could not change even if they wanted to.
For some industries, such as fossil fuels, mining, and tobacco, ISDS is an
indispensable tool for foreign market access and deregulations in those markets. In so
doing, ISDS-inspired deregulations shifts costs from the private to public sectors. For
example, deregulations of the fossil fuel and mining industries shift the costs of their
carbon-emissions and pollution to local publics. In another example, deregulations of
tobacco benefits the market share of tobacco MNCs while increasing public health
expenditures for states.

V.B. Feedback two: U.S. MNCs motivate the content of U.S. investment policy and law
V.B.1. Conflicts between U.S. MNCs and regulators
The 2004 U.S. Model BIT revised the 1994 Model BIT, which had replicated the
NAFTA investment chapter. The central revisions curtailed investor rights in two
controversial areas, the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ and ‘indirect expropriation’
articles. In 2001, the U.S. was a defendant under these two provisions. Methanex, a
Canadian firm that produces hazardous gas methanol, brought claims against the State of
California seeking $970 million in damages for a ban on a fuel additive on the grounds
that California denied Methanex the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ and effectively
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expropriated their investment by diminishing their market share. Although the U.S. had won the
case, Canada and Mexico had lost cases under the same provisions, and the USTR and State
Department claimed that in those cases the tribunal panels had adopted too expansive
interpretations of the two provisions. The governments of NAFTA Parties issued an
Interpretative Note that tied the legal interpretation of two articles to ‘customary international
law,’ norms that have been ‘crystallized’ in international law through repeated decisions over
centuries. The 2004 Model BIT included this Interpretative Note and therefore the U.S. had
weakened investor protections in its official investment policy, contrary to the interests of U.S.
MNCs.
In 2009, during the Obama administration’s review of the 2004 Model BIT, corporate
lobbyists across economic sectors advocated for a return to the NAFTA model. The Obama
administration denied this reform and opted to maintain the approach taken in the 2004 Model
BIT. They reasoned that the 2004 Model BIT had struck the appropriate balance between the
rights of multinational investors against the rights of state regulators. Therefore, policymakers do
not always favor multinational interests. However, the 2004 Model BIT did not prevent tribunals
from ruling in favor of broad interpretations of the two articles. In fact, the vaguely worded
articles provided tribunals with the autonomy to interpret the provisions on both a broad and
narrow basis. In so doing, even though the 2004 Model BIT scaled back investor rights from the
1994 NAFTA model, it still afforded strong investor protections.

V.B.2. Coherence between U.S. MNCs and regulators
As the Obama administration reviewed the U.S. Model BIT, U.S. business groups united in their
position, ‘U.S. investors are at a competitive disadvantage compared to many of their key
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competitors from countries that already have strong BITs with countries in key growth markets
such as China, India and Russia.’209 In the context of growing global competition, prominent
business lobbyist Linda Menghetti explained to Congress, ‘…strong investment protections are
vital and squarely within America’s economic and national interest.’210 In the same
Congressional Hearing, Congressman John Larson was just as forthcoming, ‘…for U.S. foreign
investors in other jurisdictions, we want to obtain greater substantive rights for our investors than
domestic investors may have in those countries. That is sort of the value of the BIT.’211
MNCs rely on FDI for global competitiveness, and in turn, their enhanced market
position allows them to expand domestic investment and employment. As MNCs realize
larger economies of scale, they become vital sources of jobs, growth, and exports for
states. In addition, MNCs are the main actors in the import and export of goods, services,
and capital. For these reasons, among others, Congress is highly sensitive to the trade
policy needs and concerns of U.S. MNCs. In so doing, U.S. MNCs have the structural
political power to motivate the content of U.S. trade law and policy. As the Obama
administration mulled proposals from labor unions and environmental groups to weaken
investor protections, business lobbyists warned, ‘An approach to [weaken investor rights]
would reverse decades of U.S. support for strong and binding international rules that
largely benefit the U.S. and its investors.’212 The 2012 U.S. Model BIT included nearly
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every proposal from U.S. business lobbies and reject all of the proposals from labor unions,
environmental groups, and consumer advocacy groups.213

V. Conclusion: clarifying U.S. trade policy positions
Figure Six: Two Policy Positions in U.S. International Investment Law
Others
U.S. multinational corporations

(labor, environmental, consumer,
libertarian groups)

ISDS directed at trading partners; strong
investor rights facilitate economies of scale,
thereby supporting domestic jobs

ISDS undermines sovereignty/democracy;
strong investor rights shift costs from
private to public sectors

Support strong investor protections

Support weak investor protections

Highlighting the feedbacks between the income and regulatory effects of the NAFTA
investment chapter serves to clarify trade policy positions. U.S. MNCs and sympathetic U.S.
politicians emphasize that the regulatory effects only affect other countries and facilitate the
global competitiveness of U.S. MNCs, so they favor strong investor protections. Conversely,
labor, environmental, public health, consumer advocacy,214 libertarian groups,215 and sympathetic
politicians argue that strong investor protections undermine shift costs from the private to public
sector. Therefore, these groups support weaker investor protections.
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The purpose of Obama administration’s revision of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT was to
ensure that it had the appropriate balance between investors and regulators. In this interagency
process, politicians favored one of two policy positions - proposals for strong investor
protections and proposals for weaker investor protections. Politicians that supported strong
investor protections endorsed the 2004 Model BIT. They dismissed concerns about ISDS
because the U.S. has not lost a case and therefore ISDS is directed at the U.S.’ trading partners.
They emphasized the need for economies of scale for MNCs because MNCs create well-paying
jobs and they are the main actors in the import and export of goods, services, and capital. In so
doing, the private interests of U.S. MNCs became the public national interest as politicians
endorsed proposals from U.S. MNCs in the 2012 Model BIT. This was a bipartisan policy
position because it included the Obama administration, the ‘New Democrat’ coalition in
Congress, and the majority of Congressional Republicans.
Conversely, politicians that advocated reform in the 2012 Model BIT sought to
weaken investor protections. These politicians represented stakeholder groups from
across the political spectrum, including, libertarian organizations, labor unions,
environmental groups, and consumer advocacy groups. They asserted that ISDS
undermined the U.S. Constitution and democratic processes domestically and abroad.
MNCs had used ISDS to challenge a range of public values, such as climate change and
public health legislation and financial regulations. Many of these stakeholder groups
sought to reverse trends that have shifted costs from the private to public sectors, which is
against the interests of U.S. MNCS. Thea Lee, Policy Director of the AFL-CIO, pleaded
during a Congressional hearing, ‘…it is important that we clarify that the interests of the
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U.S. are not entirely synonymous with the interests of U.S. multinational corporations.’216
Proposals to weaken investor protections were advanced by the majority of
Congressional Democrats, a handful of libertarian Republicans, and bipartisan groups at
every level of state government.
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Chapter Five: Negotiating the TPP Investment and Financial Services Chapters
I.

Introduction

II.

U.S. trade policy in the TPP

III.

TPP negotiations in investment (Chapter 9) and financial services (Chapter 11)

IV.

The “double movement” and the TPP investment and financial services chapters

“In our era, the economic and security realms are absolutely integrated.”
-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, 2015, describing the national security significance of the
TPP to a room full of analysts and policymakers at an Atlantic Council event

“…it is important that we clarify that the interests of the U.S. are not entirely synonymous with
the interests of U.S. multinational corporations.”
- Thea Lee, AFL-CIO Policy Director, 2009, during a Senate Hearing imploring for substantive
reforms to U.S. negotiating positions in trade and investment agreements including the TPP

I. Introduction
In a departure from past U.S. trade policy, the Obama administration’s annual policy
reports did not address the U.S. trade deficit. Rather, the USTR’s stated objective is to increase
exports and jobs, which has been the official purpose of the TPP since its inception. However,
domestic and international political actors disagreed with the USTR on how to use the TPP to
achieve that goal, which entered the domestic and international TPP negotiations with varying
degrees of success. In process tracing of the investment negotiations, my dependent variables are
the TPP investment and financial services chapters, and my independent variables are the USTR,
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domestic political actors, and other country negotiating teams. While the “free trade” actors in
the U.S., the USTR and U.S. MNCs, were politically insulated from competing domestic interest
groups to write the TPP, “socialist” and “nationalist” political actors ultimately defeated the TPP
in the U.S., dealing a significant setback to the “free traders.”

II. U.S. Trade Policy in the TPP
II.A. Origins of the TPP
Way station to the FTAAP?
Although the TPP has an open accession clause for future members, TPP negotiators only
sought to include other members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).217 The
story of the TPP began with the APEC. The first APEC ministerial meeting was called by
Australian Prime Minister Hawke in 1989, and it included trade ministers from 12 Pacific Rim
countries.218 The stimulus for the meeting was a common recognition of “increasing
interdependence” across the Asia Pacific, and the founding purpose of APEC was not to
establish a trade negotiating forum but a political institution to promote trade and investment in
the region.219 Moreover, the leaders agreed that it was “desirable” to expand APEC’s

Unites States Trade Representative, Press Release, June, 2010, “TPP question and answer:
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218
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voluntary cooperation and liberalization.
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membership, in particular by including the “Three Chinas” (PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan) which
were “essential” to the region.220
In 1993, immediately after President Clinton signed the NAFTA, the U.S. hosted the first
heads of state meeting of APEC, which included an expanded membership of 17 countries221
including the “Three Chinas.” In Congressional testimonies, officials from the Clinton
administration explained that the Asia Pacific was the fastest growing region in the world,
“critical” to the future of the U.S., and therefore strengthening APEC was “necessary.” 222 The
U.S.’ goal was to reduce trade barriers across the Pacific, as the U.S. had large and growing trade
deficits with East Asia. The following year, APEC leaders adopted the lofty goal of “complete”
trade and investment liberalization in the entire region by the year 2020.
Towards the end of regional trade and investment liberalization, in 1997, APEC agreed to
a formal, voluntary sectoral liberalization program. Only two years later it became evident that
voluntary liberalization was a “non-starter” and trade ministers would leave the issues to be
addressed in the new WTO Doha Round (Kim et al 2011). However, the Doha Round was
essentially dead on arrival due to irreconcilable differences in agriculture and the negotiations
entirely collapsed by 2006. As the Doha Round faltered, APEC’s Business Advisory Council
began promoting an APEC-wide FTA as the “only means” that APEC could realize “complete”
liberalization, called the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP).223 In the 2006 APEC
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meeting in Vietnam, President Bush urged other APEC members to “seriously consider”
negotiating the FTAAP and to “further studies on ways and means to promote” the initiative.
However, the FTAAP faced instant obstacles. In 2007, a U.S. Chamber of Commerce
spokesperson mulled,
“Negotiating an FTAAP is a long-term (15-20 year) proposition, and it
won’t be easy to pull off. On the U.S. side, anti-trade and especially anti-China
sentiment is an obvious impediment. In Asia, it isn’t certain that China and Japan
will be willing to negotiate a high standard FTA that includes most, if not all,
economic sectors.”224
The TPP was the USTR’s first step towards the FTAAP.225 If the FTAAP was the “Plan
B” to the failed WTO Doha Round, then the TPP was the “Plan B” to the slug-paced FTAAP.

TPP Begins
The TPP grew out of a much smaller FTA originally called the Trans-Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership Agreement, which began on the sidelines of an APEC meeting in 2002
between Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.226 The goal was to create a “high standard” trade
agreement “which would have the potential to grow into a larger strategic agreement” within
APEC, and the agreement had an open accession clause for future members.227 The legal
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language of this FTA was based on the U.S.’ FTAs with Singapore and Chile so as to harmonize
trade law and minimize difficulty for MNCs.228 Since it was based on U.S. FTAs it was a
“compressive, high standard” agreement that went well beyond WTO commitments, which
contrasted the numerous, “low standard” Asian FTAs that focus mainly on tariff reductions.
Brunei joined later in the negotiations and the agreement was signed in 2005 except for the
investment and financial services chapters, in which negotiations were contentious and were left
for future conclusion (Elms 2015: 2). With the WTO Doha Round deadlocked and with the
FTAAP a distant prospect, the USTR announced that it would join the investment and financial
services negotiations of the small FTA.229 The U.S.’ original motivation was to “…further
regional economic integration with like-minded countries committed to high-standard [trade]
agreements.”230 Immediately after the USTR’s announcement, Australia, Peru and Vietnam also
joined the talks and the name of the agreement was shortened to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

II.B. Trade Policy Contexts
II.B.1. Rule-making in a global economy
Aftermath of the Doha Round
As the WTO Doha Round faltered, WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, mulled over
the state of the global trading system in a speech in Australia in 2012.231 He reasoned, “This is no
longer the world of the twentieth century dominated by the U.S. pillar on one side and the
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European pillar on the other.”232 Rather, he observed, the twenty-first century is a “multipolar
world” in which major developing countries “are no longer policy takers.”233 The major
developing countries, notably China, created new supply and demand pulls and had been able to
translate their rapid economic growth into increasing geopolitical leverage in a range of
international institutions. The Obama administrations trade policy was in large measure a
confrontation with the opportunities and challenges associated with the rise of major developing
economies, especially China. With the aim of revitalizing the Doha Round, the Obama
administration pursued other major deals concurrent to the TPP.234
In 2008, the U.S. and China began dialogue for a BIT, as U.S. business lobbies coveted
investment opportunities in China, valuing it as a $250 billion dollar market (USCBC 2012).
USTR Kirk commented on the U.S.-China BIT, “We firmly believe that China can contribute
even more to global prosperity, if it opens its market with the same dedication that has
characterized its pursuit of entry into other countries’ markets over the past decade.”235 In late
2011, the U.S. and the EU committed to reignite dialogue on investment policy that ended in
2008, largely to address China’s unprecedented rise to become a capital exporter and to craft a
set of rules “to deal with the expected increase in [FDI] from China.”236 By 2013, this dialogue
had expanded into negotiations for the U.S.-EU FTA (Transatlantic Trade and Investment
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Partnership, T-TIP), underscoring the USTR’s wrenching concern about creating trade and
investment rules that address China’s competitive challenges to U.S. industries. A spokesman
from the Transatlantic Business Coalition implored Congress,
“If…[the USTR and EU]…can agree on common standards, these will
become global standards for our products around the world rather than China’s.
This will give us an enormous competitive advantage. The biggest potential
benefit of T-TIP is, therefore, in the area of regulation.”237

Declining U.S. market shares in East Asia
East Asia has been home to the world’s fastest growing markets, and not only in China.
According to the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, while the ten ASEAN countries may be small
markets, cumulatively, the ASEAN region would be a market size comparable to China or
India.238 However, despite the importance of East Asian markets to the U.S., the U.S. was
experiencing declining trade and market shares throughout the region, which made the USTR
increasingly uneasy. Initially inspired by the Asian financial crisis (1997), East Asian countries
pursued FTAs intra-regionally and then extra-regionally, although not with the U.S. In 2000,
there were 3 Asian FTAs, by 2011 there were more than 50 with 80 more under negotiation.239
China was the principle actor in regional FTAs by initiating or being invited to nearly all the
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agreements. China rose to become a global leader in world trade by importing parts and
components from the ASEAN countries for final assembly into finished goods for export to the
U.S. and EU. China piloted two mega-regional FTAs that were centered on the ASEAN, the first
was the “ASEAN plus three” proposal (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea), however, those
negotiations stalled due to differences between China and Japan. In response, talks moved
forward for the “ASEAN plus six” agreement (ASEAN plus China, Japan, Korea, India,
Australia, New Zealand) which eventually materialized into the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) with formal negotiations beginning in 2012. Although East Asia
has been dependent upon exporting to the U.S. market, the U.S. was not invited to any regional
FTAs, except for bilateral FTAs with Australia, Singapore, and (more recently) Korea.
Simultaneously, many East Asian countries signed FTAs with U.S. competitors,
including the EU. The consequences were detrimental to the U.S. – the U.S. share of total
regional trade in East Asia was eroding while there were rising shares of intra-regional trade and
extra-regional trade with U.S. competitors.240 U.S. policymakers and business analysts were
becoming increasingly anxious “solely from the static discriminatory effects” of ASEAN-centric
integration.241 Apart from trade, nearly all East Asian countries maintained highly protective
investment regimes, especially in service sectors. In addition, many expanding domestic markets
were uncompetitive for U.S. companies seeking to invest there because of the monopolies of
state-owned enterprises.242 Speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations, USTR Froman
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presented the dilemma, “Washington must make a decision: either lead on global trade or be left
on the sidelines. There really is no choice.”243

ASEAN is the “fulcrum” of East Asian integration
In 2009, the new Obama administration cancelled their involvement in all TPP
negotiations for the year to allow for an interagency review of trade policy. The Singapore
Minister of Trade and Industry responded that East Asian integration would continue without the
U.S.244 He explained that negotiations were moving forward for the “ASEAN plus three” and the
“ASEAN plus six” and that if TPP talks continue to delay then the “ASEAN plus” model would
be the building block toward the FTAAP.245 In contrast, USTR Kirk argued that in 2008, as the
U.S. joined the TPP the other bigger economies of APEC began to “rethink their approach to
FTAAP,” with the TPP as a building block rather than the “ASEAN plus” model.246 As the
“ASEAN plus six” institutionalized into the RCEP, the U.S.-led TPP and the China-led RCEP
became competing visions of trade and investment rules for East Asia. President Obama
summarized the U.S. perspective, “If we do not help to shape the rules so that our businesses and
our workers can compete in those markets, then China will set up rules that advantage Chinese
workers and Chinese businesses.”247
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Secretary of State Clinton explicitly identified the ASEAN as the “fulcrum” for East
Asia’s emerging economic architecture.248 Obama used trips and speeches to urge ASEAN
countries to join the TPP while the USTR and U.S. business community established “Trade and
Investment Framework Agreements” with ASEAN countries to facilitate and encourage their
entrance into the TPP.249 Malaysia joined the TPP in spring, 2010, and became the fourth
ASEAN member in the TPP, alongside Brunei, Singapore, and Vietnam. However, policymakers
understood that any U.S. trade and investment agreements in the region, including the TPP,
would require overcoming fierce domestic political and social resistance.

II.B.2. Domestic Political Context
Negotiating without Congressional negotiating objectives
In 2011 the Obama administration introduced legislation to Congress to implement three
FTAs negotiated by the Bush administration with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia. The
official U.S. ITC study on the three FTAs found that they would increase the U.S. trade deficit
and the ensuing Congressional battle over the passage of the agreements demonstrated waning
popular support for trade and deep divisions in Congress over the issues. The agreements would
narrowly pass Congress, which had a Republican majority at the time, however, about two-thirds
of all House Democrats and a growing minority of Republicans voted against the FTAs. 250 As
trade politics raised hostilities in Congress, the USTR planned to not pursue Trade Promotion
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Authority (TPA, formerly called “fast-track” authority) until the later stages of the TPP
negotiations.251 Since TPA is the means that Congress provides negotiating objectives to the
USTR, Congress was sharply divided and many frequently appealed to the administration for
TPA legislation. Ranking Sen. Hatch was a particularly outspoken critic of the administration,
“…TPA is not something the President asks for after an agreement is
negotiated. TPA establishes the foundation upon which trade agreement
negotiations and meaningful consultation take place…Federal Register notices
and staff-level meetings are not a substitute for TPA. Moreover, many of the
elements of the current TPP negotiation do not reflect congressional
directives.”252
USTR Kirk and Ranking House Rep. Levin responded that the USTR did not need
negotiating objectives from Congress if Congress and stakeholders would be consulted and
engaged in developing the negotiating objectives.253

“Stakeholder engagement” replaces Congressionally mandated negotiating objectives
The USTR embarked on an unprecedented campaign to engage with a broad range of
stakeholders throughout the country via briefings, advisory meetings, comments in federal
register notices, and face-to-face stakeholder events. Beginning in the sixth round in Singapore,
negotiators began to schedule stakeholder meetings parallel to negotiating rounds, formalizing
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the stakeholder outreach program.254 At the meetings, registered stakeholders had an opportunity
to make presentations to officials during negotiating rounds and some delegations met privately
with negotiators. However, stakeholders and Congress members became increasingly frustrated
with the USTR’s engagement and stakeholder efforts because the USTR would not divulge its
specific negotiating objectives or strategies in a range of key issues.
The USTR responded that at the beginning of negotiations the TPP members had signed a
confidentiality agreement, “The understanding calls for each government to disseminate its
negotiating proposals, as well as those it receives from its TPP partners, solely to government
officials and individuals who are part of the government’s domestic trade advisory process.”255
Throughout the negotiations, Congress members and stakeholders frequently called upon the
USTR for greater quantity and quality of consultations, higher levels of transparency, access to
draft texts and the development of negotiating positions, and Congress members repeatedly
introduced (unsuccessful) legislation demanding access to these materials. Concurrently, more
than 600 representatives from U.S. MNCs were named official U.S. trade advisors with access to
the texts and talks.256 Through leaks from the negotiations, a broad range of Congress members
and stakeholders discovered that their proposals were “virtually ignored” by the USTR, further
straining the creditability of stakeholder outreach as a viable replacement to TPA. As
negotiations progressed, the USTR shortened the length of stakeholder meetings and in 2013
they discontinued stakeholder meetings altogether as negotiators stopped holding formal
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negotiating rounds and instead referred to meetings as “check-in sessions” (Elms 2015). Later, as
negotiations began to face conclusion, the Obama administration sought TPA from Congress. 257
There is no evidence that the TPA process or legislation influenced the USTR’s negotiating
objectives in the investment and financial services chapters. The process of the USTR’s
development of negotiating objectives and an account of the passage TPA is presented in Annex
Five.

II.C. U.S. Objectives in TPP
As mandated by TPA, the U.S. ITC had to model and report the potential effects of the
TPP before Congress votes to implement it as law. The report was released in May, 2016 and it
projected that in the U.S. the TPP would have trivial income effects although mostly net gains,
“By year 2047, U.S. real GDP would expand by $67 billion, or by 0.18 percent.”258 The TPP had
never been primarily about realizing “gains from trade,” rather, its purpose reflects a set of
broader political and economic objectives. The Obama administration negotiated the TPP
without Congressional mandate and then pushed it through a hostile Congress because the TPP is
part of their comprehensive strategy for trade and security in Asia, and their objectives in the
TPP reflect a combination of industrial strategy, trade strategy, and foreign policy.
Table 9: Synthesis of U.S. Objectives in the TPP
Industrial Strategy
Trade Strategy
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Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015.
“Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific
Industry Sectors,” United States International Trade Commission, May 18, 2016, Publication
Number: 4607, Investigation Number: TPA-105-001.
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Expand U.S. exports and
support jobs while
countering exclusive,
Asian regionalism
Competitive
liberalization: expand
TPP membership;
encourage liberalization
in China; leverage WTO
outcomes






Use TPP to realize
FTAAP; revitalize the
WTO Doha Round
Establish norms in tradeand investment-related
transnational governance
Strengthen partnerships
with other countries
Spur broad-based
economic development





Compliment and support
the “Asia pivot” military
and security strategy
Establish mechanisms for
cooperation and resolving
frictions
Demonstrate that the U.S.
is a Pacific power
committed to the region

TPP as U.S. industrial strategy
The Bush administration joined the TPP because they were seeking to increase trade and
investment links with the world’s fastest growing regions in Asia so as to expand U.S. exports
and support jobs. Then the 2008 global financial crisis led to an unprecedented “jobless
recovery” and the Obama administration made job creation a top priority.259 U.S. policymakers
and their advisors argued that 95 percent of the U.S.’ potential customers were abroad, and
therefore, exports would be central to the country’s economic recovery.260 To the end of
increasing exports, the USTR uses FTAs to establish technical regulations and market access
rules that support the global competitiveness of U.S. industries (U.S. MNCs). The objectives of
the TPP are an industrial strategy inasmuch as the TPP will (1) establish a legal foundation to
trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific that advantages U.S. commercial interests, and (2) will
expand TPP membership to as much of APEC as possible, or at least stimulate new Asian trade
and investment negotiations with the U.S., including the U.S.-China BIT.
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The first component of the U.S. industrial strategy in the TPP is to establish “WTO-plus”
standards in the Asia-Pacific, which function to support and facilitate U.S.-led industries (U.S.
MNCs) that are capital-intensive and/or rely upon high intellectual property content economic
activities. “WTO-plus” agreements are FTAs that go beyond WTO commitments; the TPP goes
beyond the scope of past U.S. FTAs by incorporating new “twenty-first century” issues,
especially vis-à-vis pan-Pacific trade and investment. The TPP sets precedent for the most
relevant “twenty-first century” issues, including, a range of new intellectual property areas,
regulations on state-owned enterprises, digital economy rules, and enforceable labor and
environmental standards.261 The USTR integrated these new issues into the existing U.S. FTA
template so as to support the competitiveness of U.S. MNCs in the Asia-Pacific. In fact,
according to Deputy USTR Marantis, the USTR developed many of the TPP’s new regulations
on state-owned enterprises and intellectual property for future negotiations with China262 (which
is also true for sections of the investment and financial services chapters). Simultaneously,
establishing FTAs with the Asia-Pacific will serve to boost U.S. trade shares in the region during
a time of declining U.S. trade shares and increasing Asian regionalism.
The second component of the U.S. industrial strategy in the TPP is the U.S. trade strategy
of “competitive liberalization,” in which U.S. trade policymakers use regional FTAs with
developing countries to encourage third party developing countries to adopt and/or negotiate
market-oriented policies so as to compete for U.S. capital and import markets. Most
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significantly, “competitive liberalization” can leverage outcomes in WTO negotiations, which is
timely considering the stalemate of the Doha Round. In the TPP, the U.S. “competitive
liberalization” strategy is to encourage other APEC members to either join the TPP or negotiate
the FTAAP so as to compete for transnational capital and import markets. With respect to China,
U.S. negotiators aimed to use the TPP to encourage domestic reforms in China in the direction of
TPP obligations.263

The TPP as U.S. trade strategy
While working to win support for TPA, USTR Froman detailed the Obama
administration’s trade strategy in his talk “The Strategic Logic of Trade” at the Council on
Foreign Relations in June, 2016. The main goal of the Obama administration’s trade strategy was
to revitalize the WTO Doha Round, and to this end they had three objectives – (1) “establishing
and enforcing the rules of the road,” (2) “strengthening U.S. partnerships with other countries,”
and (3) “spurring broad-based economic development.”264 The trade strategy of “establishing the
rules of the road” is in large measure addressing China’s competitive challenges in a range of
multilateral forums. From the perspective of the USTR, the TPP is the vehicle by which the U.S.
could establish its role in the emerging “economic architecture” of the Asia-Pacific that would
otherwise be dominated by China.265 To that end, the TPP establishes a far-reaching set of trade-
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related and investment-related regulations that reflect U.S. “values and interests” (discussed in
Chapter 1, Section II.C.).
USTR Froman explained that the TPP will strengthen U.S. partnerships with countries in
Asia in the context of mounting military and security challenges in the region. He reasoned, “For
many of the countries that would be party to the TPP, the economic benefits of the agreement are
sweetened by the expectations that the U.S. will become more deeply embedded in the
region.”266 That is, increasing U.S. commercials ties with Asia strengthens U.S. political
partnerships in Asia which is especially important given recent security developments in the
region. Lastly, according to USTR Froman, the TPP strives for broad-based, inclusive economic
growth and development to both grow markets for U.S. exports and promote political and social
stability.267 And above all, the USTR planned to use the TPP as a pathway to opening
negotiations for an FTAAP with an ultimate goal of revitalizing the WTO Doha Round.

TPP as U.S. foreign policy
Beginning in 2011, the Obama administration folded the TPP into their broader “Asia
pivot”268 strategy, which is a diplomatic and security strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Beginning with
President Obama’s original announcement of the Asia pivot strategy in 2011269 through its later
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formulations,270 the Asia pivot has three motivations, to advance (1) security, (2) prosperity, and
(3) democracy in the Asia-Pacific. The security component271 of the Asia pivot is to address the
range of military and security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, including, escalating military
tensions between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear
proliferation, cyber-security, counter-terrorism, among others. As the U.S. developed the Asia
pivot objectives and implemented the strategy, the TPP co-evolved to become the “prosperity”
component, or the vehicle to advance the economic and social objectives of the strategy.
Officials from the Obama administration have consistently described the TPP and the Asia pivot
as mutually reinforcing. From the military perspective, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
commented on the relationship between TPP and the Asia pivot, “Security is a critical foundation
of prosperity. Trade cannot flourish in waters that are contested by force.”272 From the trade
perspective, USTR Froman offered, “At a time when there are unresolved territorial and
maritime disputes, TPP can reinforce our presence in the region and our interest in establishing
methods of cooperation and mechanisms for resolving frictions.”273 To that end, the international
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governance regulations and dispute resolution mechanisms contained in the TPP will serve to
strengthen the multilateral goals of the Asia pivot.

U.S. negotiating objectives in the TPP investment and financial services chapters
Since the development of the U.S. BIT program in the Cold War, the U.S. had well
developed negotiating objectives for investment and financial services agreements, broadly, to
facilitate and protect the free flow of private capital balanced against the need for public purpose
regulations. Since there is a high degree of consistency between the NAFTA and the TPP
investment and financial services chapters, the U.S.’ negotiating objectives in the NAFTA
chapters largely apply to the TPP chapters (Chapter 2, Section II.B. and II.C.). These negotiating
objectives advance the overall TPP objectives by promoting intra-TPP commerce, enhancing
U.S. commercial ties and partnerships in the region, and providing essential infrastructure to an
increasingly digital global economy.

III.A. 2010: TPP negotiations formally begin while Congress attempts to pressure the USTR
The USTR joined the TPP talks in the twilight of the Bush administration and with the
uncertainties of incoming President-elect Obama as he had made campaign promises for trade
policy reform. In 2009, the new Obama administration suspended all trade negotiations to
conduct an interagency review of trade and investment policy. The President avoided making
any formal commitments to the TPP throughout the year, largely because the new administration
was concerned that none of the larger Asian countries were members of the TPP. In October,
Secretary of State Clinton encouraged Japan’s membership in the TPP during a meeting with her
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Japanese counterpart.274 Japan was holding domestic, “high-level consultations” to which the
Obama administration responded with “substantial gratification.”275 They agreed to begin
bilateral consultations during Japan’s internal review process, in which the USTR reaffirmed that
Japan had to be willing to put all sectors on the negotiating table, including very politically
sensitive agricultural industries.276 During the President’s trip to Japan in early November, 2009,
he officially announced that the U.S. will join the TPP with its current the seven members (Japan
would join in 2012) and then expand to more countries. TPP negotiations formally began in 2010
and there were four negotiating rounds that year. Malaysia expressed interest in joining in the fall
and the TPP members unanimously approved. Deputy USTR Marantis explained the U.S.
approach to new members, “We will consider and welcome new negotiating partners based on
their readiness and ability to bring commercial value, balance, and ambition to the
negotiations.”277 Also in 2010, Canada and Mexico informally communicated interest in
membership.

III.A.1. 2010 Investment and financial services negotiations
There is little public information about the three negotiating rounds in 2008 between the
U.S., New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei. However, according to trade policy advisors,
the investment chapter was negotiated from the 2004 U.S. Model BIT and the financial services
chapter was based on the same chapter from the U.S.-Korea FTA signed in 2007, which is
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confirmed by the high degree of consistency between the financial services chapters of the TPP
and the U.S.-Korea FTA. In February 2009, the Obama administration announced that they
would “review the implementation of our FTAs and BITs to ensure that they advance the public
interest.”278 During this interagency review process the U.S. suspended trade and investment
negotiations, including the TPP and the U.S-China BIT (which also began in 2008). In spring,
2009, the USTR and the Department of State co-led a review of the 2004 Model BIT, which
would determine U.S. negotiating positions in the TPP.
The purpose of the review of the 2004 Model BIT was two-fold, first, it was to ensure
that U.S. trade and investment policy struck the right “balance” between advancing U.S.
commercial interests abroad while ensuring necessary regulatory space domestically, and second,
it was to update the 2004 Model BIT with new issues especially vis-a-vis trade and investment
with Asia.279 The Obama administration’s new Model BIT (2012) would serve as the basis for
negotiations in both the TPP and the U.S.-China BIT. Therefore, the positions that the U.S.
assumed in the TPP investment and financial services negotiations were also developed as
negotiating positions for the vitally important U.S.-China BIT, which helps to explain the U.S.’
policy orientation in the TPP.

Table 10: TPP 2010 negotiations formally begin while Congress attempts to pressure the USTR
Negotiating
issues in
Domestic interactions with the USTR
TPP negotiators
investment
Labor unions,
Business
P-4 (Chile, Australia, Mexico,
and
NGOs, civil
lobbies, private Congress
Brunei,
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Canada,
financial
society
sector trade
New
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Japan
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organizations
policy advisors
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Investor
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III.A.2. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
Investor rights
In 2009, the State Department established a Subcommittee to make recommendations for
a new Model BIT. The Subcommittee was co-chaired by Alan Larson, Senior Advisor at
Covington & Burling and also the former undersecretary at the State Department, and Thea Lee,
AFL-CIO Policy Director. The Subcommittee fiercely debated in four main areas of the Model
BIT and these conflicts quickly entered TPP policy discussions, including: (1) investor rights and
investor-state dispute settlement, (2) investment-related labor and environmental concerns, (3)
regulations addressing state-owned enterprises, and (4) capital controls and financial
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regulations.280 Broadly, Subcommittee members representing the private sector argued for either
no changes to the 2004 Model BIT or a strengthening of investor rights and ISDS to support U.S.
firms, employment, and national interests; they were opposed by dissenting Subcommittee
members who argued for substantive reforms to investor rights and ISDS to provide for greater
policy space for public purpose regulations, including, labor, environmental, and consumer
protections. The Subcommittee’s final report contained little consensus, conflicting
recommendations, and multiple dissenting views, and the final report was submitted to Secretary
of State Clinton in October, 2009.281
The Obama administration had planned to conclude the review of the Model BIT by the
end of 2009 but it would not be officially concluded until 2012. However, by January, 2010,
interagency discussions between the State Department and the USTR had “largely been
completed,” although there remained “significant areas” of dispute.282 The most problematic
complication to the conclusion of the review of the new Model BIT was that in 2009 the
Democrats had assumed majority control of both the House and the Senate for the first time since
1995. Democrats had been far more responsive to the critics of U.S. trade and investment policy
and they were demanding that the Obama administration make substantive changes to investor
rights and ISDS in the Model BIT. In summer of 2009, House Democrats introduced a bill 283 to
provide guidance to the Obama administrations’ trade and investment policy review and it
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contain the same or similar amendments that were presented by the dissenting members of the
Subcommittee review. Although the bill was ultimately unsuccessful, it had the support of the
majority of House Democrats including nine committee chairs and a handful of House
Republicans.284 Consequently, by November, 2010, the Obama administration decided to wait
until after mid-term elections to further consultations over the BIT with a new, incoming
Congress.285
The 2010 conflicts over the content of the Model BIT were readily imported into
domestic TPP discussions. When the Obama administration committed to the TPP, House
Democrats warned that the White House would need to make reforms to trade and investment
policy to ultimately win their support for the TPP. House Democrats explained in a letter to the
President,
“For these negotiations to yield an agreement that could enjoy broad
support, it will be critical that you work in cooperation with congressional trade
reform advocates to transform the Bush TPP initiative into an opportunity to
develop a new forward-looking American trade agreement model.”286
Among specific reforms, the House Trade Working group in Congress demanded the
exclusion of ISDS from the TPP,287 and House Democrats were bolstered by support from labor
unions and public interest groups. In January, 2010, the AFL-CIO submitted written
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comments288 on the TPP to the Obama administration, calling for reforms to investment and
financial services policy, while environmental groups urged for a significant reduction to the
scope of ISDS or to replace it with a state-to-state dispute mechanism.289 In response, the U.S.
Business Coalition for the TPP urged that the USTR and the other TPP negotiating partners
agree to a “standstill” in which negotiators would not adopt new trade or investment restrictions
that would limit, weaken, or provide exceptions to an investor rights and investment market
access.290 They argued that any such provisions would “undermine the ability of the TPP to serve
as a new model for trade expansion to support global economic recovery and will constrain any
final agreement’s ability to benefit our nation’s farmers, industries, workers and consumers.”291

Investor-state dispute settlement
U.S. business interests in the TPP quickly found resistance not just from domestic
coalitions but from groups abroad and other negotiating teams. As TPP negotiating progressed in
2010, Australia and New Zealand negotiators demanded their exclusion from ISDS. 292 ISDS was
excluded from the Australia-U.S. FTA due to adamant objections from Australia while the U.S.
business community had a certain comfort level with the strength of Australia’s judicial
system.293 Publicly, the Australian government announced “severe reservations” about ISDS in
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the TPP and that it would seek exclusion from ISDS in the TPP.294 In New Zealand, Prime
Minister John Key stated the inclusion of ISDS in the TPP was “far-fetched” and that his
government would support Australia's position.295 Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore
presented their position papers on investment during the fourth round of negotiations in October,
2010.296 Their negotiating positions were bolstered and motivated by Australian and New
Zealand labor unions and advocacy groups that had launched a campaign calling on their
governments to reject certain investment provisions and ISDS. A U.S. business representative
responded that ISDS would be important for all countries in the TPP due to the existing,
overlapping FTAs between members that already include ISDS, which would leave some
investors at a disadvantage. For example, if the U.S. were to exclude Australia from ISDS, U.S.
investors would be at a disadvantage to Singaporean investors who would be able to access ISDS
under the Singapore-Australia FTA.297 Moreover, the business representative argued that ISDS
would be “beneficial” for TPP members because it supports FDI and therefore higher paying
jobs.

Investment regulations for state-owned enterprises
While the major U.S. business forums united and focused on their opposition to proposals
from the critics of trade and investment policy, there was a small dispute over the extent to which
the U.S. Model BIT should include disciplines on state-owned enterprises, which would also
affect the content of the TPP investment chapter. A prominent business group, the U.S. Chamber

“Australian, New Zealand Groups Demand Exclusion of Investor-State From TPP,” Inside
U.S. Trade, Vol. 28, No. 48, December 10, 2010.
295
Ibid.
296
Ibid.
297
Ibid.
294

180

of Commerce, was lobbying the Obama administration to insert more substantive regulations on
state-owned enterprises into the U.S. Model BIT for negotiations with China. However, The U.SChina Business Council, which represents many of the same U.S. MNCs, argued against the
Chamber’s proposal.298 The Chamber advocated for new competition and intellectual property
regulations that would support the “offensive” interests of U.S. MNCs operating in Asian
markets dominated by state-owned enterprises, notably China. The Chamber argued that the U.S.
should assume a tough negotiating stance on the issue as a trade strategy. The U.S.-China
Business Council contested that new provisions on state-owned enterprises would potentially
undermine negotiations and the far-reaching effects of the Model BIT far exceed any
“incremental” benefits of new regulations on state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, as
China was rapidly becoming a capital-exporter, labor groups were advocating for new language
regulating foreign state-owned enterprises investing in the U.S. In January, 2010, the AFL-CIO
submitted to the Administration, “…investment rights can no longer be viewed in the main as a
package of rights to protect outward bound investment. Any agreement must ensure that Stateowned enterprises are not permitted to gain an unfair advantage when acquiring U.S. assets.”299

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
A big obstacle to the conclusion of the review of the U.S. Model BIT was the content of
the language on labor and environmental protections.300 AFL-CIO Policy Director Thea Lee
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proposed to Congress that FTAs combine tariff reductions and investment protections which
removes the costs and risks of FDI thereby facilitating and accelerating the offshoring of jobs,
“precisely because, for the most part, there has been no commensurate set of [labor and
environmental] obligations.”301 Lee and her colleagues on the Subcommittee proposed two
revisions to the Model BIT, (1) establish an enforceable legal obligations for labor and
environmental protections, and (2) establish broad exceptions to investor rights and ISDS for
labor and environmental measures.302 These proposals were vehemently denounced by business
representatives in the Subcommittee who described the proposals as neither feasible nor
appropriate. Business lobbyist Linda Menghetti pointed to the fact that the “vast majority” of
outward U.S. FDI is to high-wage countries for the purpose of market access. Menghetti
supported a statement from Ranking Congressman Brady who emphasized that “about 95
percent” of the output of U.S. subsidiaries abroad stays outside the U.S. while only “about 5 to 7
percent” comes back to the U.S., which undermines the claims of labor unions that FDI is mainly
offshoring.303 Moreover, the U.S. business community fiercely opposed labor and environmental
exceptions to investor rights, arguing that they “…would allow a government to justify
discriminatory or otherwise unfair conduct on such grounds will harm U.S. investors, costing
U.S. jobs and undermining U.S. innovation.”304 They appealed that strengthening investment-
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related labor and environmental protections would grant global competitors new economic
opportunities and advantages that would not be available to U.S. investors.305
The debate entered TPP negotiations as the House Trade Working Group urged the
USTR to go beyond the May 10 agreement in TPP negotiations, including, by establishing strong
and enforceable provisions linking investment to labor and environmental standards.306 The
USTR responded to Congress that they were still considering the issue as they developed U.S.
objectives in the TPP.307 Some USTR officials were concerned that it would be “very difficult”
to negotiate “far-reaching” labor and environmental standards with low-income developing
countries participating in the TPP, such as Vietnam or Brunei.308 Indeed, in 2010 bilateral
consultations with the U.S., Vietnam had sought “greater flexibility” for poor countries in the
TPP, particularly for labor and environmental standards.309 The U.S. responded that it would not
favor a “two-tier agreement” with different standards for different countries.310 Throughout
2010, the USTR refused to make any commitments on the issue in their consultations with
Congress.

III.A.3. Capital controls and financial regulations
The 2009 review of the Model BIT was occurring as policymakers were grappling with
aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 and its possible long-term effects. The transfers
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provision of the Model BIT obligates states to allow capital to cross borders “free and without
delay.” 311 The Subcommittee “conducted extensive discussions” on the free transfers policy and
debated the merits of including language that would grant governments policy space for “capital
controls,” an emergency regulation on cross-border flows of capital. Some Subcommittee
members were concerned that the free transfers policy does not provide developing countries
with the policy space necessary to confront massive and destabilizing capital inflows and
outflows before or after a financial crisis.312 Opposing this recommendation, other Subcommittee
members advocated that the transfer provision not be weakened and that the existing exceptions
provision313 “already provides extensive flexibility” for governments to address financial
instability and crisis. The Subcommittee was unable to come to consensus on policy
recommendations for free transfers and capital controls.
In TPP negotiations, throughout 2010 all sides of the debate reiterated their positions in
stakeholder events, public comments, positions papers, letters, and Congressional testimonies.314
While the Democratic majority in Congress demanded315 that the USTR provide governments
with broad regulatory power over multinational banks and the cross-border provision of financial
services, key USTR representatives attended private events in New York City hosted by financial
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services lobbies concerned about the Obama administration’s trade agenda and the TPP.316 There
is no evidence that in 2010 the USTR’s policy diverged from the 2004 Model BIT with respect
to the free movement of capital.

III.A.4. Market access for FDI and financial services FDI
The market access negotiations, including sectoral exceptions to investment obligations
called “non-conforming measures,” are less central to the focus of this research project and
summaries of these talks are in Annex Six.

III.B. 2011: USTR officially supports key business proposals
Negotiating rounds five through ten took place in 2011. At the 2011 APEC meeting,
Canada, Japan, Mexico publically expressed interest in joining. Administration officials issued
three Federal Register notices requesting public comments on the possible inclusion of Japan,
Canada and Mexico in the TPP talks. TPP investment negotiations were progressing relatively
slowly compared to the rest of the agreement as the USTR still had not tabled proposals for key
issues until the fifth round in late February in Chile.317 While the original TPP investment draft
was based on the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, the Obama administration had been drafting new
provisions during their on-going review of the Model BIT.

Table 11: TPP 2011 negotiations, USTR officially supports key business proposals
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III.B.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
Investment regulations for state-owned enterprises
From the onset of TPP negotiations, the U.S. had determined that addressing state-owned
enterprises was a “twenty-first century trade issue” and set aside a separate chapter in the
agreement for competition policy with state-owned enterprises. Simultaneously, in the
investment chapter negotiations, the USTR tabled the new disciplines on state-owned enterprises
that were being drafted for the new Model BIT (which were also prepared for negotiations with
China). At the February round, the USTR introduced the two new provisions, which was the first
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time that TPP countries had the opportunity to discuss the new disciplines with the USTR.318 The
first of the two provisions was a clarification that the TPP investment provisions would apply to
state-owned enterprises.319 However, the proposal did not completely meet the standards of the
U.S. business lobbies which had advocated for an expansion of the “fair and equitable treatment”
provision to address policies that favor domestic companies.320 The USTR chose not to expand
the “fair and equitable treatment” provision due to its problematic history in opening the U.S. to
ISDS cases.
The second new provision concerning state-owned enterprises was a ban on regulations
requiring the use of particular intellectual property. During the October round in Lima, Peru, the
USTR press release shared that the investment chapter would include new language to address
“…the increasingly common problem of ‘indigenous innovation’ measures that disadvantage
U.S. technology by forcing U.S. investors to favor another country’s domestic technology.”321
The new provision would ban regulations mandating that investors use domestic technology
and/or intellectual property, and it would ban regulations that would oblige a company to carry
out research and development in a host country as a condition for investment in that country.322 It
would address the growing amount of indigenous innovation policies in the Asia-Pacific that
function to favor domestic state-owned enterprises by controlling foreign investors’ use of
intellectual property, thereby disadvantaging U.S. companies.
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As negotiations progressed in 2011 and the Obama administration further considered TPP
disciplines on state-owned enterprises they would reject Democrats’ and labor union’s
investment proposals on state-owned enterprises, including, “affirmative obligations” that
foreign state-owned enterprises operate “solely of a commercial nature,” a prohibition on stateowned enterprises that receive loans or financing not available in the marketplace, and an FDI
screening mechanism.323 The U.S. Treasury Department was concerned that “overly broad” SOE
language would open up the U.S. to challenges, such as the Treasury’s 2008 bail-out of U.S.
financial institutions and auto makers.324 Reaction within the business community was mixed but
many concurred with the Treasury that inserting new disciplines against state-owned enterprises
could lead to unanticipated and detrimental effects on U.S. companies.325

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
The USTR’s focus on drafting separate labor and environmental chapter signifies that by
2011 the USTR had relegated all labor and environmental concerns to their respective chapters.
USTR Ambassador Marantis explained to Congress that proposed broad exceptions to investor
rights for labor and environmental regulations “…would undermine support among the TPP’s
strongest advocates. And, in the end, I am afraid it could seriously jeopardize congressional
approval of a final deal.”326 The USTR openly admitted it would have to concede to the business
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community’s positions in order to get the TPP through Congress. Conversely, a USTR’s 2011
press release offered, “The investment text will protect the rights of the TPP countries to regulate
in the public interest.”327

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
Throughout 2011, Australia continued to hold the line in its rejection of ISDS while New
Zealand supported the Australian delegation but not to the same extent.328 Australian Prime
Minister Julia Gillard released a policy document in April, 2011 stating the government would
discontinue negotiating ISDS and that it opposes measures that would give greater rights to
foreign firms, or would limit the government’s ability to regulate.329Australia explicitly linked its
opposition to ISDS to tobacco companies using ISDS to target public health regulations. In early
2010, U.S. tobacco company Philip Morris had lobbied the USTR to use the TPP to limit
regulations on tobacco marketing, arguing that Australia’s plain packaging regulations would be
“tantamount to expropriation” and therefore urged the USTR to pursue ISDS.330 Then in June,
2011, relying on the Australia-Hong Kong BIT, Philip Morris served the government of
Australia with a notice of an ISDS claim for “damages [amounting] to billions of dollars.”331 The
Australian government immediately announced that it would no longer support the inclusion of

“Outlines of TPP,” November 12, 2011, Office of United States Trade Representative
“U.S. TPP Investment Proposal Retains Investor-State, Breaks New Ground,” Inside U.S.
Trade, Vol. 29, No. 10, March 11, 2011.
329
“Australian Minister Says Gillard Government Won’t Back Down on ISDS,” Inside U.S.
Trade, Vol. 30, No. 11, March 16, 2012.
330
“Submission of Philip Morris International in Response to the Request for Comments
Concerning the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement,” January 22, 2010,
(available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USTR-2009-0041-0016.1)
331
“Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Will investor-State arbitration send restrictions on tobacco
marketing up in smoke?” Investment Treaty News, July 12, 2011, by Mathew C. Porterfield &
Christopher R. Byrnes.
327
328

189

ISDS in any agreement, citing Philip Morris’ attempts to “limit [Australia’s] capacity to put
health warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco products.”332
The USTR faced a dilemma – due to a federal law called the Doggett amendment the
USTR and other federal agencies cannot seek any weakening of tobacco regulations in another
country.333 U.S. legal experts argued that if the USTR opposed Australia’s cigarette law then it
would violate the Doggett amendment. As a solution, some members of Congress wrote to
USTR Kirk to exclude tobacco altogether from the TPP, a proposal that business fiercely
opposed as undesirable precedent.334 Other members of Congress supported Australia and New
Zealand’s position, as there is no ISDS in the U.S.-Australia FTA.335 USTR Ambassador
Marantis favored business interests by contesting to Congressional critics that the U.S. will not
negotiate any exclusions from ISDS, which would ultimately not be true.336

III.B.2. Capital controls and financial regulation
As the Obama administration still had not concluded its review of the Model BIT,
Treasury Secretary Geithner responded to the economist’s concerns about U.S. policy on the free
movement of capital.337 He acknowledged, “…the experience of the last decades shows that
large swings in capital flows can create significant policy challenges.” However, Secretary
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Geithner explained that the Treasury believed that developing countries have “a range of policy
measures” available to address these challenges and that U.S. FTAs and BITs provide
policymakers with the policy space to do so. Moreover, he offered that the purpose of the
“transfers” provision is “…to establish predictable rules to govern trade and investment.”338 By
the TPP February round in Chile, sources reported that the U.S. proposals had maintained past
language on transfers and financial services regulations, underscoring that in the Obama
administration’s support for the business community’s positions.339 Simultaneously, the USTR
reported that the TPP would “…protect the right of financial regulators to take action to ensure
the integrity and stability of financial markets, including in the event of a financial crisis.”340

III.C. 2012: TPP membership expands while investment chapter leaked
Negotiating rounds 11 to 15 were held in 2012 while Mexico and Canada officially
joined the agreement. By mid2012, the USTR set a dateline for the conclusion of TPP
negotiations to be October, 2013. In April, 2012, the Obama administration finally concluded is
overdue review of the Model BIT and released the text. The new 2012 Model BIT contained
minor revisions to the 2004 Model BIT that generally expanded investor rights, and this reignited
the conflicts from the 2009 Subcommittee review. In June, a U.S. civil society organization
published341 a leaked draft of the TPP investment chapter that was scrubbed such that brackets
revealed areas of disagreement but not the positions of each negotiating team. The June leak
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exactly reflected the Obama administration’s policy positions in the new 2012 Model BIT.
However, the leaked draft was heavily bracketed in its core provisions, signifying that the most
significant sections were still under dispute in negotiations, including the most controversial
provisions – “indirect expropriation,” ISDS, and “transfers.”
Table 12: TPP 2012 negotiations, membership expands while investment chapter leaked
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III.C.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
“Indirect expropriation” debate
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The leaked investment chapter revealed a significant divide over the definition of
“indirect expropriation,” in which Peru, New Zealand, and at least one other country had
countered the USTR with China’s language on indirect expropriation, as stipulated in each of
their agreements with China.342 The “indirect expropriation” provision was controversial because
it would apply to government takings of an “investment” broadly defined to include the value of
an investment, intellectual property, financial instruments, government permits, money and debt,
among others. The dissenting countries opposed the U.S. proposal that included broad investor
rights and advocated China’s language of the investor protection which allows more flexibility
for regulation. The U.S. approach to “indirect expropriation” puts the burden of proof on the host
State which must show that regulations were “designed and applied” non-discriminatorily and
for the public purpose.343 Conversely, the competing proposal344 states that “indirect
expropriation” only occurs when there is discriminatory and “severe” deprivation, which is more
difficult for investors to prove. Moreover, this proposal required that “indirect expropriation”
must be “disproportionate to the public purpose,” which puts far less burden of proof on the host
state as a government would merely need to show that a regulation is furthering a larger public
purpose. In dialogue over the leaked chapter, a spokesman for the U.S. business lobby
denounced China’s definition of “indirect expropriation” and he issued strong support for the
U.S. proposal.345
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Domestically, Public interest lawyer Robert Stumberg proposed to Congress that the U.S.
should “[n]arrow indirect expropriation so that it does not apply to nondiscriminatory regulations
as explained in the Methanex award.”346 In 2005, Methanex lost its case against the U.S. because
the ISDS tribunal ruled that “non-discriminatory” public purpose legislation does not constitute
expropriation.347 Stumberg’s proposal would have the effect of limiting “indirect expropriation”
to measures that are discriminatory or serve “illegitimate” public purposes. In contrast, business
lobby leader Linda Menghetti testified to Congress that proposals to insert clarifying language on
indirect expropriation would significantly narrow investor rights and “…put in jeopardy
important U.S. national economic and other policy goals.”348

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
While the USTR relegated labor and environmental concerns to separate chapters, labor
and environmental groups argued that these chapters would be undermined by the investment
chapter and ISDS. An AFL-CIO senior aide explained that while the USTR drafted the labor
chapter with “intense” consultations with labor unions, the AFL-CIO was unsure that labor
would support the final agreement.349 The AFL representative questioned the value of the TPP
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investment chapter to U.S. workers because policymakers and analysts were still unsure of the
TPP’s effects on offshoring and trade flows.350 Similarly, the environmental group Sierra Club
publically supported the USTR’s efforts in the environmental chapter, however, they argued that
ISDS would undermine the environmental chapter by allowing companies to sue governments
over environmental regulations and therefore environmental organizations would likely not
support the final TPP.351 Labor and environmental groups derided the “investment and
environment” provision because it was unenforceable and and “little more than paper
commitments.”352

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
The June leak revealed that the U.S. had sought to expand investment and investor rights
to include not only goods as in past agreements but also intellectual property and services. This
was achieved by expanding the scope of “performance requirements”353 to include services and
intellectual property rights (including the language drafted in 2011 for state-owned enterprises).
Early in 2012, thirty U.S. business lobbies and trade associations confronted Australia’s
opposition to ISDS in a letter to President Obama.354 The business community had two demands
of the USTR, first, to not grant countries such large exceptions to the agreement as it would be
antithetical to a “high-standard” agreement and bad precedent, and second, to ensure that all TPP
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members and potential members commit to strong enforcement mechanisms, notably, ISDS. A
business source commented that the letter was intended to demonstrate that the inclusion of ISDS
was essential to securing Congressional support for a final TPP deal, and therefore, Australia’s
exclusion from ISDS would kill the TPP.355 After the letter was published, in an Australian
Senate meeting, representative of the Australian Prime Minister affirmed that it would not back
down from its opposition to ISDS.356 In July, The U.S. National Conference of State Legislators
addressed an open letter to all TPP negotiators calling upon them to abolish ISDS from the TPP
and they encouraged the Australian delegation to continue to resist ISDS.357

Tobacco and ISDS
The USTR was working on drafting a tobacco proposal, in large measure a response to
Australia’s opposition to ISDS to protect public health tobacco regulations. Throughout 2012,
the USTR repeatedly held back from tabling the proposal due to domestic resistance from
business lobbies and Congress members from tobacco-producing states. In a May press
release,358 the USTR announced that the proposal would create a “safe harbor” provision that
would protect tobacco measures from legal challenges, but would not shield governments from
ISDS if a tobacco regulation would be tantamount to expropriation.359 The public health

355

Ibid.
“Australian Minister Says Gillard Government Won’t Back Down on ISDS,” Inside U.S.
Trade, Vol. 30, No. 11, March 16, 2012.
357
“An Open Letter From U.S. State Legislators To Negotiators Of The Trans - Pacific
Partnership Urging The Rejection Of Investor State Dispute Settlement,” The U.S. National
Conference of State Legislators, July 5, 2012.
358
“Factsheet: TPP Tobacco Proposal,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press
Release, May, 2012
359
“TPP Tobacco Proposal May Not Affect Investor-State Disputes, Expert Says,” Inside U.S.
Trade, Vol. 30, No. 41, October 19, 2012.
356

196

community applauded it as a “good first step” while the U.S. business community united in
opposition, demanding that no products receive special treatment.360 A coalition of the most
politically influential business lobbies ranging from agriculture to manufacturing and services
warned the USTR against the exclusion in the TPP of any products as bad precedent.
Conversely, in July, ASEAN health ministers met to discuss completely removing tobacco from
the ASEAN FTA and future FTAs, and this proposal was supported by TPP member
Malaysia.361

III.C.2. Capital controls and financial regulations
In May, Ranking Congressmen Barney Frank and Sander Levin issued a public letter to
Timothy Geithner, Secretary of Treasury, referencing a private meeting in which both the Under
Secretary of Treasury and USTR Kirk gave Rep. Frank “oral assurances” that U.S. trade and
investment agreements do not limit a country’s use of capital controls vis-à-vis the “prudential
carve-out” for emergency measures.362 However, Reps. Frank and Levin noted that legal
language of the provisions simply do not offer a clear assurance that a country may deploy
capital controls without being in violation of the treaty. Moreover, as international regulatory
norms had shifted to support the (limited) use of capital controls, the U.S. was now a policy
outlier. Indeed, after exhaustive research into the 2008 global financial crisis, in November,
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2012, the IMF announced a “new institutional view” that the free movement of capital rests on
weak economic theory and it has “heightened macroeconomic volatility and vulnerability to
crises” (2012: 12). The IMF’s new institutional stance called for situational capital controls (i.e.
capital controls on a case-by-case basis).
The letter from Reps. Frank and Levin pressured the Treasury to formulate an official
interpretation of the legal language related to capital controls in the TPP.363 Instead, Under
Secretary Brainard responded that any new changes to the provisions would “cast doubt” that
existing treaties do allow for capital controls, therefore, the Treasury would make no official
interpretation of the provisions.364 Reps. Frank and Levin rebutted that the official interpretation
could apply to past agreements as well. Secretary Geithner then responded to Reps. Frank and
Levin that U.S. trade and investment policy categorically provides space for capital controls in
the “exceptions” provisions, which allow governments to temporary break from their obligations
for emergency financial measures.365
The June leak of the TPP investment chapter confirmed that the Obama administration
had not amended U.S. policy stance on capital controls and that the USTR was pushing to
institutionalize the free movement of capital in the TPP against the objections of other countries.
In the leak, the “transfers” provision and its annexes were bracketed and it included two other
provisions that were introduced by other countries that would have clearly and explicitly
permitted the use of capital controls.366 The first proposal, “Measures to Safeguard the Balance
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of Payments,”367 included language that would unambiguously permit the temporary and nondiscriminatory use of capital controls to safeguard a country’s balance of payments. This
proposal closely followed the legal language on capital controls in the WTO agreement,368 and
the U.S. was the only country to oppose the provision.369 Malaysia had taken a particularly hard
stance on the issue as the Malaysian Trade Minister had mandated to negotiators to ensure that
no financial services provision impinge upon Malaysia’s policy space to institute capital
controls. The 1998 Asian financial crisis was devastating to Malaysia and policymakers rejected
the IMF’s emergency funds in favor of a mix of capital controls. Among Asian regulators and
academics Malaysia’s emergency capital controls are widely regarded as successful although
foreign businesses and investors had since “shunned” Malaysia for their policy (Gallagher et. al.
2013).
The second proposal that would have permitted capital controls appeared in brackets and
it applied only to Chile.370 The provision stated that Chile has the right to enforce its capital
controls law371 in order to ensure currency stability and the functioning of its payments system.
Similar to Malaysia, for Chile this policy stance was informed by their past experience in
implementing capital controls from 1990-5 in response to large and destabilizing capital inflows.
Chilean policymakers concluded that capital controls were the “crucial” tool to building an
environment conducive to development during a time in which GDP growth was falling in other
Latin American countries (Gallagher et. al. 2013). During the U.S.-Chile FTA negotiations,
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although Chile attempted to revise the U.S. provisions to provide for capital controls, they were
only able to obtain special ISDS procedures that included an additional six-month “cooling off”
period before investors can file a case over capital controls (Gallagher et. al. 2013).

III.D. 2013: USTR “plays hardball” while ramping up pressure to conclude negotiations
The USTR had set a self-imposed deadline to conclude negotiations by the end of 2013,
however, as the year pressed on it became evident that a December conclusion would not be
possible. In November, an anonymous Chief negotiator had his notes from the Salt Lake City
round leaked to WikiLeaks. Writing in short-hand form he observed,
“U.S. exerting great pressure to close as many issues as possible this
week. However the Chapters that were reviewed by the CNs [Chief Negotiators]
did not record much progress…One country remarked that up until now there had
not been any perceivable movement on the part of the U.S. and that is the reason
for the situation.”372
Earlier in the year, the U.S. chief negotiator, Barbara Weisel, explained that the USTR
was working with the U.S. business community in formulating their negotiating priorities.373
Weisel reasoned, “If we’re going to close the deal this year, we have to prioritize what it is we
really care about in this agreement.”374 Simultaneously, the stakeholder process was reduced and
eventually discontinued at the end of the year (Elms 2015: 14).
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Table 13: TPP 2013 negotiations, USTR applies pressure to conclude negotiations
Negotiat
ing
Domestic interactions with the USTR
TPP negotiators
issues in
Labor
Business
Congress
P-4
Australia,
Mexico,
investm
unions,
lobbies,
(Chile,
Peru,
Canada,
ent and
NGOs,
private sector
Brunei,
Vietnam,
Japan
financial
civil
trade policy
New
Malaysia
services
society
advisors
Zealand,
organizati
Singapore
ons
)
Investor Unions
Offshoring in Bipartisan
Australia loosens ISDS
Japan
rights
announce high-tech
pressure on
opposition in exchange
supports
and
opposition manufacturin the Obama
for more market access;
U.S.
investor- to TPP b/c g is “over
administratio U.S. and Japan insist on
position
state
it will lead with”; last
n for TPA
broad scope of ISDS, all on ISDS
dispute
to
U.S.
bill
other countries opposed;
settleme offshoring footwear
ASEAN countries want
nt
and
plants
exclusion from “pre(ISDS)
greater
threatened
establishment”
inequality
provisions
Financia Expanding Expand
U.S. position
Mexico
l
ISDS in
investor
“inflexible,” Chile Chief and
regulatio financial
rights and
Negotiator resigns citing Canada
ns and
services is ISDS in
U.S. anti-capital controls against
capital
deregulato financial
policy among his top
expanding
controls ry
services
public concerns in the
ISDS in
TPP
fin. ser.
Market
Wary of
Deep market
U.S., Australia, New Zealand favor
access
offshoring access
narrow exceptions market access, all
for FDI
necessary
others opposed

III.D.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
Application of ISDS to “investment agreements” and “investment authorizations”
The Chief negotiators’ notes observed, “…The most important issue for the majority of
members…is the proposal by the U.S. to apply ISDS to Investment Agreements and Investment
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Authorizations.”375 In U.S. investment law, an “investment agreement” and an “investment
authorization” cover all major contracts between an investor and a host state, including, natural
resource exploration and extraction (such as mining, oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon
exploration/extraction), public utility services (such as electricity and water treatment), and
public works concessions (such as roads, highways, infrastructure). The same provisions are in
the investment chapter in U.S.-Korea FTA but they were bracketed in the June, 2012 TPP leak.
During the Obama administrations’ review of the Model BIT, oil, gas, and mining companies
and members of Congress underscored the fundamental importance of ISDS to their
industries.376 Domestically, environmental organizations actively campaigned against ISDS as a
threat to environmental regulations and especially because the fossil fuel industry was using it as
a deregulatory tool in the context of global warming and climate change. The Chief negotiator
indicated that, “The U.S., as in previous rounds, has shown no flexibility on its proposal.”377
Japan supported the U.S. while other countries objected and made proposals to narrow its scope.

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
In Australia’s 2013 elections, the incumbent liberal party was replaced by a more
conservative party which announced that it would negotiate ISDS on a case-by-case basis.378
Japan joined the talks mid-year after vowing to the U.S. that Japan would be a “constructive”
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member of negotiations, such as, supporting the U.S.’ position that ISDS unequivocally apply to
all TPP members, even in the face of Australia’s opposition.379 By the year’s end, the new
Australian government indicated that it was open to including ISDS in exchange for additional
market access for Australian agricultural exports.380 Similarly, Malaysia announced that it
supported ISDS but was seeking longer transition periods and greater carve-outs for its domestic
industries.381 Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei sought to narrow the scope of ISDS by maintaining
that ISDS only apply to the “post-establishment” phase and not “pre-establishment,” meaning
that an investor would only be covered by ISDS after they have established an investment in the
host state. In U.S. investment law, ISDS also applies to the “pre-establishment” phase in which
ISDS applies to an investor seeking to establish an investment in a host State.382

Tobacco and ISDS
In September, the USTR and Malaysia simultaneously tabled competing proposals on
policy space regarding tobacco control measures.383 The USTR was forced to revise its earlier
proposal after federal agencies criticized it as too weak and business groups described it as
unnecessary. The USTR cited that tobacco is “unique product” that is “always harmful to human
health” and the new proposal would preserve the policy space of countries to regulate tobacco
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without a complete carve-out of tobacco that would create precedent for excluding agricultural
products.384 The new U.S. proposal reaffirmed the WTO’s commitments to tobacco control
measures and required that public health officials consult each other before any dispute
settlement procedures begin, however, tobacco tariffs would be eliminated and tobacco
companies would maintain investor rights and access to ISDS. Conversely, the Malaysian
proposal completely carved-out tobacco from the agreement and therefore precluded tobacco
from any dispute challenges, including ISDS.385 According to Malaysian officials, there was
“broad” support for their proposal, including from Japan, but negotiators had to return to their
governments before taking positions.386 However, Malaysia quickly began to soften its stance
and in December they tabled a revised proposal that removed tobacco tariffs, therefore, trade in
tobacco would be liberalized.387

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
As the AFL-CIO announced388 that it would coordinate an international campaign to stop
the TPP, a spokesman for General Electric Company denied that the TPP would promote more
offshoring and to the contrary it would create more jobs in the U.S. General Electric’s
spokesman made two arguments to the Senate, first, that many capital-intensive U.S.
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manufacturing industries are heavily dependent upon exports and the TPP was being designed to
promote such exports, which would support and grow jobs.389 Second, he declared that
offshoring was “over with” in high-technology manufacturing industries. He reasoned that in
capital-intensive manufacturing the labor cost is trivial to determining production location, “So
the international global supply chain that we have constructed allows us to be competitive around
the world and I think sustain far more jobs in the U.S.”390
Also in 2013, the U.S. and Vietnam bilaterally negotiated textile production rules and
market share. The USTR offered to cut textile and apparel tariffs by 50 percent in exchange for a
rule that would ban the use of textile materials from non-TPP members, although the USTR did
not consult domestic manufacturers on the proposal.391 The proposal was supported by 15
Senators representing U.S. footwear importers and it was opposed by The National Council of
Textile Organizations who argued that roughly 522,000 jobs would be offshored to Vietnam if
tariffs were cut by just 25 percent.392 By August, New Balance, which maintained footwear
plants in the U.S., was engaged in a spat with six other name-brand domestic footwear
companies that had no production facilities in the U.S. New Balance argued that the TPP’s
elimination of tariffs on footwear would shift investment and market share to plants in lower-cost
Vietnam thereby threatening New Balance’s U.S. production facilities.393
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III.E.2. Capital controls and financial regulations
Investor rights in financial services
On November 27, Faryar Shirzad, Managing Director at Goldman Sachs, sent an email to
USTR Froman affirming the importance of broad investor rights for the financial services
sector.394 In past U.S. FTAs, due to the Treasury’s regulatory concerns, only the “transfers” and
“expropriation” articles from the investment chapter along with ISDS enforcement applied to
financial services. In the TPP, the USTR was attempting to expand investor rights and ISDS in
the financial services sector by also including the controversial “minimum standard of treatment”
provision with ISDS enforcement.395 In addition to Goldman Sachs, a prominent U.S. financial
services lobby group wrote an open letter to the USTR advocating for the full inclusion of
investor rights from the investment chapter and access to ISDS in the TPP financial services
chapter.396 However, the USTR faced strong opposition to this unprecedented proposal,
including from Mexico and Canada, which led U.S. financial services institutions to become
“worried” that the USTR would forgo the initiative in an effort to conclude the deal by the end of
the year. Mr. Shirzad informally addressed USTR Froman as “Mike” and warned that denying
the financial services industry the same investor rights enjoyed by other industries would be
“unfortunate” given the importance of the U.S. financial services industry in generating service
exports and growing U.S. commercial presence around the world. Shirzad urged,
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“I wanted to underscore how important it is for the financial services
industry to get robust commitments on ISDS in the agreement – including on preestablishment and the full range of fair treatment ([‘minimum standard of
treatment,’ ‘national treatment,’ ‘most favored nation’]) provisions. These
measures are critical to making the TPP a meaningful agreement for our industry
and, as importantly, they set powerful precedent for the U.S.-China BIT.”397
Opponents of the proposal to expand investor rights and ISDS in financial services argue
that the provisions are deregulatory as financial services companies can challenge financial
regulations, even during financial and economic crises, which could even discourage a
government from adopting financial regulations in the first place. Historically, U.S. regulators,
including the Treasury, Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission, sought to
shield themselves from such challenges and opposed expanding the scope of ISDS mechanism to
include additional types of financial services claims.398

Capital Controls
The leaked notes of the anonymous Chief Negotiator during the Salt Lake City round
observed of the financial services negotiations, “The positions are still paralyzed. U.S. shows
zero flexibility…”399 In February, Rodrigo Contreras, Chile’s Chief Negotiator, suddenly
resigned from his post. Then in May, before the Lima, Peru round, Contreras published an
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editorial in Peru’s top newspaper explaining his concerns about the direction of the TPP, namely,
the U.S.’ demands in intellectual property and their unequivocal rejection of capital controls. He
argued that the TPP was still a work in progress and a potential opportunity for all members,
however, institutionalizing the free movement of capital in the TPP would “deprive” developing
countries of “legitimate tools to safeguard financial stability.” Contreras outlined capital controls
as fundamental to development policy,
“It is critical to reject the imposition of a model designed according to
realities of high-income countries, which are very different from the other
participating countries. Otherwise, this agreement will become a threat for our
countries: it will restrict our development options in health and education, in
biological and cultural diversity, and in the design of public policies and the
transformation of our economies.”400
Lastly, Contreras warned that growing social movements would not forgive governments
that use to trade negotiations to limit the prosperity and well-being of their countries. Earlier that
year, Treasury Secretary Lew had visited the ASEAN TPP members and among their discussions
was the Asian countries’ continued to opposition to the U.S. provisions that would limit capital
controls. To that end, in Singapore, officials stressed to Secretary Lew that the “eventual TPP
package will have to provide an overall balance of benefits for all participants,” and a lot of
“tough work” remained before TPP countries could conclude the deal.401
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III.F. 2014: The Obama administration prepares for TPA while pushing for TPP conclusion
By 2014, the negotiations had hit two major stumbling blocks, first, that the USTR lacked
TPA from Congress, and second, the U.S. and Japan had hit an impasse in bilateral market
access for agriculture and autos. The TPA gave other countries the assurance that any
agreements with the USTR would not be changed by Congress, and since the USTR lacked TPA
other negotiators held back their offers. Therefore, beginning in 2014, the Obama administration
began to actively work with Congress to develop a TPA legislation. However, progress had
further waned as the U.S. and Japan could not resolve their bilateral market access issues in
agriculture and autos. This dilemma nearly arrested the entire negotiations as other countries
conditioned their offers on the outcome of the U.S.-Japan deal.402
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III.F.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
Application of ISDS to “investment agreements” and “investment authorizations”
The ASEAN countries continued to reject the broad scope of applying ISDS to
“investment agreements” and “investment authorizations” for three reasons.403 First, countries
did not want to expose themselves to ISDS in public-private partnerships, in the case of
Malaysia, the country was undertaking a series of public-private partnerships infrastructure and
forestry projects that could potentially be challenged using ISDS under such a provision. Second,
the ASEAN countries did not want ISDS to apply to government procurement, which was
politically sensitive in each country and Malaysia had taken a particularly hard stance on the
issue.404 In fact, in the June, 2012 leak there was a proposed provision that the ISDS “…does not
apply where there is a dispute between a Party and an investor of a Party related to government
procurement or the provision of a subsidy or grant.”405 The third reason was the dispute over
tobacco, discussed below. The ASEAN countries were seeking exceptions or outright carve outs
in all three areas. Domestically, labor union representatives from affiliates of Public Services
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International made their case to Senate Finance Committee Democrats in September. Among the
union’s TPP concerns were that the provisions applying ISDS to public services and in tandem
with the services and government procurement chapters it would threaten jobs in the public
services sectors such as public health, education, and law enforcement. They argued that
privatization of public service sectors opens the door to MNCs guided by the profit motive that
will devalue wages, labor standards, and jobs.406

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
The new Australian government had dropped their absolute opposition to ISDS but they
were seeking greater U.S. market access in exchange.407 In March, the USTR published a “fact
sheet” on ISDS intended to defend U.S. investment policy from the domestic and foreign
opposition. The USTR did not directly address criticisms of ISDS but merely sought to
rhetorically separate “fact from fiction” by claiming that ISDS offers the same protections to
investors abroad that they enjoy in the U.S. while safeguarding the right of governments to
implement public purpose regulations, such as “…in the interest of financial stability,
environmental protection, or public health.”408 The press release asserted that a “core value”
guiding trade policy is “promoting the rule of law,” and ISDS is one of the cornerstones of this
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objective.409 Therefore, the USTR was not espousing ISDS for economic merits, but rather, as a
foreign policy goal to promote the rule of law abroad.

Tobacco and ISDS
Early in the year, Malaysia’s revised tobacco proposal still had support from other
members but many members were “reluctant” to give their full support because they did not
want to make concessions in other areas of the talks.410 Towards the end of the year, the USTR
had informally discussed with other countries a compromise that would exclude tobacco-related
disputes from ISDS but would not affect the rest of the TPP, such as state-to-state disputes and
removing tariffs on tobacco.411 According to Sen. Hatch, the Department of Health and Human
Services had refused to give away it’s ‘‘policy space’’ in regulating tobacco which helped to
motivate the USTR to carve out tobacco products from ISDS.412 The USTR’s proposal was
blasted by a tobacco industry spokesman, “This proposal would unfairly discriminate against a
single sector by denying access to due process and other basic and fundamental legal
principles…Worse, it sets a terrible precedent opening the door for other trade partners to begin
targeting other business sectors for exclusion.”413

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
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In December, President Obama addressed the Business Roundtable and outlined his
administration’s plan to obtain fast track. He mulled that passing fast track would be challenging
because many Americans “mistakenly” attribute wage stagnation and job loss to trade
agreements.414 Obama said that the link between trade and wage stagnation is a “half-truth,” and
he claimed that more jobs have been lost to automation than to offshoring. Therefore, he urged
Democrats and unions to not “fight a war” on past trade agreements, “Those who oppose these
trade deals, ironically, are accepting a status quo that is more damaging to American workers.”415
Obama asserted that there had been offshoring of U.S. manufacturing as a direct result of the
NAFTA and China entering the WTO, however, the TPP will not promote offshoring since
companies “can do that now without any real restraints.”416 Moreover, he argued that the TPP
would boost labor, environmental, and intellectual property standards which would help support
U.S. jobs. Thea Lee, Policy Director of the AFL-CIO, contorted that unions are not “anti-trade,”
rather, they made a range of substantive recommendations for the TPP that were “virtually
ignored” by the Obama administration.417 Union representatives presented studies contesting that
trade has had a more important effect on jobs and wages than claimed by Obama.418

III.F.2. Capital controls and financial regulations
In February, after Chile’s elections, representatives of the new Chilean government met
with USTR Froman and conveyed that they would not give up their right to capital controls,

“In Two Speeches, Obama Says He Will Make Case For TPA to Congress,” Inside U.S.
Trade, December 5, 2014.
415
Ibid.
416
Ibid.
417
Ibid.
418
Ibid.
414

213

which would go beyond their commitments in the U.S.-Chile FTA.419 Several high ranking
officials of the new Chilean government had concluded that the costs of the TPP would outweigh
the benefits because Chile already had FTAs with all of the TPP countries but they were being
asked to make sensitive concessions in intellectual property rights and capital controls.420
Similarly, a handful of U.S. Senators led by Sen. Elizabeth Warren addressed USTR Froman
about their concerns that the TPP would restrict financial regulations in the U.S., “With millions
of families still struggling to recover from the last financial crisis and the Great Recession that
followed, we cannot afford a trade deal that undermines the government’s ability to protect the
American economy.”421 They identified three provisions as problematic for financial regulations
- ISDS, market access, and capital controls. They noted that ISDS had successfully been used in
another country to target their emergency financial measures and that the USTR’s proposed
expansion of the “minimum standard of treatment” provision to the financial sector would have a
powerful deregulatory effect on the financial services sector. They outlined concerns that market
access commitments in the financial services sector would undermine the ability of regulators to
restrict “predatory or toxic financial products - such as particularly risky forms of derivatives”
because such regulations could be interpreted as a denial of access to the U.S. financial
markets.422 They opposed the ban on capital controls because it could “…limit Congress’
prerogative to enact not only capital controls, but basic reform measures like a financial
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transactions tax.”423 In conclusion, they pressed the USTR to explain how U.S. trade policy
would help Congress and regulatory agencies to prevent future financial crises.

III.F. 2015: Obama administration secures TPA then concludes TPP negotiations
While the USTR pressured Congress for TPA, other TPP negotiators contributed by
warning Congress that without TPA the TPP would end up “like the Doha stalemate.”424 As TPP
proponents did not yet have the necessary votes in Congress to secure passage of TPA, major
U.S. industry groups stepped up lobbying efforts, especially the financial services lobbies.
Emails between USTR Froman and executives of the big U.S. banks revealed close coordination
on lobbying efforts to win votes for TPA while scheduling meetings to discuss the content of the
TPP and T-TIP - “See u thurs, bob” one bank executive signed in his email to USTR Froman.425
Simultaneously, in January, wikileaks obtained and published a new leaked draft of the
investment chapter revealing that the USTR had secured unprecedented investor rights, further
fueling an increasingly diverse domestic opposition to TPA.426 The TPP negotiations were
concluded on October 5, 2015 and the final text was made public on November 5, 2015.
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III.F.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
Investor rights
The leaked January draft of the investment chapter revealed which conflicts had been
settled, which remained, and other developments since the 2012 leak. All brackets around the
definition of “investment” had been removed, signifying that the ASEAN countries did not
secure their exceptions to the “pre-establishment” obligations while other countries had dropped
their proposals to narrow the scope the chapter. The conflict over the indirect expropriation
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provisions had been resolved, with a removal of the brackets around the U.S. proposal and a
deletion of the competing proposal, which was language from China’s BITs.427 It is unclear if
any political trade-offs settled the conflict. In addition, there was a deletion of a footnote
establishing broad interpretation of “public welfare objectives,” an edit that weakened the public
purpose carve-out from the investor protection.428 These developments protected the
“expropriation” provision from the attempts from other countries to block any legal avenues that
would allow companies to bring “indirect expropriation” claims under ISDS.
In March, in a NAFTA case involving a U.S. investment in a Canadian quarry, an ISDS
tribunal ruled that Canada breached its “minimum standard of treatment” obligations awarded
the U.S. company $101 million USD.429 The governments of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico
disagreed with the tribunal’s decision, which motivated the USTR to make slight revisions to the
TPP “minimum standard of treatment” provision. Notably, the USTR introduced new language
that provided that a government measure that is merely inconsistent with an investor’s
expectations does not constitute a breach of the “minimum standard of treatment” provision.430 A
second new provision carved-out government subsidies and grants from the “minimum standard
of treatment” obligation.431 However, with the release of the final TPP text, legal experts doubted
the effect of the new provisions because no past findings of a violation of the provision had
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rested exclusively on the fact that an investor’s expectations were not met, but rather that the
state acted in an unfair or arbitrary way.432

Application of ISDS to “investment agreements” and “investment authorizations”
Throughout most of the year the conflict continued over the application of ISDS to
“investment agreements” and “investment authorizations.” In the June, 2012 leaked draft of the
TPP investment chapter both terms appeared 12 times and all bracketed, then in the January,
2015 leak both terms appeared 18 times and all bracketed, and in the final text the terms
appeared 41 times, signifying that conflict was not resolved until near the end of negotiations and
most likely at the political level of Chief Negotiators. As the NAFTA did not have such
provisions, Mexico had emerged as leading the opposition to the U.S. proposal, and especially
they sought to guard against ISDS claims in the event of breaches to public concessions
contracts.433 Based on the final text, the USTR had made two major compromises from their
negotiating position delineated in the 2012 Model BIT. The first compromise was to scale-back
the definition and scope of “investment agreements” and “investment authorizations.” With
respect to natural resources, an “investment agreement” would not include public land, water, or
radio spectrum; with respect to the supply of public services, an “investment agreement” would
not include correctional, healthcare, education, childcare, or welfare services; the definition of
“investment authorizations” would not apply to non-discriminatory regulations that address
competition, the environment, public health, licensing regimes, or investment incentives. The
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second compromise led to the creation of a new Annex which provides that a state may condition
a contract for an investment agreement such that disputes could be arbitrated under an alternative
legal forum to the ISDS procedures. The Annex also contained some country-specific provisions,
notably, Mexico did not consent to the application of ISDS to oil, gas, petroleum, and a range of
public infrastructure. In sum, while the USTR began negotiations insisting on the application of
ISDS to diverse public domain contracts called “investment agreements” and “investment
authorizations,” to conclude the TPP, the USTR had to narrow the definition of both terms and
the scope of ISDS as applied to the terms.

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
While trying to win TPA from many skeptical or critical Congress members, the USTR
was forced to defend its positions. Throughout 2015, the USTR published fact sheets, question
and answer sessions, and responses to high-profile critics in Congress, such as Sen. Elizabeth
Warren. In fact, Ranking Rep. Levin had drafted an alternative TPA bill with substantive
proposals for reforms to investor rights and ISDS. In March, House Democrats had a private
meeting with USTR officials concerning the TPP investment chapter in which the USTR
indicated that it would not change its negotiating positions on the issues.434 Some Congress
members in attendance responded that the USTR’s unwillingness to compromise on its
negotiating positions was contrary to the purpose of TPA, in which Congress mandates
negotiating objectives to the USTR. House Democrat Alan Grayson elaborated, “Now they're
telling us that major parts ... of these agreements are no longer subject to negotiations, much less
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guidance through legislation.”435 The USTR stuck to its talking points that stakeholder
consultation substituted Congressional mandate. Similarly, USTR Froman responded to
criticisms in the Senate, “The TPP investment rules have been carefully crafted though many
years of close stakeholder consultation and a public comment process.”436
In addition to attempting to limit the scope of “investment agreements” and “investment
authorizations,” TPP countries were seeking carve-outs from ISDS for specific sectors. Australia
was conditioning its acceptance of ISDS to improved market access for its sugar and dairy
exports, and by August the U.S. had offered additional market access to Australian sugar.437 In
addition, as revealed by the January leak, Australia asserted that if it accepted ISDS then it would
not apply not to tobacco measures and a list of other public health measures.438 Canada sought a
complete carve-out of its “culture industries” from ISDS.439 By the end of negotiations, Australia
conceded to ISDS while both Australia and Canada succeeded in securing these carve-outs. The
January leak also disclosed that Malaysia had been seeking a permanent and complete carve-out
of government procurement from ISDS.440 Malaysian officials were seeking a high monetary
threshold above which the government procurement of construction would be open to foreign
bidders.441 However, by the end of the year, they had only secured a three year transition period
of isolating government procurement from ISDS.
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Tobacco and ISDS
The USTR’s informal tobacco proposal provided a broad exemption from ISDS for
tobacco-related regulations, and this provoked outrage not just from tobacco companies and
affected Congress members but also from the business community more generally.442 President
Obama justified his administration’s position, “The big bugaboo that’s lifted up there is tobacco
companies suing poorer countries to make sure that anti-smoking legislation is banned, or at least
tying them up with so much litigation that ultimately smaller countries cave.”443 However, the
USTR waited until after Congress passed TPA to officially table its tobacco proposal that would
deny the benefits of ISDS to tobacco companies and products.444 Throughout the year,
Democratic and Republican Congress members from tobacco producing states, including Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, went to bat for the tobacco industries.445 McConnell did not
withdraw his support for the TPP, but he warned USTR Froman, “…[do] not set a new precedent
for future U.S. trade negotiations by negatively carving out a specific American agricultural
commodity — in this case tobacco.”446 However, in TPP negotiations, the USTR “was clear”
that tobacco had to be treated differently, especially because it was a “salient” issue with a
“sizeable” bloc of TPP members, including Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia.447 The
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USTR’s lead negotiator Barbara Wiesel explained that if the USTR did not compromise on
tobacco then they would have had to compromise in other areas, such as ISDS.448 The USTR’s
proposal was accepted by the other TPP negotiators and subsequently some Congress members
who had supported TPA vowed to not support the final vote for the TPP.449

Investment-related labor and environmental concerns
The auto rules of origin were among the last conflicts of negotiations and they were
decided in a political tradeoff with the other remaining issues. In an FTA, product-specific rules
of origin interact with the investment chapter inasmuch as the investment chapter facilitates
and/or incentives offshoring. The final rules of origin for autos was set at 45 percent for the TPP
bloc, meaning that 45 percent of the total content of an automobile must come from TPP
members in order for the automobile to qualify for the benefits of the agreement, such as tariff
reductions. While U.S. and Mexican automakers supported the TPP auto rules of origin, U.S.
labor unions alongside a handful of Congress members lamented the compromise, as in their
view it was a downgrade from the 62.5 percent auto rules of origin in the NAFTA.450 They
argued that the new TPP auto rules of origin would result in increased offshoring and/or import
competition from the Asian TPP members.451
Simultaneously, U.S. footwear producer New Balance had cut a deal with the Obama
administration to forgo their opposition to the TPP in exchange for a contract to supply the
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military with Made-in-the-USA shoes.452 However, according to New Balance, the Obama
administration reneged on the arrangement which led New Balance to join the textile workers
union in opposing the TPP. By the end of negotiations, labor unions and sympathetic Congress
members were warning that the TPP meant further offshoring in both the automobile and textile
sectors. Alongside long-standing ISDS-related environmental concerns, the TPP’s potential
effect on the quantity and quality of jobs became a central sticking-point in the 2015 TPA
debates in Congress. The debates were largely a continuation of the on-going conflicts, however,
the point of issue was no longer the content of the TPP but rather whether or not Congress should
pass TPA which would open the door to ratifying the TPP.

III.F.2. Financial regulations and capital controls
Capital controls
Whereas the 2012 leak illustrated that TPP countries proposed various forms of capital
controls to the opposition of the USTR, the January 2015 leak showed that there had been some
incremental movement on the stalemate. Most notably, in the January 2015 leak there were two
competing provisions that would govern capital controls.453 The first proposal was based on the
WTO balance of payments provisions which provide relatively greater policy space for
implementing capital controls and it replicated the language found in the 2012 leak, which was
contested by the U.S.; the second was a set of more narrow provisions that was similar to the
language found in the U.S.-Korea FTA. There were two main differences between the proposals,
in the first instance the U.S. proposal had a far more limited scope in that it only applied to
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“movements of capital,” whereas the competing proposal applied to all “transfers or payments,”
even for goods and services. The second difference was that the U.S. proposal imposed far more
stringent conditions that a capital control would have to meet in order to qualify as an exception
to TPP obligations, including, that the measure would not exceed one year and that it would be
applied as a non-discriminatory tax, among other conditions. Both proposals were bracketed and
the issue would not be resolved until towards the end of negotiations. However, the leak
demonstrated that the U.S. had moved from its original negotiating stance to be more accepting
of capital controls. Ranking Rep. Levin observed that the conflict was now over the extent of
capital controls, “Other TPP countries have insisted on [capital controls]…The focus is now on
ensuring that the language in the exception is neither too narrow nor too broad.”454
The final agreement, “Temporary Safeguard Measures,” 455 was a combination of the two
proposals although with some significant political compromises. The provisions apply broadly to
all transfers, however, they are subject to a range of specific conditions and if those conditions
are met then any capital controls measure must not exceed 18 months. Among those conditions
are that they must be consistent with the expropriations provision, including: they must not
interfere with investors’ ability to earn a market rate of return; they must not be used “to avoid
necessary macroeconomic adjustment”; they are not permitted for payments or transfers relating
to FDI; states must follow specific procedures for consultations with other TPP members and
publish a schedule for their removal.456 In sum, while TPP countries secured the right to
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temporary capital controls, the U.S. attached a curious combination of specificity and ambiguity
to the necessary conditions that would permit the implementation of capital controls.
The 2012 leak revealed that Chile was seeking to codify their unrestrained ability to
implement any capital controls in a separate annex to the investment chapter, including its right
to implement reserve requirements to capital inflows, which they had successfully implemented
for five years in the early 1990s. The January, 2015 leak contained some additional provisions,
notably that the reserve requirement does not exceed 30 percent of the amount transferred and
must not be imposed for longer than two years. In the final agreement, any references to the
broad regulatory power of Chile’s monetary authorities was removed, and the phrase
“Notwithstanding Article 9.9 (Transfers)” was inserted prior to the provision.457 The end result
was that Chile secured the right to implement a specific form of capital controls (reserve
requirements on capital inflows) for no more than two years.

Investor rights in financial services
By the conclusion of negotiations, the USTR had secured an unprecedented expansion of
ISDS to investors and investments in financial services by incorporating the “minimum standard
of treatment” provision from the investment chapter into the financial services chapter and then
making it subject ISDS enforcement. In past FTAs, the U.S. had only incorporated the
“expropriation” and “transfers” provisions and subjected them to ISDS enforcement in the
financial services chapters.458 Domestically, the measure was controversial as the “minimum
standard of treatment” provision has been cited in nearly 90 percent of all ISDS claims and
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critics argued that expanding this right to financial services firms could “open a Pandora’s box”
of claims against financial regulations.459 A spokesman from the financial services industry
contested that the addition of “minimum standard of treatment” would only “slightly” enhance
investor rights in financial services because the lack of access to the right in the past had not
stopped many ISDS claims in financial services.460
In negotiations, the measure was resisted by other countries who eventually proposed a
range of counter-offers in the form of carve-outs and exceptions. By the end of negotiations,
Brunei, Chile, Mexico, and Peru had secured a limited carve-out from the new obligation. The
provision461 granted that “minimum standard of treatment” in financial services would not apply
to any fact or situation prior to the fifth anniversary of ratification of the TPP in Brunei, Chile,
and Peru, and the seventh anniversary in Mexico. In so doing, those countries not only secured a
transition period but also an exception to the obligation for existing conditions that would
currently constitute a breach of “minimum standard of treatment” in financial services.
Following the conclusion of negotiations, the USTR’s trade advisory committee on services
issued their report to the USTR measuring the final text against the industry’s negotiating
objectives. While the services and finance industries supported the TPP, among their reservations
on the financial services chapter was the fact that it did not include the “national treatment” and
“most favored nation” provision from the investment chapter.462 In sum, the USTR expanded
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investor rights in financial services over domestic regulatory concerns and international
opposition but not to extent that industry groups had hoped.
G. New President Trump Withdraws the U.S. from the TPP
President Obama signs the TPP
At the end of 2014, USTR Michael Froman announced that trade promotion authority
(TPA) was necessary to conclude the TPP negotiations. Congress grants TPA to the President to
allow for an “up or down” vote for an FTA, in return, in the TPA legislation Congress sets the
negotiation objectives for the President. In past practice, Presidents sought TPA from
Congress before negotiating an FTA because the TPA contains Congressionally
mandated negotiating objectives. However, the Obama administration had not sought
TPA from Congress until the end of TPP negotiations because Congress was hostile to
the TPP from the start of negotiations. House Democrats had repeatedly introduced TPA
legislation containing negotiating objectives proposed by labor unions and environmental
organizations, which were contrary to the USTR’s priorities in the TPP. In May and June
of 2014, the TPA failed its original votes in the House and Senate as many Congressional
Democrats were demanding a renewal of Trade Adjustment Assistance and measures
against currency manipulation as the price for their support for TPA. Trade Adjustment
Assistance coordinates federal programs aimed at reducing the impact of import
competition as a result of trade and investment agreements.
Beginning in 2015, the AFL-CIO in tandem with other unions froze all campaign
contributions to pressure Congress members to oppose TPA while growing conservative
opposition to U.S. trade policy led to new political alliances across party lines. Political
trade-offs were made in favor of a stronger Trade Adjustment Assistance while major
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corporate lobbies stepped up efforts to win the necessary Congressional votes. Research by
Maplight, an organization that specializes in measuring campaign contributions, found that
industry groups gave 8.6 times more money ($197.9 million) to House Representatives who
voted in favor of TPA than to those who opposed the legislation ($23.1 million) (Stevens 2015).
By the end of June, 2015, the TPA had been reintroduced to both the House and Senate where it
narrowly passed and President Obama signed it into law in July. TPA passage enabled the
conclusion of TPP negotiations in October because it gave TPP members the necessary
confidence to put forward their final offers because TPA ensured that Congress could not change
the final deal (Froman 2014).
In February 2016, the TPP members signed the agreement. For the TPP to become
implemented as international law, TPP members would have to pass the TPP through their
respective political ratification processes. In the U.S., this meant Congress would vote on the
TPP’s implementation. Due to the 2016 Presidential election cycle, this was becoming
increasingly complicated as the top candidates were campaigning against the TPP. The Obama
administration did not send the TPP up for vote as Congress was awaiting the results of the 2016
elections.

The 2016 Presidential Elections
The first social protest in the U.S. against the TPP was in June 2010, in which advocates
from the labor, environmental, family farm, consumer, indigenous rights, and among others held
a gathering outside the TPP’s first U.S. negotiating round. Their banner read, “A New Deal or
No Deal,” and their message was a call for a new trade agreement model that would prioritize the
interests of labor, the environment, and the consumer, rather than corporate profits. As
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negotiations continued, so did the social protests against the TPP. From that moment and
until Obama signed the TPP in 2016, popular opposition to the TPP gained more and
more momentum. First thousands, then tens of thousands, then hundreds of thousands,
and then millions of U.S. citizens signed letters and petitions in opposition to the TPP and
its corporate-sponsored content. During the fast-track debate in 2015, more than 2,000
local political organizations signed statements opposing fast-track for the TPP.
Trade became a hot-button issue on the 2016 Presidential campaign trail.
Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton was challenged by Senator Bernie Sanders, a
self-described “Democratic Socialist,” who had soared in popularity in only months.
Sanders’ long track record of opposition to U.S. FTAs and his persistent resistance to the
TPP throughout negotiations boosted his message and popularity. Sanders actively
campaigned against the TPP, he argued, “The TPP is a disastrous trade agreement
designed to protect the interests of the largest [MNCs] at the expense of workers,
consumers, the environment and the foundations of American democracy” (Sanders
2016). Sanders promised that as President he would integrate public interests and public
institutions into trade policy formation, on the principle of democracy.
Conversely, as Secretary of State, Clinton oversaw the State Department’s
formation of key trade and investment negotiating objectives for the agreement
(Department of State 2012) and then she declared the TPP as the “gold standard” of trade
agreements. Sander’s growing popularity and popular opposition to the TPP seemed to
have forced Clinton to rethink her trade policy stance. In October 2015, just before the
first Democratic primary debate, Clinton announced that she had a change of heart on the
TPP and that the TPP was in need of fundamental changes to earn her support. When
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Clinton reversed course on the TPP and announced her opposition, it meant that both of the
Democrat’s frontrunners did not support the TPP. As the TPP needed the Democrats support in
Congress, this was the key moment in sealing the TPP’s fate.
Republican frontrunner, reality television star Donald Trump, grew in popularity with the
majority white working class by pledging to “Make America Great Again.” On trade, he
promised to withdraw from the TPP and label China a currency manipulator, threatened to
withdraw from the WTO and NAFTA, and to impose high tariffs on imported Chinese goods and
goods produced by U.S. MNCs that had offshored production. Trump’s “America first” trade
policy was one part of a larger package of social protections for the white working class, which
also entailed empowering them with putative immigration and criminal justice policies. He
promised xenophobic border walls and controls to protect working class jobs from “illegal
immigrants” and aggressive security policies to protect working class communities from the “bad
hombres” to the South and the “radical Islamic terrorists” in the East. Trump’s nationalistic
rhetoric worked. Trump won the election because he won white working class voters in key
swing states and counties (Freund & Sidhu 2017; Sasson 2016; Cohn 2016; Tankersley 2016).

The TPP gets Trumped
After Trump won the election, true to his campaign promise, he withdrew the U.S. from
the TPP on his first week in office. Congressional Democrats and their constituents refused to
give Trump credit for the TPP’s 2016 defeat, Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer
proclaimed, “TPP was dead long before President Trump took office.” Similarly, Richard
Trumka, head of the AFL-CIO, attributed the lack of Congressional support for the TPP to “a
powerful coalition of labor, environmental, consumer, public health and allied groups.” Obama’s
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USTR Froman responded that the TPP was merely in a state of hibernation because the
U.S.’ core interests do not change with an administration change. At the April 2017
APEC meeting in Vietnam, trade ministers from the TPP countries marginalized Trump’s
new USTR Robert Lighthizer and they pledged to ratify the TPP without the U.S.

V. Conclusion
Polanyi’s “double movement” and TPP negotiations
In the TPP investment chapter negotiations, U.S. political actors represented all
three of the ideal types of trade policy positions. U.S. MNCs, the Obama administration,
and bipartisan groups in Congress supported “free trade” policies (market-based
governance). Labor unions, environmental organizations, consumer groups, and many
Congressional Democrats supported “socialist” trade policies (subjecting markets to
democratic control). Libertarian, small government, and “Tea Party” Republicans and
political organizations, along with the Trump administration, supported the “nationalist”
trade policies (prioritizing national interests over multinational interests). The “free
trade” actors vigorously promoted the TPP while “socialist” and “nationalist” groups
denounced the TPP in favor of social protections, and the alliances had crossed
conventional party lines on both sides of the debate. As negotiations progressed, U.S.
political actors sharpened their positions as they conflicted and cooperated with groups in
other countries. With the election of Donald Trump, “socialist” and “nationalist” political
currents had defeated the “free traders” in the TPP battle.

“Free trade” actors in TPP investment negotiations
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The “free trade” actors sought strong investor protections and far-reaching applications of
ISDS with limited exceptions. They promoted their position as “de-politicized,” neutral, marketbased governance for the region. However, the “free trade” groups were in conflict with the
“socialist” and “nationalist” actors. Therefore, their promotion of market-based governance was
a political decision rather than a “neutral” economic law. For example, during domestic
negotiations, U.S. business groups united in their position, “U.S. investors are at a competitive
disadvantage compared to many of their key competitors from countries that already have strong
[investment agreements] with countries in key growth markets such as China, India and Russia”
(Inside U.S. Trade 2010a). Prominent business lobbyist Linda Menghetti explained to Congress,
“…strong investment protections are vital and squarely within America’s economic and national
interest” (cited in House 2009). The domestic negotiations over specific provisions revealed the
USTR’s decision-making process in developing negotiating objectives – they would support
most of business’ proposals and reject any competing proposals, including those of labor,
environmental, and consumer groups. Since the Obama administration did not pursue TPA and
lacked Congressional directives, the USTR was free to reject other policy proposals.
However, the Obama administration did not entirely represent “free trade” policies. The
USTR had a more nuanced approach than simply pursuing the expansion of investor protections
and ISDS in indefinite directions. As the U.S. had been a defendant in numerous ISDS cases, the
USTR did not support all of business’ proposals. For, example, the “minimum standard of
treatment” and “expropriation” provisions were less investor-friendly than the proposals
advanced by U.S. MNCs. However, compared to the investment policies of other countries, U.S.
investment policy is the among the most pro-investor rights (Alschner & Skougarevskiy 2016).
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“Socialist” trade actors in TPP investment negotiations
In negotiations, the U.S.’ proposed multinational investor protections immediately
conflicted with the priorities of labor unions, environmental organizations, and consumer
advocacy groups. For this reason, diverse groups in the U.S. called on the Obama
administration to democratize trade and investment policy. Labor unions had two primary
concerns in investment negotiations, first, that strong investor protections facilitated
offshoring of jobs, and second, they attempted to tie investor rights to investor
obligations to raise labor standards abroad. However, it was sometimes unclear whether
these demands were “socialist” or “nationalist.” Labor unions who sought to insert
language into the investment chapter to raise global labor standards were “socialist,”
while labor leaders who prioritized the interests of U.S. workers over workers in other
countries were “nationalist.” Environmental organizations also sought to weaken investor
protections. Their purpose was to prevent multinational investors from using ISDS to
weaken environmental regulations, notably, the fossil fuel industry’s deliberate use of
ISDS to dismantle climate change regulations. Similarly, the USTR conceded to a broad
tobacco exception from ISDS. While the U.S. business community united in opposition
against product-specific exemptions to ISDS as an unacceptable precedent, the conflict
represented a growing domestic and international sentiment that MNCs use ISDS to
undermine public interest legislation, particularly in small or developing countries. The
heated debate over capital controls starkly contrasted the public and private interest in
monetary and exchange rate policy. Developing countries, led by Chile, outlined the right
to capital controls as fundamental to development policy; whereas the USTR was
opposed to capital controls in order to facilitate flows of private capital and support the
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commercial interests of U.S. financial services MNCs. U.S. consumer advocacy groups,
hundreds of leading U.S. economists, and Congressional Democrats supported
developing countries’ right to capital controls. These groups represented “socialist” trade politics
as they sought to democratize trade policy formation.

“Nationalist” trade actors in TPP investment negotiations
Similar to the “socialists,” in all countries “nationalists” tended to be opposed to strong
investor protections. The developing countries pushed back on the USTR for a combination of
weaker investor rights and broad exceptions to ISDS, and many of their motivations were to
benefit domestic industries. For example, Mexico sought broad exceptions to ISDS in the energy
sector to safeguard national energy firms while Malaysia sought exceptions for government
procurement to give contracts to national firms. Even the U.S. took such precautions - the USTR
did not include the proposals from labor unions on state-owned enterprises because the Treasury
did not want to expose itself to ISDS claims against emergency financial measures, such as
nationalizing the banks and automakers after the 2008 financial crisis. Libertarian political
organizations, like the Cato Institute, announced that they opposed ISDS because it undermined
U.S. sovereignty and democracy. Politicians, notably Donald Trump, opposed the TPP along
nationalist lines inasmuch as the TPP resembled past U.S. FTAs that allowed MNCs to abandon
production in the U.S. while allowing other countries to import without reciprocal market access.
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Chapter Six: The Direction of U.S. International Investment Agreements
I. Introduction
II. Comparing the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters
III. The TPP’s impact on state sovereignty
IV. Conclusion: international investment law theory revisited

I. Introduction
In this chapter, I compare the legal content of the NAFTA and TPP investment
agreements. Although there are key differences, in the main, the NAFTA and TPP
investment agreements are highly consistent. I argue that based on this analyses, the TPP
investment chapter heavily favors “private” interests in the “public-private” divide and it
categorically limits development policy options for the low-income TPP countries. I
conclude that although President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the TPP, it is not in the
Trump administration’s interest to revise the U.S. Model BIT. In the next chapter I will
discuss the intersection of the U.S. Model BIT with Trump’s “America First” campaign
promises.

II. Comparing the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters
II.A. Differences between the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters
“The TPP is not NAFTA” – President Obama
In broad terms, the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters
contain very similar investor protections and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
procedures, however, there are some important and specific differences. International
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investment law experts Wolfgang Alschner and Dmitriy Skougarevskiy compared the TPP
investment chapter to over 3000 international investment agreements in force using a method
that turns text into data to compare similarities and differences between texts (2016). They found
that the TPP investment chapter was most similar to the investment chapters of the U.S.Colombia FTA (81 percent similarity) and the U.S.-Peru FTA (81 percent similarity) (2016).
Notably, Alschner and Skougarevskiy found that the TPP investment chapter was 70 percent
similar to the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and 58 percent similar to the NAFTA investment chapter
(2012).
Alschner and Skougarevskiy’s methodology is limited in two significant ways. First, their
methodology omits footnotes and annexes, which contain some of the USTR’s most important
negotiating concessions. Notably, the exceptions to the application of ISDS to “investment
agreements,” which cover public-private contracts over natural resources, infrastructure, and
public services (Annex 9-L), and the annexes covering capital controls (Annex 9-E, 9-F, and
Exceptions and General Provisions). Second, Alschner and Skougarevskiy’s study does not
discuss the legal context of the provisions, in which slight changes to the language can have
strong modifications to the legal interpretation. For example, the central difference between the
“minimum standard of treatment” articles in the NAFTA and the TPP is that the NAFTA article
contains the broad language that investments be treated “in accordance with international law,”
while the TPP article specifies that that investments be treated “in accordance with applicable
customary international law” (emphasis added). The insertion of only two words, “applicable
customary,” before “international law” significantly alters the interpretation of the article
because it limits the scope of which international law is being referenced. The TPP article
provides for “applicable customary international law,” which is an established body of legal
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precedents that are centuries old, whereas the NAFTA article merely cites “international
law” which was interpreted by investors to be any international law.
President Obama repeatedly addressed the TPP’s critics, “The TPP is not
NAFTA.” Based on my own analysis, there are three mains sources of differences
between the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters: (1) the
experiences of the U.S. as a defendant under the NAFTA ISDS; (2) evolving commercial
interests of U.S. MNCs abroad; (3) the USTR’s concessions during TPP negotiations.
The investment provisions that are contained the NAFTA were originally designed for
capital-importing states and so the original U.S. drafters did not anticipate the U.S. to be
an ISDS defendant. However, the early NAFTA cases, especially those brought against
the U.S., motivated the Department of State to modify core provisions. The most
significant of these revisions came during the drafting of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT in
which the Department of State carefully scaled back the strength of two core investor
protections, the “minimum standard of treatment” and “expropriation” articles. This was
achieved by the creation of annexes that tied the interpretations of the two provisions to
“customary international law” that has been established in centuries of international
arbitrations on the two provisions. The adjustments to these two provisions were the most
significant changes to the U.S. Model BIT (2004).463
The commercial interests of the U.S. MNCs have evolved with technology and
the growing commercial and political importance of Asian markets. To support the
interests of U.S. MNCs, both the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and the TPP contain expanded
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The other NAFTA-inspired small revisions to the U.S. Model BIT are well documented
elsewhere (Vandevelde 2009 and 2010; Alvarez 2004).
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investor protections that were not conceivable in the 1990s. Comparing the NAFTA and TPP
investment and financial services chapters, the TPP’s most significant expansion of investor
rights include: expanded “performance requirements” aimed at state-owned enterprises banning
transfers of technology and intellectual property; application of ISDS to “investment
agreements” and “investment authorizations”; application of ISDS to the WTO intellectual
property rules (TRIPS); the application of the “minimum standard of treatment” article to the
financial services sector. The strengthening of these U.S. investor protections were in large
measure developed for future negotiations with China, particularly regulations on intellectual
property and state-owned enterprises (which are further developed in the TPP intellectual
property and state-owned enterprises chapters).
Lastly, other key differences between the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial
services chapters emerged from the concessions that the USTR made during TPP negotiations.
The USTR’s most important negotiating concessions to the TPP’s regulations include:
exceptions to the application of ISDS to “investment agreements”; more liberal policy space for
use of capital controls; the complete carve-out of tobacco from ISDS. The TPP’s impact on state
sovereignty is discussed below (Section III).

II.B. Similarities between the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters
The ghost of Calvo
Far more significant than the specific differences between the NAFTA and TPP
investment and financial services chapters are their fundamental similarities. Considering the
diverse and wide-ranging proposals to alter the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, the Obama administration
made only very minor revisions (outlined above) to the 2004 U.S. Model BIT in their drafting of
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the 2012 Model BIT. The Obama administration’s wholesale endorsement of the 2004
Model BIT signaled the structural consistency of U.S. investment policy since the Cold
War. The 1983 U.S. Model BIT was developed by the Reagan administration which was
then imported into the NAFTA investment chapter. The NAFTA investment chapter
motivated some slight revisions to core investor protections in the 2004 Model BIT. In
turn, the 2004 Model BIT was slightly expanded upon by the Obama administration in
the 2012 Model BIT, both of which were used to negotiate the TPP investment chapter.
From the Cold War through the “rise of China,” the main elements of U.S. investment
policy have remained stubbornly unchanged – a broad definition of investment and the
six core investor rights enforceable by ISDS (the six are: national treatment; most favored
nation; minimum standard of treatment; expropriations; transfers; and performance
requirements). Since the TPP investment chapter is an expanded version of the NAFTA
investment chapter, then it was mostly written by the Reagan administration and not the
Obama administration.
In 2007, Congress adopted the “May 10th Agreement” which promised to
rebalance the priorities of U.S. trade and investment agreements with greater emphasis on
the public interest. The May 10th Agreement included stronger labor and environmental
protections, intellectual property flexibilities that would facilitate greater access to lifesaving medicines, and investment language that clearly limited the rights of multinational
investors to those afforded to domestic investors, referred to as “no greater rights.” In
2009, during the Obama administrations’ review of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, various
proposals were made to insert a “no greater rights” provision into the new (2012) U.S.
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Model BIT. These proposals were fiercely opposed by the U.S. business community, lobbyist
Linda Menghetti warned Congress,
“An approach to incorporate further the ‘no greater rights’ language would
reverse decades of U.S. support for strong and binding international rules that
largely benefit the U.S. and its investors. This return to Calvo is not necessary and
would be very harmful” (cited in House 2009).
Prior to Menghetti’s statement, Harvard law professor Robert Stumberg had
demonstrated to Congress that the U.S. BIT program provides greater investor rights than the
rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution, which business lobbyist Menghetti had implicitly
acknowledged. However, Menghetti warned that seeking a reversion to U.S. domestic law would
amount to a return to the Calvo doctrine. Speaking on behalf of a group of major U.S. MNCs,
Menghetti asserted that any proposed “no greater rights” provision would “…provide few if any
benefits to the U.S. while creating huge risks for U.S. investors overseas” (cited in House 2009).
Menghetti explained to Congress that strong investor protections are necessary to raise investor
confidence in foreign markets to make foreign investments, therefore, any rollback of investor
rights to domestic law would “dramatically shift” the risk profile of foreign investments and put
U.S. firms at disadvantage.
In the same Congressional Hearing, Congressman John Larson was just as forthcoming,
“…for U.S. foreign investors in other jurisdictions, we want to obtain greater substantive rights
for our investors than domestic investors may have in those countries. That is sort of the value of
the BIT” (cited in House 2009). The early twenty-first century debates over “no greater rights”
were eerily reminiscent of the early twentieth century conflicts between the Calvo Doctrine and
the Hull Doctrine. After Mexico’s mass expropriations in 1917, U.S. Secretary of State Polk
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asserted that “on occasion” international law may afford foreigners with “broader and
more liberal treatment” than nationals,
“The Government of the United States is firmly of the opinion that
the great weight of international law and practice supports the view that
every nation has certain minimum duties to perform with regard to the
treatment of foreigners, irrespective of its duties to its own citizens” (cited
in Borchard 1940: 453).
Simply put, U.S. investment policy has remained highly consistent over time
because the international commercial interests of U.S. MNCs depend upon strong
investor rights and protections. After President-elect Trump pledged to withdraw from
the TPP, USTR Michael Froman, who oversaw TPP negotiations, retorted, “American
core interests don’t change from administration to administration” (cited in AFP 2016).
Indeed, even if the Trump administration does withdraw the U.S. from the TPP, U.S.
investment policy will not fundamentally change with an administration change. Rather,
the same or similar conflicts in TPP negotiations between multinational investors and
state regulators will emerge in the next negotiations whether it be in a TPP renegotiation
or a different FTA or BIT.

Strong investor rights as comparative advantage
Congressional Democrats, labor unions, environmental organizations, consumer
advocacy groups, academics, and think tanks advanced complex and substantive policy
proposals for both the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and the TPP. Most of the proposals would
have significantly weakened investor rights and ISDS while strengthening the ability of
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governments to regulate. Even during the NAFTA negotiations, labor unions and environmental
organizations had presented Congress with sophisticated evidence supporting their proposals and
debunking the arguments of U.S. MNCs. U.S. trade and investment policy became increasingly
unpopular in the country as growing sections of the population linked globalization to job loss,
growing inequality, environmental damage, and other problems. For this reason, during the TPP
negotiations the Obama administration did not seek trade promotion authority from Congress as
they sought to insulate the USTR’s negotiating positions from democratic processes. This also
explains the unprecedented secrecy surrounding the TPP negotiations. In this context, the Obama
administration categorically rejected any policy proposals that were unfavorable to the U.S.
commercial interests abroad. In 1959, in sociologist C. Wright Mills’ analysis of the domestic
power structure, he concluded that labor unions were “dependent variables…in the national
context” (1959: 265). This analysis still holds, labor unions and all other domestic political actors
found themselves marginalized from trade and investment policy negotiations which eliminated
them as independent variables effecting the agreements.
In both the NAFTA and TPP negotiations, there were consistently three independent
variables that acted upon the texts, (1) the USTR and other relevant government agencies
(notably the Treasury, Commerce, and State Departments), (2) U.S. MNCs, and (3) other country
negotiators and regulators. Congress was an independent variable during the NAFTA
negotiations because the USTR received negotiating objectives from Congress via fast track
legislation, however, during the TPP negotiations there was no such legislation and Congress’
influence over the content of the negotiations was diminished. For example, even when the
Democrats controlled Congress in 2009-10 and the majority of House Democrats supported
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legislation for progressive trade policy reform, in response the USTR simply waited for a
new Congress.
The negotiating history of the NAFTA and the TPP shows that the USTR
consulted closely with the U.S. MNCs in drafting and negotiating the agreements. In
large measure, this is because a U.S. trade agreement must pass Congress for its
implementation as law and Congress is highly sensitive to the needs and concerns of the
U.S. MNCs and large exporters. As explained by former Secretary of State James Baker
during the NAFTA negotiations, “[a trade] agreement not acceptable to the broad
spectrum of American business is doomed to failure” (cited in Senate 1991). During TPP
negotiations, House Republicans warned that if the Obama administration conceded to
labor and environmental groups’ policy proposals then “…they risk eroding traditional
support for trade…” because the business community would not support such trade and
investment law (cited in Inside U.S. Trade 2010). To that end, the agreements advance
the individual commercial interests of U.S. MNCs and large exporters. In TPP
negotiations, Congress was a “mediating variable” because Congress had an ambiguous
effect on the content of the investment negotiations, however, the Congressional
legislative process enhanced the influence of the other independent variables, including
by giving a powerful voice to labor unions and environmental groups. However, since all
of the policy proposals for the investment and financial services chapters from labor
unions and environmental organizations were rejected by the USTR, Congress’ main
impact was to secure the power and influence that U.S. MNCs had over the agreements.
The USTR argues that that U.S. investor protections and ISDS reflects “U.S.
values and interests” (2015). The U.S. BIT program represents U.S. values because it
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support an international rule of law and ISDS is a conflict resolution process that smooths
international tensions. Indeed, without ISDS there would be a basis for developing
countries to reject international law as they did during the Cold War, which would foreshadow a
return to gunboat diplomacy. Simultaneously, the USTR argues that U.S. investment law is in the
U.S. interest because the U.S. wrote the laws and China did not. The USTR and U.S. MNCs
argue that U.S. investor protections and ISDS are in the U.S. national interest because U.S.
MNCs employ U.S. workers and their global comparative advantage relies on U.S. investment
agreements. For example, the fossil fuel industry promotes ISDS as in the national interest
because it sustains the global competitiveness of U.S. energy companies and their workers. A
spokesman from Chevron, a U.S. oil and gas company, lobbied to Congress during the Obama’s
administration’s investment policy review in 2009,
“Sustained progress toward a comprehensive global investment protection
regime is necessary to both reduce the risk associated with overseas investments
and to ensure that U.S. companies are not disadvantaged against foreign
competitors whose investments are protected by such agreements” (cited in House
2009).
At the time of that testimony, Chevron was engaged in a (successful) multibillion dollar
ISDS dispute with Ecuador under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT. Just as U.S. MNCs depend upon the
regulatory obligations of U.S. investment agreements for their comparative advantages, the same
regulations curtail state sovereignty.

III. The TPP’s impact on state sovereignty
The TPP and investor-state dispute settlement
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In early 2015, as the Obama administration expended tremendous political capital
to win the necessary Congressional votes for trade promotion authority (formerly called
“fast-track legislation”), Senator Elizabeth Warren issued a scathing critique, “Agreeing
to ISDS in this enormous new treaty [TPP] would tilt the playing field in the U.S. further
in favor of big multinational corporations. Worse, it would undermine U.S. sovereignty”
(Warren 2015). Jeff Zients, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, publically
responded to Warren, “ISDS does not undermine U.S. sovereignty, change U.S. law, nor
grant any new substantive rights to multinational companies. The reality is that ISDS
does not and cannot require countries to change any law or regulation” (Zients 2015).
Factually, Zients was correct in that ISDS tribunals do not have the authority to change a
country’s law. However, ISDS tribunals order governments to pay multinational investors
and corporations monetary damages (awards have ranged up to billions of dollars) for
breaches of investor rights. Therefore, in practice and implementation, ISDS undermines
the authority of regulators as governments modify, amend, or withdraw legislation due to
the threat of ISDS, called “regulatory chill.” While it is difficult to empirically
demonstrate the existence of “regulatory chill,” there have been documented instances of
it in North America.464
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Sinclair detailed that the threat of a NAFTA ISDS suit changed cigarette regulations in
Canada: “In the mid-1990s, as part of intensive lobbying against proposed federal regulations to
require plain packaging of cigarettes, the tobacco industry procured a legal opinion by former
NAFTA chief negotiator Carla Hills that asserted such regulations infringed NAFTA’s
intellectual property rules and constituted expropriation in violation of NAFTA’s investment
chapter. The multinational tobacco industry repeatedly threatened the Canadian government with
trade treaty action, including an investor-state challenge. The federal government’s proposals for
plain packaging were abandoned and replaced with watered-down requirements to increase the
size of health warning labels on packages” (2015: 37).
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If Zients is correct that ISDS does not undermine state sovereignty, then this does not
explain the reason that TPP negotiators insisted on the complete carve-out of tobacco from ISDS.
Tobacco has become a local public health issue all over the world as smoking has increased
cancer rates which has strained state budgets, motivating governments to regulate tobacco
companies, marketing, and products. In turn, tobacco companies have explicitly and successfully
used ISDS as a deregulatory tool, such as in Australia, Canada, and Uruguay. Although the
USTR was strongly against any product-specific exceptions to ISDS as “dangerous” precedent,
the U.S. eventually conceded to the tobacco carve-out as a compromise. President Obama
justified his administration’s decision, “The big bugaboo that’s lifted up there is tobacco
companies suing poorer countries to make sure that anti-smoking legislation is banned, or at least
tying them up with so much litigation that ultimately smaller countries cave” (The White House
2014). As ISDS tribunals mandate that countries pay MNCs monetary compensation ranging
from millions to billions of dollars, legislators in those countries find that their capacity to
regulate is limited by ISDS, directly undermining state sovereignty. The problem becomes
particularly acute for capital-importing developing countries, some of which have national GDPs
that are smaller than the market capitalizations of leading MNCs.

The TPP and expansive investor rights
Investor-state dispute settlement does not undermine state sovereignty per se, rather, it
enforces multinational investor rights that conflict with the ability of states to regulate. The TPP
contains some of the most expansive multinational investor rights of any international investment
agreement in force (Alschner and Skougarevskiy 2016). Compared to other investment treaties,
multinational investor rights are particularly strong in the TPP investment and financial services
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chapters in at least five regulatory areas: (1) a broad definition of investment that includes
far-reaching intellectual property rights; (2) the historically problematic “minimum
standard of treatment” and “indirect expropriation” articles; (3) an expansive list of
prohibitions on “performance requirements” including unprecedented regulations
targeting state-owned enterprises; (4) limited policy space for capital controls; (5) limited
exceptions to the application of ISDS. The TPP’s multinational investor rights in these
five areas go well beyond WTO obligations and in some important instances they conflict
with international regulatory norms.
Similar to the investment agreements of other developed countries, the U.S. uses a
broad, asset-based definition of “investment” (in contrast to an enterprise-based
definition) that covers tangible and intangible property controlled by investors of another
Party. The TPP’s definition of investment is not new as it includes a non-exhaustive list
of assets that are considered to be “investments,” including intellectual property rights.
Intellectual property law in U.S. FTAs have always gone beyond WTO obligations in
length, strength, and scope of patentable items. The TPP intellectual property chapter
expands into new regulatory areas, such as, data exclusivity and market exclusivity to
prevent the development of low-cost generic drugs. Since the TPP intellectual property
rights chapter contains unprecedented expansions of intellectual property rights, the
definition of investment also grows to encompass these new rights.
Over the objections and counter proposals of domestic groups and other country
negotiators, the U.S. retained the same strong investor rights from the 2004 Model BIT in
the TPP investment chapter, and even expanded some. The main innovation of the 2004
U.S. Model BIT was to tie the legal interpretations of “minimum standard of treatment”
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and “indirect expropriation” to “customary international law,” thereby weakening the strength of
these two key investor protections. However, arbitral tribunals have not based their
interpretations of these provisions on “customary international law” but rather have merely cited
the standards of other tribunals, creating “evolving” standards of what constitutes “minimum
standard of treatment” and “indirect expropriation.” Therefore, since TPP’s “minimum standard
of treatment” and “indirect expropriation” articles can be interpreted as both narrow and broad
investor rights, they afford strong investor protections. Moreover, the TPP significantly
strengthened investor rights in the financial services sector by applying the “minimum standard
of treatment” article to the financial services chapter for the first time. The TPP further
strengthened investor rights with new provisions in the “performance requirements” article that
are directed at state-owned enterprises, specifically, they ban host states from requiring the use of
domestic technology, require host states to allow multinational investors to participate in the
development of industry standards, and clarify that all of the TPP’s investment obligations apply
to state-owned enterprises.
Lastly, the TPP incorporates strong investor rights because exceptions to investor
protections are highly limited and specified. The two key areas were capital controls and the
application of ISDS to “investment agreements.” The USTR was forced to concede to a more
liberal approach to capital controls than it originally intended, nonetheless, the policy space for
capital controls is simultaneously vague yet highly conditional and temporary. The other most
contentious area of investment negotiations was the U.S.’ proposal to apply ISDS to “investment
agreements” and an “investment authorizations,” which cover all major contracts between an
investor and a host state, including, natural resource exploration and extraction (such as mining,
oil, gas, etc.), public utility services (such as electricity and water treatment), and public works
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concessions (such as roads, highways, infrastructure). Except for Japan, other countries
either rejected this proposal or sought broad exceptions. At the insistence of U.S. oil, gas,
and extractive industries, the U.S. attempted to limit any exceptions to the application of
ISDS to “investment authorizations.” The final agreement contained two major
compromises, first, a reduced scope of “investment agreements” and that carved-out
specific areas of the public domain, and second, conditions under which disputes could
be arbitrated under an alternative legal forum to the ISDS procedures. Cumulatively, the
TPP investment chapter provides some of the strongest investor protections of all existing
international investment agreements (Alschner and Skougarevskiy 2016).

The TPP and conflicts with public interest legislation
Multinational investors and corporations invoke the “minimum standard of
treatment” and “indirect expropriation” clauses when governments change or introduce
regulations that negatively impact their investment. However, because the U.S. definition
of the “minimum standard of treatment” and “indirect expropriation” articles offer
investors particularly strong rights, multinational investors and corporations have
assumed liberal interpretations of these rights. In so doing, multinational investors and
corporations have increasingly used them to bring ISDS challenges against public interest
legislation (Choudhury 2008). For example, the NAFTA ISDS cases overwhelming
targeted environmental regulations.
Strong investor rights and the offensive use of ISDS have the effect of “lockingin” a government’s regulatory environment, thereby limiting state sovereignty to design
and implement future market regulations. However, regulatory norms evolve. Consider
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the TPP’s tobacco carve-out. The regulatory norms on tobacco evolved from treating tobacco as
a “safe” product to a “dangerous” product, and states introduced public interest legislation
accordingly. The fact that TPP negotiators had to carve-out tobacco from ISDS demonstrates that
ISDS is used as an offensive tool by MNCs to lock-in a favorable regulatory environment in a
particular country.
However, tobacco is not the only commodity that is patently against the public interest
and in which regulatory norms have evolved. Nor is tobacco the only public issue that has
motivated public interest legislation which has been a target of ISDS claims. The U.S. fossil fuel
industry understands that they are contributing to global warming, which is against the public
interest as global warming has been linked to the increasing frequency of natural disasters,
among other public issues. Yet the oil and gas industry has won billions of dollars in successful
ISDS cases, thus weakening climate change and fossil fuel regulations in those countries. Two
NAFTA examples include a successful ISDS case against a ban on fracking in Canada, and the
pending $15 billion claim against the U.S. for the Obama administration’s denial of the Keystone
XL oil pipeline. In the lead up to the 2008 global financial crisis, the “toxic assets” that were
fraudulently sold to investors all over the world by U.S. multinational banks were malicious to
the public welfare as they destabilized the global financial system. Yet, the TPP extends the
“minimum standard of treatment” protection to the financial sector and one multinational bank
has already successfully used ISDS against emergency financial measures.465 Similarly, the
international regulatory norms on capital controls have been shifting and evolving for at least the
last hundred years (Abdelal 2009), yet the TPP cements a stringent and limiting approach to
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Saluka Investments B.V. vs. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, Ad hoc-UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (2006).
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capital controls that domestic lawmakers cannot change. Since at least the industrial
revolution, the relationship between capital and labor has been mediated by government
and labor standards have consistently changed, yet MNCs have used ISDS to challenge
labor protections including a minimum wage bill.466 Pharmaceutical MNCs have used
ISDS to extend patent monopolies on medicines even though many countries have laws
recognizing that patent laws evolve over time.467 In sum, TPP negotiators have not
adequately explained why tobacco is the only public issue that deserves to be carved-out
from ISDS as ISDS undermines state sovereignty to address a range of public issues.
The TPP’s limits to state sovereignty have disproportionately strong effects on
developing countries because they are capital-importers and investor rights apply to host
states. However, as the number of ISDS cases have steadily increased each year, highincome and developed countries have also been increasingly defendants in ISDS cases.
The TPP exposes the U.S. to greater risk of ISDS challenges because it extends the
jurisdiction of ISDS to territories with which the U.S. did not have a BIT or FTA (notably
Japan which is a capital-exporting state) and there are more than 9000 MNCs in the TPP
countries (Weisman 2015).
Lastly, the TPP investment chapter (and any other international investment
agreements) lacks a corresponding arbitral mechanism to bring justice to multinational
investors and corporations that have violated their obligations under international labor,
environmental, and human rights laws. Specifically, there is investor-state dispute
settlement but there is no state-investor dispute settlement not to mention a public-
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investor dispute settlement. A key innovation of the TPP investment chapter was an
unprecedented “corporate social responsibility” clause,468 however, it is a “voluntary”
commitment and entirely unenforceable. Similarly, the “environment and public health”
article469 is phrased as a moral obligation of multinational investors and is unenforceable.
Therefore, ISDS creates a tremendous legal disparity between multinational investors and local
publics, in which multinational investors have access to binding and enforceable ISDS
arbitrations but local publics are limited to municipal legal remedies.
For example, in Peru, a TPP member, U.S. based mining company Renco Group Inc. had
metal smelter operations that contaminated air, soil, and water to the extent that it caused an
epidemic of lead poisoning in nearby towns. The Peruvian government ordered Renco to clean
up the site and Renco launched an ISDS case470 against Peru citing a breach to the “minimum
standard of treatment” article under the U.S.-Peru FTA. Meanwhile, in 2007, U.S.-based lawyers
brought claims against Renco on behalf of 162 sickened Peruvian children in the state of
Missouri because Missouri allows foreign plaintiffs to bring claims against companies located in
that state (Wallach 2012). As Renco could bring its claims to ISDS tribunals but the citizens of
Peru had to rely on U.S. domestic courts, ISDS created uneven legal rights between Renco and
the citizens of Peru. In another example, in Mexico, another TPP member, multinational banks
(Wachovia and HSBC) were found laundering billions of dollars for Mexican drug cartels. While
the Obama administration refused to bring criminal charges against the banks because they
believed it would have been “destabilizing to the global economy,” victims of the drug war in
Mexico were left to sue the multinational banks in U.S. courts (cited in Roth 2012). The TPP
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expands the financial sectors’ access to ISDS but it does not offer a concurrent
mechanism to check the financial sectors’ flagrant abuse of those rights. This imposed
legal disparity between social groups further undermines state sovereignty as
multinational investors enjoy the privileges afforded by ISDS but local publics lack
access to international tribunals to bring justice to the crimes and transgressions of
multinational investors. In some instances, such as the ones outlined above, this legal
disparity between multinational investors and local publics can contribute to a situation in
which multinational investors and corporations are “above-the-law” in nation-states.

IV. Conclusion: international investment law theory revisited
IV.A. Comparing the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters to free trade
theory
Are the TPP investment and financial services chapters a “golden straightjacket”
(Freidman 2012) that constrains “arbitrary” government regulations and enhances market
efficiency and productivity? Do these agreements remove the state from the market such
that private investment flows respond to market forces? The short answer is no. With the
exception of certain elements of the market access negotiations, neither the content nor
the negotiations of the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters had
anything to do with free trade theory. This was well argued by Ranking Rep. Sander
Levin during Congress’ debates over trade promotion authority in 2015,
“What do David Ricardo and Adam Smith have to say about the
inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement in our trade agreements?
Nothing, to my knowledge. What do they have to say about providing a 12
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year monopoly for the sale of biologic medicines?...What does the theory of
comparative advantage have to say about those issues? Absolutely nothing – and
yet those are the issues at the crux of the TPP negotiations today” (Levin 2015).
The content of U.S. investment policy represents the offensive commercial interests of
U.S. MNCs balanced against the defensive goals of domestic regulators. The interests of U.S.
MNCs have evolved well beyond comparative advantage and market efficiency or any other
traditional topic in open macroeconomics. To the contrary, the NAFTA and TPP investment and
financial services chapters are full of what can be considered protectionist measures, notably,
long and strong patent monopolies and other related intellectual property protections (Baker
2016). For this, one can argue that U.S. investment agreements “socially constructed”
comparative advantages as U.S. MNCs depend upon these unique protections for gaining market
share and mitigating risk (Streeten 1996). The other side of the coin is that the same investment
regulations produced social and political conflicts which became the main source of contention
in negotiations. These conflicts were not questions of free trade but public issues concerning the
appropriate limits to state sovereignty to implement market and industry regulations.
Free trade theory does not account for the most important content in the NAFTA and TPP
investment and financial services chapters. Notably, free trade theory does not explain two key
characteristics of the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters: (1) trade is
not free but managed, and (2) the negotiations are not “country x vs. country y” but rather
“multinational interests vs. state regulators.”

(1) Trade is not free but managed
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The NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters contain
provisions that can be characterized as market access, regulatory, or a combination of
both. The sectoral market access negotiations were driven by U.S. MNCs seeking to
access foreign markets, and they were countered by negotiators in those countries who
had a competing set of motivations. The outcomes of the market access negotiations have
commercial “winners” and “losers.” For example, during NAFTA negotiations the U.S.
financial services industry threatened to sink the NAFTA in Congress if Mexican
negotiators did not concede complete market access in financial services and
subsequently Mexico’s banking system quickly became majority foreign-owned. In
another NAFTA example, the U.S. flagships in information technology entered Mexico
and shortly after most of the competing domestic firms in Mexico went out of business
(Gallagher & Zarsky 2007). These examples do not reflect the theory of comparative
advantage in which countries lower tariffs (or even non-tariff barriers) and market forces
maximize the efficiency of scarce resources. Rather, this example shows that commercial
“winners” and “losers” are the result of political trade-offs by trade negotiators who are
balancing different domestic and international political pressures. In so doing, market
access provisions (in tandem with the regulatory provisions) lead to managed trade as
commercial outcomes were determined by trade negotiators.
The regulatory provisions also function to manage trade. The clearest example is
intellectual property rights, in which the U.S.’ long and strong patent monopolies are by
definition “managed trade” because a monopoly is a guaranteed market outcome.
Similarly, the TPP’s disciplines on state-owned enterprises, including the relevant
provisions in the investment chapter, function to create market outcomes favorable to
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U.S. MNCs operating in TPP territories. The NAFTA and TPP’s strong investor protections are
not free trade but managed trade because these multinational investor rights create a regulatory
environment that is favorable to U.S. MNCs.
Many commentators on U.S. trade and investment policy, particularly the critics, describe
U.S.-style multinational investor protections as deregulatory because they weaken regulations in
host states. However, deregulation implies less or no regulation, whereas U.S. BITs and FTAs
are packed with regulations. Therefore, it is more accurate to characterize U.S. BITs and FTAs
as “re-regulatory” rather than deregulatory because in practice U.S. BITs and FTAs replace
existing legislation in host countries. For example, in negotiating the NAFTA, Mexico was
pressured to replace the Calvo doctrine with ISDS. Therefore, the political management of
regulations leads to managed trade as regulations condition patterns of trade and investment.

(2) Not “country x vs. country y” but “multinational interests vs. state regulators”
In free trade theory, “country x” trades the goods and services that it has relative costefficiencies with “country y” and vice-versa. Therefore, free trade theory assumes that trade and
trade negotiations are between “country x” and “country y.” However, in actuality, the main
actors in trade and trade negotiations are multinational commercial interests and state regulators.
In the development of the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters, the
content of the agreements was originally motivated by U.S. MNCs and then it was negotiated
with domestic regulators in an interagency process that determined U.S. trade and investment
negotiating objectives. The USTR then took these negotiating objectives to their counter-party
negotiators who represented the goals of their domestic regulators. In an overly simple model of
the process, U.S. MNCs first negotiated the agreement with U.S. domestic regulators who then
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negotiated the agreement with regulators in other states. This is illustrated by the
contentious debate over capital controls in the TPP. U.S. policy on capital controls was
motivated by U.S. MNCs and then approved by domestic regulators and then in TPP
negotiations it was disapproved by regulators in other countries who demanded greater
policy space for capital controls. That negotiating process cannot be explained by free
trade theory. Essentially, the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters
can be explained as the outcome of conflicts between U.S. MNCs and state regulators,
both in the U.S. and other countries.

IV.B. Comparing free trade theory to NAFTA outcomes (investment and financial services
chapters)
Does trade balance?
A central tenet of comparative advantage and free trade theory is that trade will balance,
meaning the value of imports and exports will tend to equalize and there cannot be chronic trade
imbalances. My findings on the U.S.-Mexico trade imbalance refute the notion of equilibrium
due to monetary dynamics. The Mexican central bank, Banco de Mexico, has been accumulating
dollar reserves to protect against exchange rate appreciation due to capital inflows (“The Dutch
Disease”). Banco de Mexico’s predicament was that as U.S. capital flowed into Mexico, which
the NAFTA was designed to promote, the Peso would appreciate against the dollar and Mexico’s
exports would lose competitiveness vis-a-vis exporters in East Asia. Moreover, Banco de Mexico
had to accumulate dollar reserves due to exchange rate volatility due to capital flow volatility,
and as insurance against the risks posed by financial integration with the U.S., including global
financial crises (Ibarra 2012; Sidaoui et. al. 2010). Mexico’s growing stock of dollar reserves has
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financed the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico. For the aforementioned reasons, as long as Banco de
Mexico desires to accumulate dollar reserves and not other currencies, then there is no reason to
expect U.S.-Mexico trade to tend towards balance.

Are industries national?
Both comparative advantage and Gomory and Baumol’s theory (2001) rest on the
assumption that industries are national. In comparative advantage, the commercial actors are
countries. In Gomory and Baumol’s multiple equilibrium trade theory, the commercial actors are
national industries that are retained by countries. However, to what extent are industries still
national? In 1996, political economist Susan Strange dismissed the relevance of free trade
theory, “[products cross borders] not because of any comparative advantages in market terms of
one country over another but because the management of a [MNC] has decided on a production
strategy that involves such movements” (1996: 48). The main commercial actors in trade are no
longer nations or national industries but MNCs and their value chains. However, this does not
mean that MNCs have lost their national roots. Economist Ian Fletcher argued that most MNCs
are “strongly tied” to a particular nation. According to Fletcher, “Despite the myth of the
stateless corporation, only a few dozen firms worldwide maintain over half their production
facilities abroad” (2010: 25). Fletcher cited a 1996 study that found, “[MNCs] typically have
about two-thirds of their assets in their home region/country, and sell about the same proportion
in their home region/country” (cited in Fletcher 2010: 25). In a survey of the assets and sales of
Fortune 500 companies during the early 2000s, economists Rugman and Hoon Oh found that
most MNCs operate regionally rather than globally (2008). They concluded, “…globalization as
popularly understood does not exist. For example, there is no evidence that U.S. firms operate
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globally. Instead, they both produce and sell on a home region basis, as do [MNCs] from Europe
and Asia” (2008: 13). Only the top dozen or so MNCs operate on a truly global scale, and the
vast majority of MNCs have regional operations and strategies.
Economists Rugman and Hoon Oh also found that MNCs tend to dominate in their home
region but also invest and operate in other regions. For example, there are many foreign-owned
MNCs investing in North America, but the “home” U.S. MNCs have most of the market share in
North America, and there are similar patterns in Europe and Asia (Rugman & Hoon Oh 2008:
13). The NAFTA facilitated regional economies of scale for U.S. MNCs such that they could
retain competitive advantages in North America while MNCs from Europe and Japan contested
the market. To that end, economists Moran and Oldenski found that U.S. manufacturing MNCs
that invested in Mexico also expanded domestic investment and operations in the U.S. (2014:
41). Similarly, the NAFTA facilitated economies of scale in the regional financial services
industry (dos Santos & Lapavitsas 2008). That most MNCs operate regionally rather than
globally meets Gomory and Baumol’s assumption that industries are national. Gomory and
Baumol’s theory can be extended from national industries to apply to regional industries.
However, that does not mean that the current market structure is static, nor does it address
increasing trends towards the “deregionalization” of MNCs.

MNCs vs. Ricardo
While the assets and sales of most MNCs remain regionalized, there are also strong
trends towards their globalization. Economists Rugman and Hoon Oh found that services MNCs
were more regionalized than MNCs that manufacture and/or sell goods. There are likely many
contributing factors to the high degree of regionalization of services MNCs. However, “non-
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tariff barriers” to trade in services guard against competition in services markets. For this reason,
U.S. services MNCs motivate a range of regulatory chapters in U.S. FTAs, including, stateowned enterprises, competition policy, procurement, services, e-commerce, investment,
telecommunications, and financial services, among others. U.S. MNCs seek to use these
regulatory chapters in U.S. FTAs to reregulate signatory countries so that U.S. MNCs can gain
market share in those countries, which would lead to more globalization of services MNCs.
Economists Rugman and Hoon Oh’s study on the assets and sales of MNCs do not take
into account trade flows. The assets and FDI of MNCs are not complete measures of the
globalization of MNCs, as many MNCs contract production rather than invest in productive
enterprises, particularly in East Asia. For example, Apple does not own Foxconn but contracts its
production to Foxconn. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
approximately 80 percent of world trade takes place in “value chains” linked to MNCs (UNCTD
2013). Therefore, due to trade flows, MNCs have much further global reach than is suggested by
their regionalized assets and sales.
The increasing globalization of MNCs lends to two conclusions related to free trade
theory, first, national competition is increasingly obsolete, and second, the trade balance is no
longer a measure of national competitiveness. Stephen Roach, former chief economist of Morgan
Stanley’s China operations, declared, “Country-specific economic competition has been rendered
obsolete by the emergence of multicounty, vertically integrated supply chains” (2014: 117). As
developing countries, particularly in East Asia, participate in production and value chains linked
to MNCs, these countries are not competing for production but rather sharing in production. The
organizing logic of global value chains is not national comparative advantage but a “tradeinvestment-services-intellectual property nexus” (Elms & Low 2013). This is because an
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industry or firm’s comparative advantage becomes unbundled and dispersed across nations, as
nations join supply chains rather than build supply chains. Therefore, a country’s trade balance is
less a measure of national competitiveness. On the U.S. side, the trade deficit does not signify
that U.S. firms have lost industrial competitiveness. Quite the contrary, U.S. MNCs are the most
dynamic and competitive in the world. U.S. MNCs rely on regional and global supply chains that
are not determined by the theory of comparative advantage with a basis in one nation or even
region (Elms & Low 2013). As MNCs become increasingly global, they undermine the
credibility of Gomory and Baumol’s theory, which rests on the assumption that industries are
national.

IV.C. Comparing investment law literature to NAFTA outcomes (investment and financial
services chapters)
International investment law is studied from three disciplines - economics, legal studies,
and international political economy. Scholars rarely make empirical and theoretical connections
between these three different approaches. In what follows, I will attempt to fill this gap using my
findings from the NAFTA investment chapter. I argued that free trade theory’s assumptions
about investment law do not match the actual content and implementation of investment law.
Therefore, free trade theory is not a useful framework for understanding investment law. Rather,
I propose a combination of legal studies and international political economy.
International investment law has regulatory effects and income effects, and scholars
typically consider them separately. I argue that the legal implementation and income effects are
two sides of the same coin, that is, they have dynamic feedbacks to each other. As international
investment law balances multinational investor rights against the state’s ability to regulate, a
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growing number of legal scholars characterize this dichotomy as a “public-private” debate over
the purpose, content, and implementation of investment law (Shan 2007; Choudhury 2008;
Spears 2010; Mills 2011). On the income side, investment law has been a crucial tool for MNCs
to access foreign markets and mitigate certain political risks of investing and operating in those
markets (although that is not to say that investment law motivates FDI) (Menghetti 2011).
However, in the existing literature there is little explicit recognition that MNCs rely upon
investment law for their economic interests, and in turn, their market power translates into
political power to motivate the content of investment law.
The contentious history of investment disputes, ranging from gunboat diplomacy to
controversial ISDS cases, demonstrates that investing in developing countries can carry great
social and political risks for MNCs. U.S. MNCs depend upon investment law to establish basic
conditions for investment in developing countries. International investment law combines
technical rules on market access and regulations, with U.S. investment law as among the most
far-reaching and demanding in the investment treaty universe. Beginning with the NAFTA
investment chapter, U.S. MNCs began to use investment law for regulatory advantages in foreign
markets, as opposed to using investor protections only to mitigate risk. The USTR and U.S.
MNCs describe regulations in the host states that disadvantage U.S. MNCs as “non-tariff
barriers” to investment and operations in foreign markets. Therefore, the USTR and U.S. MNCs
carefully design U.S. investment law to reduce and/or eliminate these domestic regulations in
host states. For this reason, corporate lobbies effectively barred Congress from inserting a “no
greater rights” provision into the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, which would have limited multinational
investor rights to the same rights as domestic investors in a host state. In U.S. FTAs, including
the NAFTA and TPP, the investment chapters have substantive interconnections with other key
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chapters, notably, intellectual property rights and services and financial services. This “nexus” of
international regulations provides the indispensable legal underpinning to MNCs’ FDI into
developing countries. In turn, MNCs’ FDI and market access in developing countries facilitates
their economies of scale and therefore increased global market share.
MNCs rely on FDI for global competitiveness, and in turn, their enhanced market
position allows them to expand domestic investment and employment. As MNCs realize larger
economies of scale, they become vital sources of jobs, growth, and exports for states. In addition,
MNCs are the main actors in the import and export of goods, services, and capital. For these
reasons, among others, Congress is highly sensitive to the trade policy needs and concerns of
U.S. MNCs. In so doing, U.S. MNCs have the structural political power to motivate the content
of U.S. trade law and policy. As U.S. investment law and policy embodies the private interests of
U.S. MNCs, investment law increasingly comes into conflict with public interests in a range of
regulatory areas.
The “public-private” debate is not unique to U.S. investment law. Many of the most basic
standards for investment protection in the NAFTA and TPP investment chapters are in the more
than 3000 international investment agreements in force worldwide. Since the early 1990s,
thousands of international investment agreements have proliferated to cover the planet and most
of the agreements contain the same basic investor rights with some form of arbitration. In fact, as
China has emerged as a major capital-exporter, China’s own investment policy has evolved to
resemble the U.S. Model BIT (Berger 2013). The difference is that U.S. investment agreements
contain some of the strongest and far-reaching investor protections than other investment
agreements, including those of China and other capital-exporters.

263

States are now coming to terms with the fact that international trade and investment law
has been driving a wedge between national public interests and multinational private interests,
both in terms of governance (regulations) and income (distribution). For this reason, Donald
Trump ran for the Presidency on the campaign promises of economic nationalism and
sovereignty. The Trump administration’s “2017 Trade Policy Agenda” announced that they
would ignore WTO rulings against the U.S. that impinged upon U.S. sovereignty, threatening to
undermine the multilateral trade regime. States will condition global commerce in the twentyfirst century by making political tradeoffs between multinational private interests and national
public interests.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy and Polanyi’s “Double
Movement”
I.
II.

Introduction
Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy

III.

Motivations of Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy

IV.

Politics of Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy

V.

Limitations to research and future research

“Fascism, like socialism, was rooted in a market society that refused to function.”
-Karl Polanyi, 1944, The Great Transformation

I. Introduction
Karl Polanyi argued that the breakdown of the international market system in the
1930s led to the rise of fascism and socialism in Europe (1944: 25). Polanyi observed that
European nations responded to capital flight, rising unemployment, and social and racial
tensions by supporting fascist and socialist leaders. The fascists promised large sections
of the population social protections from unfettered international markets in exchange for
a loss of “human freedoms,” while the socialists promised to subject the market to
democratic control, even if this would threaten private property rights.
In a curious parallel, in the twenty-first century U.S., globalization and
automation have created polarized and precarious employment systems and the
breakdown of the international market system in 2008 deeply exacerbated those trends
(Kalleberg 2013). The white working class had the most to lose as employment shifted
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from manufacturing to services and the “new economy” left many of them behind (Standing
2011). Hard work no longer translated into success, inequality grew, and social and racial
tensions mounted. During the 2016 Presidential race, political outsiders Donald Trump and
Bernie Sanders, representing opposite sides of the political spectrum, won the sympathies of the
white working class. Donald Trump’s “nationalist” rhetoric and Bernie Sander’s “socialist”
messages offered new directions and greater social protections. In electing Trump, the white
working class sought to swing the “double movement” pendulum from “free market” policies to
“nationalist” policies.

II. Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy
Consequences of TPP Withdrawal
The Trump administration has set out to abandon multilateral FTAs, including the TPP,
in favor of bilateral FTAs (USTR 2017: 1). The new USTR explained, “These bilateral
discussions will present unique opportunities to engage our Asia-Pacific partners in areas in
which the TPP failed to provide adequate market access of American-made goods and
agriculture products” (2017: 143). Trump’s Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross justified the new
administration’s cold feet in multilateral FTAs, “The concessions made with each nation by the
U.S. add up, and what happens is the other countries get the benefit of things they didn’t even
ask for because you had to give them to someone else” (cited in Needham 2017). On those
grounds, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the TPP.
Since the Reagan administration began to negotiate the WTO (the GATT Uruguay
Round, 1986-1994) and through the Obama administration, U.S. trade policy has started and
ended with WTO politics and negotiations. That is, for the last 30 years, U.S. trade policy has
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been motivated by WTO negotiations or has been intended to motivate WTO
negotiations. After the Bush administration walked away from the WTO Doha Round,
they joined the TPP in 2008 as an alternative path to trade liberalization.
It took the Obama administration nearly a year to commit publicly to the TPP.
Within the context of the stalemated WTO Doha Round, there were three immediate
catalysts for the Obama administration’s decision to press forward with the TPP. The first
was that Japan was cooperating in joining the agreement, which was necessary to make
the TPP politically viable for the U.S. The second reason was that East Asian economic
integration was proceeding without the U.S., and the USTR and the U.S. business
community feared marginalization in this highly valuable region. Singapore’s trade
minister made it explicitly clear to the Obama administration that East Asian trade and
investment integration would proceed with or without the U.S., as the ASEAN was the
fulcrum of the China-led RCEP multilateral trade agreement. The third reason, closely
linked with the second, was APEC politics.
By 2007, all APEC members had committed to the long-term goal of an APECwide FTA (called the FTAAP). From the U.S. perspective, an APEC-wide FTA would
have stimulated favorable outcomes at the WTO Doha Round. However, one of the
central obstacles to realizing an APEC-wide FTA (U.S.-China trade conflicts
notwithstanding) was the difficult question of who would write the rules for this FTA, as
U.S. FTAs demand far more regulatory commitments than China’s FTAs. The China-led
RCEP and the U.S.-led TPP quickly emerged as competing visions for the trade and
investment rules for a potential future APEC-wide FTA. Moreover, U.S. MNCs and
exporters would have a lot at stake in an APEC-wide FTA. For this reason, President
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Obama repeatedly stressed that the TPP would enable the U.S. to “write the rules” for the AsiaPacific and not China.
By withdrawing from the TPP, the Trump administration is back to square one. They
must now figure out how to address all three of these imperatives that launched the Obama
administration into the TPP. The TPP set legal precedent for the Trump administration to
negotiate bilateral FTAs with Japan and eventually Vietnam and Malaysia (the U.S. already has
FTAs with the other TPP countries). However, without U.S. involvement in multilateral deals,
there is no chance of revitalizing the WTO Doha Round. The purpose of the TPP was to position
the U.S. to have a multilateral negotiating strength for a future APEC-wide FTA, which in turn
would have catalyzed outcomes in the deadlocked WTO Doha Round. Therefore, the Trump
administration’s trade policy marks a substantial break from the Obama and Bush
administrations.

Moving forward
In March 2017, the USTR published its “2017 Trade Policy Agenda” with some
exposition on an “America First” trade policy, although it lacked details on how to achieve those
aims. The report detailed four trade policy priorities, the first two were novel, and the latter two
were carry-overs from the Obama administration. The Trump administration’s top two trade
policy priorities are, “(1) defend U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) strictly enforce
U.S. trade laws” (USTR 2017: 2). Each represents potentially significant policy breaks from past
practice.
States arbitrate trade disputes in WTO dispute settlement procedures. The losing state
often must make domestic regulatory changes to satisfy the winner, which entails negative
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impacts to domestic constituencies in the losing state. The U.S. has lost numerous WTO cases,
and past administrations and Congresses have complied with the rulings. In 2003, President
Bush’s United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick explained,
“The U.S. should live up to its obligations under WTO rules….We
recognize that each matter [in which compliance is required] involves sensitive
interests. Yet America should keep its word, just as we insist others must do”
(cited in Chorev 2005: 342).
The Bush administration, just like their predecessors and successors, made the political
calculation that the WTO was largely established in the U.S.’ image and mostly serves U.S.
interests. Therefore, the benefits of the multilateral trade regime outweigh the costs. For this
reason, after the WTO Doha Round of negotiations collapsed in 2008, the Obama administration
established their number one trade policy objective as “revitalizing the WTO Doha Round”
(Froman 2014b). In sharp contrast, the Trump administration has put an unprecedented emphasis
on stressing national sovereignty in relation to the WTO’s dispute settlement system, setting
precedent for the U.S. to ignore WTO rulings that the Trump administration would consider
violations of U.S. sovereignty. The USTR’s report asserted that, “…the Trump Administration
will aggressively defend American sovereignty over matters of trade policy” (USTR 2017: 3).
Moreover, Trump’s National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro reportedly asked the USTR
to catalogue the U.S.’s options for avoiding the WTO dispute settlement system, moving more in
the direction of protectionism.
From a domestic perspective, to prioritize national sovereignty over trade policy is
congruent with a nationalistic trade agenda. Given the U.S.’ contentious disputes with its largest
trading partners at the WTO, including China, Canada, Mexico, and large economies in Asia,
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this priority sets precedent for protectionism against unfavorable rulings at the WTO that would
harm domestic constituents. From an international perspective, all of these actions would drain
the effectiveness and creditability of the entire multilateral trading system, which would be
highly consequential to the U.S. economy. This is well expressed by the mixed reactions of U.S.
labor unions. Thea Lee, the deputy chief of staff at the AFL-CIO, commented on the USTR’s
“2017 Trade Policy Agenda”,
“On the one hand, we would agree with certain parts, that our trade policy
has not been aggressive or consistent enough in looking out for the interest of
American workers…We don’t necessarily agree that we need to go completely
outside the international trade system” (cited in Paletta & Swanson 2017).
U.S. trade policy was instrumental in determining the scope and framework of the WTO
and in turn, the WTO has been highly necessary and beneficial for U.S. MNCs and agricultural
exporters. This is why the Obama administration wanted to use the TPP to revitalize the WTO
Doha Round. Moreover, undermining the WTO could lead the U.S. to become more isolated
from East Asia, which in turn does not offer hope for the WTO Doha Round.
The second of the Trump administration’s trade policy priorities is to “strictly enforce
U.S. trade laws.” In the 1988 Omnibus Act, Congress laid out a primary trade negotiating
objective to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. However, Congress was careful to instruct that the
main channel to reduce the trade deficit was via an aggressive export strategy and not by trade
protectionism on imports. Aggressive export promotion in tandem with an openness to imports
remained trade strategy through the Obama administration. The Trump administration’s priority
to “strictly enforce U.S. trade laws” is setting precedent to use trade remedy laws to restrict
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imports from non-market economies that use “unfair trade practices” (read: China). Protectionist
restrictions on imports would be a nationalistic break from past U.S. trade practice.

III. Motivations of Trump’s “America First” trade policy
In the NAFTA negotiations there were a range of “nationalist” actors who had
denounced the agreement, such as Ross Perot and his famous quip that the NAFTA
would produce “a giant sucking sound” of investment and jobs to Mexico. However, in
the 1992 Presidential election, Perot only won about one percent of the vote. Republican
incumbent President Bush was in favor of the NAFTA, as his administration had
negotiated the NAFTA alongside the WTO. And the Democrat challenger, Bill Clinton,
had also come out in support of the NAFTA, although he took a more careful approach
by promising labor and environmental standards in side agreements. Over twenty years
later, during the 2016 Presidential elections, Donald Trump repeated Ross Perot’s same
nationalist talking points criticizing the NAFTA while promising to reverse the Obama’s
“free trade” agenda. Why did Trump’s nationalism have far more currency with voters
than Ross Perot’s? Why were candidate Trump’s trade promises so politically successful?
Why were the leading Presidential candidates in the 1992 election in favor of the NAFTA
but the leading candidates in the 2016 election against the TPP?
Based on my analysis of the NAFTA and TPP negotiations, I propose three
motivations to the emergence and institutionalization of Trump’s “America First” trade
policy. First, that Trump’s trade promises were part of a larger “America First” foreign
policy, such that trade issues intersected with other foreign policy priorities. Second, that
Trump’s trade rhetoric had widespread receptiveness from the white working class,
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especially in key swing states and counties. Third, that Democrat nominee Hillary Clinton lacked
an alternative to the “free trade” model that was so deeply ingrained in both political
establishments.

“Make America Great Again”
Despite the many sound arguments that President Obama had improved welfare in the
country, there is equal evidence to the contrary. The “Great Recession,” which occurred during
Obama’s tenure, had permanently damaging effects on the labor market, foreclosing
opportunities of social mobility for millions of working class people and especially young people
(Jaimovich & Siu 2012: Kalleberg 2013). The Obama administration’s Wall Street bailouts did
not improve that condition. Despite Obama being the first non-white President, activists opposed
to mass incarceration encountered the politics of a society that claimed to be “colorblind.”
Despite Obama’s record numbers of deportations, Obama offered no long-term solutions to
contentious debates about immigration, terrorism, border security, and the growing
undocumented population. Despite Obama’s political rhetoric of the U.S. as a diverse and
inclusive nation, drastic demographic changes had upended everyday life in many white
communities and produced a politics of resentment. Internationally, as China’s rise was highly
correlated with the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment and wages, commentators easily
painted Obama’s multilateral initiatives as being unresponsive, if not complacent, to the China
challenge. In contrast, Donald Trump’s campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” had
something the Democrats lacked – a message of redemption.
Despite Trump’s outlandish and completely unfeasible campaign promises, his message
was congruent at the domestic and international level. At the heart of it, he promised to empower
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the white working class and prioritize their interests. He promised domestic and
international policies to restore the old industrial economy. Domestically, he claimed that
widespread deregulations and tax reform would stimulate investment and jobs,
particularly in the energy sector that the Obama administration had targeted with “jobkilling” environmental legislations. He promised a border wall to permanently stem the
tide of immigration and put bans on Muslim immigration to protect the country from
terrorist threats. He promised to strengthen the war on drugs to restore “law and order”
and support law enforcement. Trump’s trade objectives were part of his larger pledges to
put “America First” in all international affairs. He announced a plan to defeat ISIS and
rebuild the military, and he assured that he would confront China’s “mercantilism” and
get tough on MNCs that offshored manufacturing. In so doing, Trump easily
distinguished himself as a nationalist, in contrast to Clinton’s multinational loyalties.

Receptiveness of the white working-class
In a review of news articles from major media outlets, most articles attribute
Trump’s victory to support from the white working class and nearly half of the articles
cite manufacturing troubles (Freund & Sidhu 2017: 2). To be sure, there is evidence that
most of Trump’s supporters are wealthy, suburban whites (Sasson 2016). However,
Trump’s support in key swing states came from working class whites, and these votes
delivered Trump the sufficient Electoral College votes for the Presidency. In the rust
belt/swing states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, Clinton
underperformed Barack Obama among white working class voters, and Clinton lost those
state to Trump (Sasson 2016). According to exit polls, whites without a college degree
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made up a third of the voting population and Trump won them by 39 percentage points, far
surpassing 2012 Republican nominee Mitt Romney’s 25 percent margin in 2012 (Tankersley
2016). Uneducated whites, particularly in swing states and key counties, were the foundation of
Trump’s victory (Freund & Sidhu 2017).
While exit polls suggested that “the economy” was the primary motivation working class
whites in voting for Trump, exit polls are notoriously unreliable. However, there is evidence that
trade pattern woes can swing U.S. elections. Autor et. al. (2017) found that import competition
from China led to more votes for Trump in 2016 than Bush in 2000, especially in key counties
and states. Similarly, Autor et. al. (2016) found that import competition from China is
significantly correlated with increased political polarization in congressional elections, as
measured by the number of moderate incumbents who lost their seats. Jensen et al. (2016)
included trade in services in their analyses and they found that while good imports are associated
with more political polarization, services exports are associated with more support for the
incumbent. While campaigning in these regions, Trump said that as President he would exit the
TPP, threaten to withdraw from the WTO and NAFTA, and impose strong tariffs on imported
Chinese goods and goods produced by U.S. MNCs that had offshored production. His message
clearly had currency with the white working class in these key swing states because he won their
vote.

Clinton’s lack of alternatives to “free trade”
“NAFTA is the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere, but certainly ever signed
in this country,”471 Trump taunted Clinton during a prime time television debate in the 2016
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Cited in Patrick Gillespie, CNNMoney, 27 September 2016.
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Presidential race. Clinton’s husband, President Bill Clinton, had implemented the
NAFTA as law in 1994. According to Trump, the NAFTA was a “disaster” because of
the subsequent multiplication of the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico, and he promised to
renegotiate the deal, or ‘tear it up,’ to reduce the trade deficit. By Trump’s calculation,
the trade deficit was in large measure due to the offshoring of U.S. manufacturing to
Mexico.
Trump observed his lone agreement with Bernie Sanders, “We have one issue
that’s very similar, and that’s trade.” Sanders had repeatedly derided the NAFTA for
favoring the interests of MNCs over U.S. workers. In contrast, Clinton offered little
alternative to the “free trade” initiatives of past administrations, including her husbands’.
As I documented in Chapter Five, as Secretary of State, Clinton had oversaw the forming
of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, which set key negotiating objectives for the TPP and the
TPP investment agreements are highly consistent with the same agreements in the
NAFTA. Clinton then proclaimed the TPP to be the “gold standard” of FTAs. During the
Democratic primaries in the 2016 Presidential race, after Clinton suffered a string of
surprising upset losses to Bernie Sanders in the rust belt/swing states, Clinton reverse her
support for the TPP. However, her loss of the rust belt white working class to Sanders
and then Trump demonstrated that voters did not trust her new trade/economic policies.

IV. Politics of Trump’s “America First” trade policy
Using the framework that I presented in the introduction (reproduced below), I
will compare Trump’s trade rhetoric to his actual policy implementation.
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Figure Six: Two Policy Positions in U.S. International Investment Law (reproduced)

Others
U.S. multinational corporations

(labor, environmental, consumer,
libertarian groups)

ISDS directed at trading partners; strong
investor rights facilitate economies of scale,
thereby supporting domestic jobs

ISDS undermines sovereignty/democracy;
strong investor rights shift costs from
private to public sectors

Support strong investor protections

Support weak investor protections

On the Presidential campaign trial, candidate Trump clearly took the policy position to
weaken investor protections and prioritize national sovereignty. After withdrawing the U.S. from
the TPP, the new Trump administration requested Mexico and Canada to renegotiate the NAFTA
in March 2017. To deliver an “America First” trade policy in the NAFTA renegotiations, the
Trump administration would have to prevent offshoring by reducing U.S. manufacturing FDI to
Mexico. To achieve this in the NAFTA renegotiations, they can pursue two policies, (1) to
impose regulations that restrict manufacturing FDI to Mexico, and/or (2) to make fundamental
reforms to the NAFTA investment chapter, which regulates regional FDI and capital flows.
However, President Trump’s actual trade policy is moving in the direction of strong
investor rights in the NAFTA, thereby supporting U.S. MNCs rather than the nationalist interest
groups that voted for him. Trump’s top trade advisors understand that the global competitiveness
of key U.S industries are dependent upon trade and investment with Mexico. Peter Navarro, head
of Trump’s newly created White House National Trade Council, proposed to use the NAFTA
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renegotiations to create a ‘mutually beneficial regional powerhouse where workers and
manufacturers on both sides of the border will benefit enormously.’472 In the Trump
administration’s draft notice to Congress, they proposed only cursory revisions of the
NAFTA investment chapter.473
Commentators may call this trade strategy “North America First” or “U.S. MNCs
First,” but they cannot call it “America First.” The NAFTA is a regional, multilateral
initiative, it is not a nationalistic one. Similarly, if the Trump administration negotiates
the U.S.-China BIT to contain strong investor protections, then they will support
multinational interests over national interests, contrary to his trade promises to his voting
base. Therefore, while withdrawing from the TPP in order to prevent a deepening of the
U.S. trade deficit was a “nationalist” trade policy, it is doubtful that Trump will remain
true to his other core trade promises. President Trump had already decided against
labelling China a currency manipulator, which he had promised to do as a candidate.

V. Limitations to research and future research
V.A. Limitations to research
The main limitation to my process tracing of the NAFTA and TPP investment and
financial services chapters was a lack of access to negotiating materials and documents.
The NAFTA process tracing is far more complete because all of the negotiating draft
texts for the investment chapter are publically available (publicly released 2004), while
the TPP negotiations were highly secretive. The most useful information on the TPP
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Cited in Andrew Mayeda, Eric Martin, and Nacha Cattan, Bloomberg, 15 March 15 2017.
See Stephen P. Vaughn, above n 3.
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negotiations came from leaked draft texts, documents, and emails, and the second most useful
were leaked information to the press especially Inside Trade. Therefore, the lack of public
transparency limited my data collection such that some important details were missing, notably,
country-specific negotiating positions in the TPP.

V.B. Areas for future research
While the Trump administration has made certain revisions to U.S. trade policy, it is
unclear if trade policymaking institutions have also been changed. Future empirical research
should address whether or not the Trump administration actually changed the alliances between
U.S. MNCs, domestic trade agencies, and multilateral trade institutions. Moreover, does the
newly created White House National Trade Council change any of these institutional dynamics?
Similarly, as the TPP was negotiated nearly twenty years after the NAFTA yet the
content of the investment and financial services chapters are very similar, future research should
address why U.S. investment policy has remained so consistent over the years. Specifically, as
the core investor protections from the 1982 U.S. Model BIT remain the core protections in the
2012 U.S. Model BIT, why has U.S. investment policy remained so consistent from the Cold
War through the “rise of China”?
Lastly, for the purposes of producing knowledge that goes beyond the academy, future
research on trade negotiations should analyze the strategies of the different U.S. domestic
political groups to influence U.S. trade and investment policy. Labor unions, environmental
organizations, and consumer advocacy groups were largely unsuccessful in influencing domestic
policy in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT. However, during TPP negotiations these domestic political
actors formed relationships and networks with anti-TPP constituencies in other countries. For
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example, if during the TPP negotiations U.S. domestic political actors found the USTR to
be unresponsive to their proposals, then how did trade negotiators in other countries
respond? Future research should analyze the “pros and cons” and the effectiveness of
these strategies.
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Appendices
Appendix One:
Overview of foreign bank operations in Mexico
While local Mexican banks retained their advantage in relational, “soft” information,
foreign banks rely on “hard” information for mass retail lending and new financial products such
as derivatives (Detragiache et. al. 2006; dos Santos 2013; de Hass 2012). Foreign banks in
Mexico enhanced and expanded consumer credit and credit card networks, introducing
automated credit scoring, electronic lending platforms, and products such as credito a la nomina,
or wage-linked loans (dos Santos & Lapavitsas 2008: 49). Household and consumption loans as
a share of total loans jumped from less than 15 percent to 42 percent between 1999 and 2006.
Further statistical analysis demonstrates that the rapid expansion of household and consumer
loans has been led by foreign banks while domestic banks have significantly lower exposures to
consumer credit (Schulz 2004; Haber & Musacchio 2005; dos Santos & Lapavitsas 2008: 49; dos
Santos 2013). In 2007, the UK bank HSBC and the U.S. bank Citigroup attributed 52.4 and 75.8
of all profits in their Mexican operations to their consumer lending segments (dos Santos 2013:
322). The result has been a reorientation of Mexican banking credit away from productive
enterprises while targeting household income streams.
As foreign banks have come to dominate the Mexican banking sector, they led the
transformation of Mexican banking operations towards a reorientation of credit towards
household lending and fee-based income. While U.S. banks have profited from these activities, a
number of analysts have raised policy concerns. As banks in Mexico increasingly target personal
income as a source of profit, they simultaneously have reduced loans to productive enterprises. A
number of studies have found that foreign banks in Mexico have led a falling availability of bank
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credit to productive enterprises, particularly small and medium businesses (Schulz 2004; Haber
& Musacchio 2005; Doyran & Erdogan 2015; dos Santos 2011 & 2013)474. Further, Beck and
colleagues (2008) present evidence that while credit to productive enterprises has a statistical
association with higher rates of per capita growth, credit to households has none. While it is
difficult to draw conclusions based on a lack of statistical evidence, there have been a number of
studies that point to adverse growth effects of the reorientation of credit to household lending
(Doyran & Erdogan 2015; dos Santos 2013). Economist Paulo dos Santos observed, “Coupled
with the central role lending to poorer households played in the U.S. credit crisis starting in
2007, this underscores the need for deliberate consideration of the economic content of credit to
households as an urgent matter of development policy” (2013: 317). While the number of nonperforming loans of total loan portfolios in Mexico have been declining with foreign bank entry,
debt to income ratios have been rising for both households and firms, posing greater financial
risks.
Foreign banks have also reoriented the Mexican bank system towards non-interest
income, or fee-based activities for financial market mediation, such as originating derivatives475.
In Mexico, the share of banks’ non-interest income to total income increased from 16.71 percent
in 1998 to 57.62 percent in 2011 (Doyran & Erdogan 2015: 339). Simultaneously, gross
contingent liabilities as a share of total banking capital grew from 0.63 percent in 2000 to 35.31
percent in 2006 (dos Santos & Lapavistsas 2008: 50). Further evidence suggests that these trends
in Mexico have been largely accounted for by foreign banks (Doyran & Erdogan 2015: 338; dos
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Although to the contrary, González and Peña (2012) found no distinction between foreign
banks and domestic banks in this regard.
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By 2014, the gross market value of outstanding of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivative
contracts expanded to $21 trillion dollars. The OTC derivatives market is unregulated and it is
the largest market in the world.
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Santos & Lapavistsas 2008: 50; Haber & Musacchio 2005: 35). The market making activities
and new financial products of international banks in Mexico contributed to further consolidation
of the global banking industry.

Figure Seven: Mexican Housing and Consumption Loans as Share of Total Loans
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Figure Eight: Banks’ Net Non-Interest Income Share of Total Income
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Table 16: Mexico, gross contingent liabilities (as percentage of total banking capital)
2000
0.63
2001
2.84
2002
4.14
2003
6.32
2004
15.77
2005
24.33
2006
35.31
Source: dos Santos, Paulo and Costas Lapavitsas. 2008. “Globalization and Contemporary
Banking: On the Impact of New Technology”, Contributions to Political Economy, 27(1).
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Appendix Two
Table 17: NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases up to January 1, 2015
Canada
Mexico
United States

NAFTA
(total)

Total cases filed
against Party
35
22
20
77
Total decided cases
filed against Party
13
11
11
35
Decided cases
won/decided cases
7/6
6/5
11/0
24/11
lost
Source: Sinclair, Scott. 2015. “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes to January 1,
2015.” Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
Table 18: NAFTA Chapter 11 Claims and Awards by Provision and Country up to January 1,
2015
Canada
Mexico
United States
Chapter
Total
Awards
Total
Awards
Total
Awards
11
Citations of
Given for
Citations of
Given for
Citations
Given
Provision Article in all Breaches Article in all Breaches of of Article
for
(NAFTA
Decided or
of Article
Decided or
Article
in all
Breach
Article)
Settled Cases
Settled Cases
Decided
es of
/ Total
/ Total
or Settled Article
Citations in
Citations in
Cases /
all Filed
all Filed
Total
Cases
Cases
Citations
in all
Filed
Cases
National
7/26
3
9/15
4
6/17
0
Treatment
(1102)
Most
4/23
1
2/6
0
2/11
0
Favored
Nation
(1103)
Standard
2/4
0
2/4
0
0/3
0
of
Treatment
(1104)
Minimum
11/32
3*
11/19
2**
7/18
0
Standard
of
Treatment
(1105)
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Performan
5/12
2
4/6
0
1/2
0
ce
Requirem
ents
(1106)
Transfers
0/1
0
0/1
0
0/1
0
(1109)
Expropriat
9/26
2
11/18
1
5/13
0
ion (1110)
Cases with
unavailabl
3
1
e
documents
(missing
data)
Cases
8
2
2
outstandin
g
*Two of the three awards given by Canada as breaches of Article 1105 were issued prior to
the 2001 FTC Interpretation of Article 1105
**One of the two awards given by Mexico as breaches of Article 1105 were issued prior to
the 2001 FTC Interpretation of Article 1105
Author’s compilation based on Sinclair, 2015
Table 19: NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases Filed by Investors by Nationality
Canadian Investors
Mexican Investors
U.S. Investors
Against
Against
Against
Against
Against
Against
Mexico
U.S.
Canada
U.S.
Canada
Mexico
1
19
1
1
34
21

NAFTA
(total)

Cases
77
Filed
Source: Sinclair, Scott. 2015. “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes to January 1,
2015.” Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
Table 20: Types of Regulation Challenged under NAFTA Chapter 11 up to January 1, 2015
Policy Challenged
Cases
Environmental protection
18
Administration of justice
7
Agriculture
6
Health care, pharmaceuticals
6
Trade remedies
5
Land use planning
5
Financial regulation, taxation
5
Postal services
2
Other
11
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Source: Sinclair, Scott. 2015. “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes to January 1,
2015.” Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
Appendix Three:
NAFTA Free Trade Commission carefully scales back “minimum standard of treatment” in 2001
The NAFTA established476 the Free Trade Commission (FTC) to supervise its
implementation and resolve disputes arising from its interpretation. The FTC is composed of
“cabinet level representatives” of the NAFTA parties and the FTC’s legal interpretations of the
agreement are binding upon investor-state arbitral tribunals. To date, the FTC has issued one
interpretation477, in 2001, and its effect was to scale back “minimum standard of treatment” in
response to broad claims made by investors under the provision. As the NAFTA came into force
in 1994, there was a relatively small amount of BITs in existence and there had been no arbitral
awards under the U.S. BIT program. The original drafters of the BIT had never considered that
the U.S. could be a respondent to an investor-state case because BITs were initially designed for
contract with developing countries, which had not been capital-exporters (Vandevelde 2009:
285). In addition, the U.S. legal system was congruent with the BIT provisions. However, when
the U.S. became a NAFTA Chapter 11 defendant in 1998 against a Canadian company seeking a
$500 million award it initiated changes to U.S. trade policy.
Early investor-state claims against the NAFTA states rotated around the phrase “fair and
equitable treatment” as well as the other minimum standard of treatment provisions. Investors
have argued that “fair and equitable treatment” means that once an investment contract is made
an investor has an expectation of the regulatory environment for that investment, and
governments breach “fair and equitable treatment” when they make regulatory changes after an
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Article 2001 of the NAFTA
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA Free Trade Commission,
July 31, 2001. (http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp)
477
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investor has set their expectations. In Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (2001),
Metalclad had won a decision against Mexico in which Metalclad claimed expropriation because
Mexico denied it fair and equitable treatment. Metalclad was a U.S. company that had purchased
land in Mexico to establish a waste disposal facility but the local government denied Metalclad
the right to establish the waste facility on environmental grounds. Similarly, in S.D. Myers, Inc.
v. Government of Canada (2002), U.S. company S.D. Myers, Inc., which produced hazardous
waste, had won a partial award against Canada for its claims that Canada’s environmentally
motivated ban on PCB exports breached the minimum standard of treatment provisions on the
grounds that other NAFTA provisions were breached as well. Then in 2001, Methanex, a
Canadian firm that produces hazardous gas methanol, brought claims against the State of
California seeking $970 million in damages for a ban on the fuel additive MTBE on the grounds
that the ban breaches national treatment, denies fair and equitable treatment, and effectively
expropriates its investment by diminishing its market share (Methanex v. United States
(2004)).478 All three cases became highly controversial in U.S. trade policy debates as the U.S.
was negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas479.
When the U.S. became a defendant in the Methanex case the USTR began to change its
tune about the definition of minimum standard of treatment, and the USTR asserted that in the
early cases the NAFTA tribunal panels had adopted too expansive interpretations of this
provision. The USTR and State Department believed that the language “fair and equitable
treatment” was limited to the norms that have been “crystallized” in international law through

Inside U.S. Trade. “U.S. Cites NAFTA Party Agreement to Limit Investor-State Disputes.”
May 18, 2001.
479
Inside U.S. Trade. “Zoellick Cool to Restrictions on Investor-State Disputes.” April 4, 2001.
478
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repeated decisions over centuries480. In contrast, Methanex and other companies argued that fair
and equitable treatment was a “free standing commitment” in addition to the obligation to
provide treatment according to other trade and investment laws, such as WTO obligations481.
After the launch of Methanex v. United States, USTR Zoellick favored issuing the FTC
Interpretation of the treatment provision scaling back investor rights on this provision.
Regardless of the FTC Interpretation, the tribunal dismissed Methanex’s claims in 2004.
The 2001 FTC Interpretation clarified two minimum standard of treatment provisions,
firstly, it limited the absolute minimum standard of treatment for investments to “customary”
international law, and secondly, it asserted that a breach of another NAFTA article or a different
international agreement (such as the WTO) did not constitute a breach of the NAFTA. By
inserting the word “customary” into the treatment provision, the FTC referred to “uniform,
extensive and representative State practice” (ABA 2010). In so doing, the 2001 FTC
Interpretation established a narrower minimum standard of treatment afforded to investments
thereby scaling back investor rights to bring claims against states.

480
481

Ibd
Ibd
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Annexes
Annex One
“Fast-track” and the process of developing of the USTR’s negotiating objectives in the NAFTA
The U.S. Constitution assigns to Congress the authority to “regulate commerce with
foreign nations” and “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.”482 Simultaneously, the
Constitution transfers to the President broad authority of foreign affairs and the exclusive
authority to negotiate treaties and international agreements.483 The President appoints the USTR,
and the USTR centralizes government policy-making on trade and negotiates international trade
and investment.484 In so doing, both the executive and congressional authorities develop and
execute U.S. trade and investment agreements.
Fast-track was created by the Trade Act of 1974 and it was designed as a solution the
“unwillingness” of trade partners to negotiate due to special interests “inherent” in U.S. trade
policy making (cited in Fergusson 2015). Trade partners called upon Congress to not reopen any
negotiated provisions and consider trade agreements within a “definite time-frame” (cited in
Fergusson 2015). Fast-track was the solution and it mandated Congress to “suspend its ordinary
legislative procedures” and vote a trade agreement “up or down” with limited debate and no
amendments. In addition, “fast-track” legislation also contained Congress’ negotiating objectives
for the President, among other checks on the Executive including consultations with
Congressional committees.
Fast-track procedures are as follows: the President submits a trade agreement for fasttrack authority, Congress has 60 or 90 legislative days to review the proposal and either approve
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U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8
U.S. Constitution, Article II
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Trade Act of 1974, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979
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or disapprove fast-track for the trade agreement. Upon approval of fast-track, during negotiations
the USTR must consult the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, as each joint committee of the Congress “has
jurisdiction over legislation involving subject matters which would be affected by the trade
agreement.”485 The consultations include: the nature, purposes, policies, and objectives of the
agreement and all matters relating to its implementation.486 In addition, the USTR consults
closely with U.S. business and business groups, “since an agreement not acceptable to the broad
spectrum of American business is doomed to failure.”487 Beginning with the NAFTA, the USTR
would hold stakeholder consultations with non-governmental organizations, including labor
unions and environmental groups, who also influence votes in Congress. Lastly, after
negotiations are concluded, the President must submit the agreement to Congress for final
approval on an “up or down” vote. In sum, the fast-track mechanism provides Congress with: the
authority to mandate negotiating objectives; consultations between the USTR and Congress; and
Congress’ authority over final implementation. In so doing, fast-track grants Congress the
authority to influence the outcome of negotiations while the negotiations are within the domain
of the Executive.
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Trade Act of 1974
Ibid
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James Baker, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
testimony U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 1990. “United States-Mexico Free
Trade Agreement : hearings before the Committee on Finance”, One Hundred Second Congress,
first session, February 6 and 20, 1991.
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Figure Nine: Organizational inputs into USTR’s objectives during NAFTA negotiations
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Negotiating process and structure in the NAFTA
As mandated by the 1974 Trade Act and the 1988 Omnibus Act, the USTR centralized trade
policy and negotiations by coordinating with different governmental agencies to determine trade
policy, including the State Department, Treasury, Department of Commerce, Agriculture, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and other governmental agencies. Therefore, the USTR had
members from different governmental agencies. In turn, the USTR had a number of interfaces
with the private sector and state governments via the advisory committee system, established by
the 1974 Trade Act, which mandated that the USTR “adequately reflect U.S. public and private
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sector interests.”488 The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations reflects private
sector interests, composed of 45 advisors representing business, industry, and agriculture, and
these members were appointed by the President but recommended for appointment but the
USTR. 489 The Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee provided policy advice on trade
matters with significance to state and local governments, and other advisory committees included
agriculture, labor, and the environment. In addition, the USTR regularly consulted policy and
negotiations with business lobbies and relevant Congressional committees.

“Advisory Committees”, Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed 2014,
(available: https://ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-committees)
489
“Charter of the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations”, Office of the United
States Trade Representative.
488
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Annex Two
Do U.S. BIT provisions stimulate FDI inflows to developing countries?
The effects of U.S. BIT provisions on capital and FDI flows have been studied and
debated since the U.S. BIT program began, and the results are very mixed. Some studies
demonstrate that U.S. BITs lead to higher FDI inflows while other studies argue that U.S. BITs
have no effect on FDI flows. Economists Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) and Buthe and Milner
(2009) both determined that BITs attract FDI inflows to developing countries particularly when
the developing country contracts with an OECD country. Moreover, Salacuse and Sullivan
(2005) found that the U.S. BITs have a greater effect in attracting FDI to developing countries
than the BITs of other OECD countries, in particular in attracting U.S. FDI. To the contrary, a
1998 UNCTAD study, one of the first to evaluate the relationship, concluded that “…BITs did
not play a primary role in increasing FDI, and that a larger number of BITs ratified by a host
country would not necessarily lead to higher FDI inflows” (cited in Sachs and Sauvant 2009: 21).
Economist Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Yackee (2007) also found little support that BITs
impact FDI flows. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) found that “…rather than encouraging more FDI
flows in riskier environments, BITs only have a positive effect on FDI flows in countries with an
already stable business environment and reasonably strong domestic institutions" (cited in Sachs
and Sauvant 2009: 21).
The U.S. BIT experience in Africa also casts serious doubt on the relationship between
U.S. BITs and FDI. In 2011, only six490 of the forty-eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
accounted for 96.4 percent of total U.S. FDI in the region and none had entered into a BIT with
the U.S. (Ofodile 2011: 5). The clear lack of correlation between BITs and FDI in Africa was
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frankly stated by President Clinton in two different letters to the Senate for the ratification of
BITs with Ecuador and Mozambique, “It is the U.S. policy…to advise potential treaty partners
during BIT negotiations that conclusion of such a treaty does not necessarily result in increase in
private U.S. investment flows.”491
FDI is motivated by a range of factors and BITs are only one of those variables. Any
analysis of the relationship between BITs and FDI must be done on a case-by-case basis as
situational independent and intervening variables clearly must also be considered. Therefore, any
conclusions based on the economic and social performance of the NAFTA Investment Chapter
are not readily generalizable to other TPP members.
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Letter Of Submittal from U.S. President Clinton to U.S. Senate regarding Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Republic of Mozambique Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S. Department of State (May 1, 2000).
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Annex Three
Mexico’s pre-NAFTA trade and investment liberalizations
The NAFTA likely had little impact on inward FDI to Canada and the U.S. because both
countries were already open to investment and with strong investor rights. However, for Mexico
the NAFTA and pre-NAFTA investment liberalizations were a stark departure from Mexico’s
import substitution industrialization strategy during the Cold War. In 1993, Mexico’s inward
stock of FDI was just $52 billion, about 7 percent of GDP. By 2012, the stock reached $315
billion, some 27 percent of GDP (Hufbauer et. al. 2014). However, it is difficult to separate the
effects of NAFTA from Mexico’s pre-NAFTA investment liberalizations on inward FDI to
Mexico.
The U.S.-Mexico trade and investment relationship has international attention as the U.S.
is the top capital-exporting developed country and Mexico has been among the top two capitalimporting developing countries in the hemisphere (Brazil is the other), and they share a large
border. Until the early 1980s, Mexico had far reaching restrictions on foreign investment as
Mexico pursued import-substitution industrialization. Following the Mexican debt crisis in the
early 1980s, which left Mexico in need of dollars to pay its debt, Mexico began to liberalize
foreign investment measures beginning by reforming the maquiladora program in 1983 by
relaxing controls on foreign investment for the Mexican border region.
Maquiladoras are production plants on the Mexican side of the U.S. border that export
goods assembled with imported inputs. Maquiladoras are generally foreign firms that perform
the assembly stage of production of goods using low-wage (typically female) Mexican labor and
relaxed environmental standards. From the perspective of Mexican policymakers, the
maquiladora program served two purposes, “Mexico needed the employment, the U.S.
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companies in particular needed industrial-competitiveness as U.S. –produced labor-intensive
products were no longer price competitive in the U.S. market” (Hadjimarcou et. al. 2013: 208).
In the 1980s, a series of currency devaluations helped to strengthen the attractiveness of the
maquiladora program to U.S. FDI, and in turn, even as wages ranged between $0.60 and $0.70
cents an hour it was 40 percent higher than the average stipend (Hadjimarcou et. al. 2013: 209).
In 1989, the Salinas administration generalized maquiladora-type investment liberalization to the
other Mexican states and broadened the law to include other capital flows. From the Mexican
perspective, the NAFTA generalized the maquiladora model, and for this reason it is empirically
difficult to isolate the effects of NAFTA on U.S. FDI to Mexico.
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Annex Four
Effects on U.S. Labor and Jobs, Claims of NAFTA Proponents and Opponents
Claims of NAFTA Proponents
NAFTA proponents at the Peterson Institute for International Economics find that since
NAFTA’s implementation in 1994, trade with Mexico produces net gains for U.S. citizens
despite a relatively small net job loss (Hufbauer et. al. 2014). Economists Gary Clyde Hufbauer
et. al. (2014) estimate that from 2009 to 2011, over 4 million people in the U.S. become
involuntarily unemployed each year and 203,000 of those workers (about 5 percent) lost their
jobs due to trade with Mexico (2014: 11). However, based on U.S. exports to Mexico from 2009
to 2013, in each year 188,000 workers gained new jobs that are supported by trade with Mexico,
and those new manufacturing jobs for export pay better than the lost import-competing jobs
(Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 13). Therefore, by arithmetic of jobs lost minus jobs gained, from 2009 to
2013, the U.S. net job loss by trade with Mexico was roughly 15,000 annually, which is nearly
“imperceptible” within the context of far greater job losses associated with the broader trends of
the U.S. economy (Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 13).
Despite the small net job loss from trade with Mexico, Hufbauer et. al. cite economist
Robert Z. Lawerence who found that in 2008, for each net U.S. job loss to trade with China the
US economy gained about $900,000 via enhanced productivity and lower prices in goods and
services (2014: 13). Hufbauer et. al. estimate by these same calculations, from 2009 to 2013, for
each net job lost to Mexico the US economy gained “several hundred thousand dollars” (2014:
13). To that end, Hufbauer et. al. do not find any correlation between the U.S. trade deficit and
the unemployment rate.
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Figure Ten: No correlation between U.S. trade deficit and official unemployment rate (from
Hufbauer et. al. 2014)

To the support of NAFTA proponents, Autor et al. (2013) found that while U.S. imports
from China have exerted “a modest negative effect” on U.S. wages in manufacturing, imports
from Mexico had no significant effect on US wages in the manufacturing sector (cited in
(Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 17). These findings were supported by studies from McLaren and
Hakobyan (2010), Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), and Edwards and Lawrence (2013). Based
on this literature review, Hufbauer et. al. concluded that import competition from Mexico has not
suppressed wage growth over the past two decades (2014: 17). The takeaway conclusion from
Hufbauer et. al. (2014) is that since NAFTA, trade with Mexico has produced net benefits to the
U.S. economy but with uneven distribution, whether or not the winners compensate the losers is
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a political question (usually addressed by debates in Congress over the Trade Adjustment
Assistance program which provides support for workers displaced by international trade).
Similarly, economists Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski conclude that U.S.
TNCs that have offshored to Mexico have become more competitive globally and in turn they
have increased their investment and employment at home in the U.S. (2014). Moran and
Oldenski analyzed confidential firm-level data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis on the
international activities of US-owned MNCs between the years 1990 and 2009. Moran and
Oldenski reported,
“…expansion in Mexico by a [US-based MNC] is associated with
domestic U.S. expansion by the same firm…These results are consistent with the
complementarities that we found using all countries in which U.S. firms invest.
U.S. firms that have greater sales, hire more workers, spend more on R&D, export
more goods, and invest more capital in Mexico also have greater sales, hire more
workers, spend more on R&D, export more goods, and invest more capital in the
United States. So the overall message is that greater investment in Mexico by U.S.
firms benefits both countries” (2014: 40).
By these results, outward FDI helps U.S. firms to become more globally competitive
which in turn expands their domestic operations and employment in the U.S. due to their
increased dynamism. Responding to United Auto Workers’ demands for cessation to offshoring
to Mexico, Moran and Oldsenski contest that offshoring to Mexico benefits U.S. workers
inasmuch as it facilitates the globally competitive position of the firm, “…the competitive fate of
UAW workers at Ford’s US assembly facilities actually depends on NAFTA” (2014: 41).
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Claims of NAFTA opponents
In direct opposition to research from the Peterson Institute for International Economics,
U.S. public interest group Public Citizen argued that NAFTA has contributed to U.S.
unemployment and income inequality (2014). In their own report on the twenty year legacy of
NAFTA, they cite an estimate from the Economic Policy Institute that since NAFTA, the U.Strade deficit to Mexico and Canada produced a net job loss of one million by 2004, and one third
of those jobs were in the service sector which lost business due to closed manufacturing plants
(2014: 8). However, between NAFTA’s implementation in 1994 and 2010, U.S. trade with
Mexico caused a net loss of 700,000 jobs, a figure reduced from 2004. Public Citizen is clear
that, “Much of the job erosion stems from the decisions of U.S. firms to embrace NAFTA’s new
foreign investor privileges and relocate production to Mexico to take advantage of its lower
wages and weaker environmental standards” (2014: 8).
NAFTA opponents, as expressed in the Public Citizen (2014) report, argue that the treaty
has reduced wages and undermined unions inasmuch as it enabled firms to threaten workers with
offshoring during wage bargaining sessions. A Cornell University study commissioned by the
NAFTA Labor Commission found that since NAFTA, as many as 62 percent of U.S. union
drives faced employer threats to relocate abroad, and the factory shut-down rate following
successful union certifications tripled (cited in “Public Citizen” 2014: 11). The report found that
companies made explicit threats to relocate to Mexico in more than 10 percent of the cases, and
in other cases there were implicit threats, such as “given NAFTA we may need to reconsider our
options,” or handing out statistics to workers on the wage differentials between U.S. and
Mexican autoworkers (cited in Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 17). The study concluded, “NAFTA
created a climate that has emboldened employers to more aggressively threaten to close, or
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actually close their plants to avoid unionization” (cited in Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 17). In addition,
the AFL-CIO claimed that loss of bargaining power not only undermined wages and hours but
also work conditions including health and safety standards (AFL-CIO 1999).
Public Citizen argues that the NAFTA has produced negative welfare effects because
workers who have lost their jobs due to trade and have found new employment will typically find
said new employment in lower-paying jobs. Further, the wage losses from workers taking lowerpaying jobs have been greater than gains in lower prices by cheaper imports. Since NAFTA, two
out of every five displaced manufacturing workers who were rehired experienced an annual
wage loss of an average of $10,000, and by 2012 that figure had increased to two out of every
three workers (2014: 10). Lastly, these wage losses have been far greater than price gains from
NAFTA imports. The Center for Economic and Policy Research calculated that U.S. workers
without college degrees (63 percent of the workforce) have likely lost an amount equal to 12.2
percent of their wages under NAFTA-style trade even after accounting for the benefits of
cheaper goods (a net loss of more than $3,300 per year for a worker earning the median annual
wage of $27,500.67) (2014: 12). This welfare loss has contributed to income inequality inasmuch
as the average U.S. wage has grown less than one percent annually in real terms while worker
productivity has risen at more than three times that pace.
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Figure Eleven: U.S. labor force participation rate vs. trade balance
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Annex Five: Inputs into the development of the United States Trade Representative’s negotiating
objectives in the TPP
Figure Twelve: Organizational inputs into USTR’s objectives during TPP negotiations
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The battle for trade promotion authority (TPA, formerly “fast-track”)
The USTR sought to finish the TPP by the end of 2013, and during summer of that year
Obama publically requested TPA from Congress, although many in Congress were skeptical of
the administration’s commitment.492 As the relevant Congressional committees began the
process of drafting TPA legislation, Congress members from both parties warned the
administration that it would “take all hands on deck” to win TPA in a hostile Congress.493 Led by
Ranking Rep. Sander Levin, some House Democrats drafted an alternative TPA bill which
introduced substantive reforms to trade and investment policy and the bill had the support of the

“Obama Asks For Fast-Track Authority, Froman Defers To Congress On Bill,” Inside U.S.
Trade, August 2, 2013.
493
“TPP Caucus Seeks Meeting To Press Obama For Strong Role On TPP, TPA,” Inside U.S.
Trade, December 6, 2013.
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majority of House Democrats.494 Simultaneously, the majority of House Democrats and a bloc of
Republicans announced their opposition to the current TPA while a coalition of labor,
environmental, and public interest groups charged that the TPP is a repeat of past “failed” FTAs
and pledged to lobby Congress members to oppose TPA, among other goals.495
It was not until fall of 2014 that the administration went into full gear to pursue to the
TPA. In an essay published in Foreign Affairs, USTR Froman announced that TPP negotiations
had reached the stage in which TPA was necessary to conclude the TPP, “[B]y ensuring that
Congress will consider trade agreements as they have been negotiated by the executive branch,
[TPA] would give U.S. trading partners the necessary confidence to put their best and final offers
on the table.”496 However, winning the necessary Congressional votes for TPA was complicated
by a catch-twenty two - the White House could not get TPA without showing Congress the text
of the TPP, and the White House could not show Congress the TPP text without getting TPA to
finalize the negotiations.497 The debate was further compounded by the release of the State
Department’s annual human rights report which found grave instances of human rights abuses
ranging from slavery to pervasive sex trafficking in TPP members Vietnam, Brunei, and
especially Malaysia.498 The TPA contained an amendment that forbade the U.S. to enter FTAs

“TPP Issue Analysis: Investment Chapter,” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Ways & Means, Minority Staff Report, 114th Congress, November 30, 2015.
495
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Trade, May 1, 2015.
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with any country in the most egregious category of human trafficking, however, the problem was
eventually resolved when the State Department issued a revision upgrading Malaysia’s status.
In May and June of 2014, the TPA failed its original votes in the House and Senate as
many Congressional Democrats were demanding a renewal of Trade Adjustment Assistance and
measures against currency manipulation as the price for their support for TPA.499 Trade
Adjustment Assistance coordinates federal programs aimed at reducing the impact of import
competition as a result of trade and investment agreements. Beginning in 2015, the AFL-CIO in
tandem with other unions froze all campaign contributions to pressure Congress members to
oppose TPA while growing conservative opposition to U.S. trade policy led to new political
alliances across party lines. Minority House Leader Nancy Pelosi announced her opposition to
the legislation because House Democrats felt as though they did not have enough input into the
TPA. Political trade-offs were made in favor of a stronger Trade Adjustment Assistance while
major industry groups stepped up lobbying efforts to win the necessary Congressional votes.
Research by Maplight, a research organization that specializes in measuring campaign
contributions, found that industry groups gave 8.6 times more money ($197.9 million) to House
Representatives who voted in favor of TPA than to those who opposed the legislation ($23.1
million).500 By the end of June, 2015, the TPA had been reintroduced to both the House and
Senate where it narrowly passed and the President signed it into law in July. TPA passage

“Froman Sees TPP Deal in 2015; Kind Says White House Linking TPA, TAA”, Inside U.S.
Trade, December 5, 2014.
500
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499

305

enabled the conclusion of TPP negotiations in October and the final text of the agreement was
made public in November.
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Annex Six:
Negotiations in market access for FDI and financial services FDI
2010:
As Malaysia applied for membership in the TPP, it had to address the issues that led to
the collapse of negotiations in the U.S.-Malaysia FTA in 2007, and the most painful of these
issues were in the financial services sector where Malaysia heavily restricted foreign investment.
In Malaysia, foreign investment in a range of sectors had been roughly capped at 30 percent, and
in financial services industries caps were much higher if not entirely restricted.501 In Malaysia’s
domestic reforms, Malay policymakers addressed affirmative action regulations requiring
employment of ethnic Malays, requirements to enter into joint ventures with Malaysian
companies, and technology transfers.502 In financial services, Malaysia increased the amount of
equity a foreign investors could own in a financial services companies from 49 percent to 70
percent.503 A USTR spokesperson responded that Malaysia’s unilateral reforms in financial
services were a “good initial step” as Malaysia considered TPP membership.504 To join the TPP,
the Malaysian government had to overcome resistance from its independent central bank which
was “wary” of financial services liberalization as a boon to foreigners and potential financial
instability.505

2011:

“Senior Malaysian Officials Signal Strong Interest In TPP Participation,” Inside U.S. Trade,
Vol. 28, No. 15, April 16, 2010.
502
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503
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505
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Vol. 28, No. 38, October 1, 2010.
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While labor and skeptical Democrats warned of offshoring of jobs, the business
community insisted on the deepest market access for FDI as possible, especially the financial
services lobbies. Since the inception of the TPP, as all countries agreed to seek a “high-standard”
outcome, countries negotiated market access on a “negative list” basis, in which all sectors are
opened and exceptions are negotiated.506 In March, 2011, negotiators exchanged their initial
offers on market access in investment and financial services.507 Negotiators in investment and
services negotiated their countries’ sectoral exceptions to TPP obligations as a group.508
Singapore had tabled a rollback of market access from the U.S.-Singapore FTA, to which the
USTR responded that it was a “non-starter.” Vietnam had never signed a U.S.-style FTA and was
not prepared to offer deep market access and they were the last to make market access offers,
which slowed the negotiations. In his December Congressional testimony, a leader of The U.S.
Business Coalition for TPP demanded, “Singapore and Vietnam must open their financial
markets.”509

2012:
Major U.S. financial services lobbies penned two open letters to the USTR in 2012. The
first urged the USTR, “As the 13th negotiating round in San Diego approaches, we are
concerned that a final TPP financial services chapter may fail to meet the high-standards
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established by past FTAs, including full market access, national treatment, and a clear and
enforceable commitment to permit cross-border data transfer and processing.”510 The financial
services lobbies outlined bullet point market access and regulatory demands of each TPP
member, in addition to expanding core investor protections from the investment chapter to
financial services investors (in past U.S. FTAs, ISDS only applied to “most favored nation” and
“national treatment” for the financial services sector).511 Conversely, the ASEAN countries in the
TPP (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Vietnam) were particularly resistant to U.S. market
access in financial services.512 In 2009, Malaysia had increased the cap on foreign ownership in
the banking and financial sector but would not go further. In response, U.S. negotiators took the
position that opening their service sectors was in their own best interest while U.S. financial
services lobbies pressed Malaysia for an elimination of caps on FDI in financial services.513 For
Vietnam, USTR officials had been helping their Vietnamese counterparts to structure Vietnam’s
offer on market access in services and investment such that it only addresses Vietnam’s “discrete
interests.”514
The second letter from financial services lobbies was to issue a “strong support” for the
inclusion of Mexico, Canada, and Japan in the TPP, provided that each country worked to further
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the objectives of the financial services lobbies.515 In the case of Japan, a major sticking point in
bilateral consultations between Japan and the U.S. was competition policy with the state-owned
banking and insurance entity, Japan Post. In 2012, Japan had issued new legislation that would
allow Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance to issue new financial products with less
regulatory hurdles than a foreign owned bank or insurance company. U.S. industry and the
USTR responded that it was a step back from moving toward the high-standards of the TPP and
for Japan to join the TPP then Japan would need to address the USTR’s “…serious and longstanding level playing field concerns with respect to Japan Post in the insurance, banking and
express delivery sectors.”516
Moreover, the financial services lobby was calling for a ban on regulations that would
require financial institutions to store financial data within a country’s borders, and they described
it as an “essential” provision of any trade deal.517 Indeed, the USTR had insisted on an “ecommerce” chapter in the TPP and binding obligations that would require MNCs to establish or
use local service providers. In 2011, the largest U.S. services MNCs, ranging from Silicon
Valley to global banks, drafted a position paper on the issue for presentation to APEC. 518 A
senior vice president at global bank Citigroup explained that developing countries were
beginning to implement data localization requirements as a means to boost domestic
employment, technology transfer, or foreign investment.519
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2013:
The leaked notes from the anonymous Chief Negotiator revealed that the U.S. was trying
to limit the scope of general exceptions to the investment chapter, thereby creating greater
market access for FDI. The U.S. proposal, which was supported by Australia and New Zealand,
was to limit the sectoral carve-outs from the obligations of the investment chapter to only
specific provisions, notably, “national treatment” and “most favored nation.”520 The counter
proposal, which was supported by Chile, Japan, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, would have
entirely carved-out economic sectors or industries from the all of the obligations of the
investment chapter, not just specific provisions, which would limit market access.521

2014:
By 2014, negotiations in investment and financial services had largely been concluded in
the area of investor rights and technical rules and the focus of the talks shifted to market access
and general exceptions to market access. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Japan were the countries that
did not have a previous FTA in place with the U.S. and they continued to have the most
contentious market access proposals relative to the demands of the USTR and U.S. business
groups, who sought an agreement with the highest commercial value possible. By mid-year,
according to a U.S. business lobbyist, Vietnam, Malaysia and Japan proposed a broad exception
that would exempt all new services that are developed in the future from the TPP investment
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521
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chapter and other rules.522 As market access commitments were on a “negative list” basis, in
which all sectors are on the table and countries negotiate exceptions, the proposal would
undermine the “negative list” format which was unacceptable for the USTR and U.S. business
groups. Moreover, Vietnam and Malaysia sought to ban investment on entire sectors which was
rejected by the USTR as a basis for negotiations.523 Their resistance was particularly strong
towards FDI in the financial services sector, where each country had highly protected and
regulated banking and financial industries.

2015:
Data localization requirements
Since at least 2012, the U.S. financial services industry had lobbied the USTR for a ban
on any regulations that would require multinational financial institutions to store its client data
on local data servers.524 By summer 2015, U.S. financial institutions learned that the TPP did not
include this provision, motivating a lobbying effort to change the TPP text while setting
precedent for future agreements. At the crucial moment in which the Obama administration was
trying to gather industry support for the TPP, the major financial services lobbies chose to
withhold their support for the TPP until the administration addressed the issue (in addition to a
market access restraint in Malaysia, discussed below).525 In response, officials from the Treasury,
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the State Department, and the USTR met with representatives of the industry to determine the
type of assurances the industry was seeking.526 The meeting revealed that the Obama
administration had an inter-agency dispute over the issue. The Treasury Department, with the
support of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Communications Commission, had opposed the
provision during negotiations because they wanted to maintain access to banking and other
financial data for regulatory purposes.527 However, the USTR advocated for the provision on
behalf of financial industries, arguing that without the provision U.S. firms would be at a
competitive disadvantage in the region. Since the TPP was already concluded and the negotiators
had agreed not to reopen the text, the issue could not be resolved in the TPP. As a compromise
with the financial industry, the Treasury drafted language to include in future FTAs and BITs
that would address the issue and the industries realigned themselves to support the TPP.528

Market access for FDI
As the conclusion of negotiations neared the market access talks became increasingly
“heated,” particularly as some ASEAN countries were seeking broad sectoral exceptions or
carve-outs and especially in financial services.529 The most problematic market access exception
was that Malaysia had secured the right to block inward FDI in the financial services sector if
Malaysian authorities determined that such investment was not in the “national interest.”530 In
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response, U.S. financial services industries and a handful of supportive Congress members
withheld their support for the TPP, arguing that Malaysia’s investment screening in financial
services is “highly subjective” and “perpetuates discrimination” while setting bad precedent for
future negotiations.531 Other countries (Australia, Canada, Mexico, and New Zealand) also
retained investment screens although not specific to the financial services sector, however,
according to U.S. industry groups, “U.S. negotiators were successful in mitigating the potential
impact of these screens.”532 The USTR successfully increased the monetary threshold and/or
scope of investment screening in Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand (notably,
Canada’s threshold was significantly increased over the current NAFTA threshold).533 U.S.
industry groups advised the USTR that TPP market access talks should be a minimum baseline
for future market access negotiations, “If new countries express interest in acceding to TPP, their
offers must improve on the existing TPP provisions and not replicate the barriers described
above.”534 The USTR concurred and industry moved to support the TPP.
The long, thorny list of sectoral exceptions to TPP investment obligations mostly affected
U.S. multinational services firms. In many services sectors, including accounting, engineering,
audiovisual services, and energy services, countries generally matched their TPP market access
commitments to their WTO obligations in an unproblematic way.535 However, in other sectors,

531

Ibid.
“Report of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries,”
December 3, 2015, Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries
(ITAC 10), Advisory Committee Report to the President, the Congress and the United States
Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement (TPP).
533
Ibid.
534
“Report of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries,”
December 3, 2015, Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries
(ITAC 10), Advisory Committee Report to the President, the Congress and the United States
Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement (TPP).
535
Ibid.
532

314

U.S. services corporations took issue with restrictive market access commitments, including
healthcare services (Vietnam, Singapore, Mexico); legal services (Brunei, Chile, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Vietnam); and financial services which were the most complex and were
contained in a separate annex. Countries took a range of exceptions to the financial services
chapter, including, foreign ownership limitations and restrictions in operations when
incorporated in a certain form (Canada, Vietnam); branching restrictions or requirements
(Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam); subsidies and other advantages for local entities
(Brunei, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore); “arbitrary” nationality or citizenship
requirements for employees and personnel (Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico,
Singapore).536 Moreover, according to the U.S. financial services industry, some TPP members
did not improve upon commitments from existing FTAs with the U.S. (Singapore, Chile), while
other TPP members made “low quality” offers (Vietnam, Malaysia).537 In the banking and
insurance sectors in Japan, Japan and the U.S. came to a bilateral agreement codified in a side
letter to the TPP that Japan’s state-owned enterprise in banking and insurance, Japan Post, would
open its sales network to foreign investors.538 Malaysia successfully secured broad carve-outs for
their “Bumiputra policies” which provide preferential treatment to businesses owned by ethnic
Malays in areas like services and government procurement.539
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